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Abstract 
 The proposition of this thesis is to explore a key concept in archival theory 
and practice, namely the value of archives. The underlying principle is that by 
drawing upon ideas from outside of the archival discipline – from axiology – this 
concept can be examined in an innovative and reflective manner. The evaluation of 
archives is a core activity for archivists. Archivists make value judgements when 
they decide what to keep and what to destroy, and in how they choose to arrange and 
describe archives. However, although the term ‘value’ appears frequently in the 
professional archival literature, often linked with other qualifying terms, including 
‘historical’, ‘evidential’, ‘legal’ and ‘informational’, these terms are contested, often 
ill-defined, and frequently misleading. This thesis critically examines the theoretical 
concepts behind such terms and their use within the archival profession.  
The application of Theory Derivation methodology, which employs analogy 
or metaphor to transpose and redefine a concept or theory from one context to 
another, enables the author to find new insight and explanations for archival value 
from the field of axiology (the study of value and value judgements). This thesis 
explores questions about what sort of property or characteristic of an object gives it 
value, whether having value is an objective or a subjective matter, and whether value 
can be measured. Philosophical concepts of value, in particular concepts of intrinsic 
value – as exemplified in the work of G. E. Moore (1873-1958) – are explored. The 
re-interpretation of key tenets of archival theory, including appraisal, provenance and 
respect des fonds, through the particular framework of Moore’s Principle of organic 
unities will demonstrate that the concept of value has a wider resonance in the 
archival field than has been previously considered.  
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Selection, like management, is not an exact science; if it were then the 
archivist might have exact criteria and theorems to guide him. Nor is 
selection solely an art. It can be argued as more of an art than a 
science, but it is preferable to consider selection as a craft, practiced 
to achieve certain ends with suitable criteria or guidelines to meet 
these ends.1  
 
 
 
 
 
The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly in 
passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel 
quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection 
and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we started 
from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a 
sort of shadow.2  
 
  
                                                 
1 Helen H. Harrison and Rolf F. Schuursma, The Archival Appraisal of Sound Recordings and Related 
Materials. A RAMP Study with Guidelines (Paris: General Information Programme and UNISIST, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 1987), 27. 
2 Bertrand Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, The Monist, 28.4 (1918), 495-527, (497-8). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Chapter summary 
 The proposition of this thesis is to explore a key concept in archival theory 
and practice, namely the value of archives. The underlying principle is that by 
drawing upon ideas from outside of the archival discipline – from axiology – this 
concept can be examined in an innovative and reflective manner. Ideas about the 
value of archives underpin archival theories about appraisal, arrangement and 
description; they also inform wider perceptions about the importance of 
recordkeeping and the significance of a society’s culture. 
This chapter introduces the main themes of this study and details the rationale 
behind it. The importance of theory to inform practice is outlined, followed by an 
explication of the research questions of the study. This chapter also presents an 
analysis of differing views about archives and records terminology as exemplified in 
the Life Cycle and Records Continuum approaches to recordkeeping, as well as an 
overview of developments in archival theory, which have been in response to its 
problematizing by postmodernism and technological developments. This chapter 
describes the methodological approach and literature review undertaken by the 
author, and concludes with a summary of the remaining chapters of the thesis.  
1.2. Justification of topic 
The evaluation of archives is a core activity for archivists. Archivists make 
value judgements when they decide what records to keep and what to destroy, and in 
how they choose to arrange and catalogue those records. These judgements, or 
evaluations, lie at the very heart of what archivists do; the attribution of value upon 
archives determines, to a very large extent, their survival and facilitates their access 
for future generations. Unsurprisingly, therefore, within the professional archival 
literature can be found a proliferation of usage of the term ‘value’.3 The word is 
often linked with other qualifying terms, including ‘historical’, ‘legal’, ‘evidential’ 
and ‘informational’. However, meanings for all of these terms remain at best ill-
defined and, at worse, confusing. Few writers critically examine the theoretical 
                                                 
3 Geoffrey Yeo, ‘”Nothing Is The Same As Something Else”: Significant Properties and Notions of 
Identity and Originality’, AS, 10.2 (2010), 85-116, (100). 
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concepts behind such terms and their use within the archival profession. To give one 
example, in the 1950s, American archivist, William D. McCain, recognized that 
archivists have a ‘blind spot’ when it comes to thinking about the value of records.4 
McCain added that it is seen as a waste of time to debate the issue because they 
regard it as self-evident and elementary. He was one of the first archivists to publicly 
question what is meant by ‘historical value’, stating: ‘if we expect men to consider 
records of value because we say that they have “historical value”, we must have men 
who know what history is, why history is useful and that history is interesting’.5  
Studying one of the authoritative Glossaries available to archivists illustrates 
the problem: ‘value’ is defined in terms of records as ‘The usefulness, significance, 
or worth of something to an individual or organisation’, with a list of narrower terms 
as follows: ‘administrative value, archival value, artifactual value, associated value, 
continuing value, enduring value, ephemeral value, evidential value, fair market 
value, fiscal value, historical value, informational value, intrinsic value, legal value, 
monetary value, operational value, permanent value, primary value, secondary 
value’.6 Each of these so-called ‘narrower’ terms has a separate entry in the 
Glossary; some are synonyms, others antonyms, and many are explained with further 
reference to other terms or definientia.7 For example, if the archivist looks up 
‘archival value’ she is told that synonyms include ‘permanent value, continuing 
value, enduring value, and, mostly outside the United States, indefinite value’; 
related terms include ‘primary value’ and ‘secondary value’; and the definition itself 
reads: ‘The ongoing usefulness or significance of records, based on the 
administrative, legal, fiscal, evidential, or historical information they contain, 
                                                 
4 William D. McCain, ‘The Value of Records’, Presidential Address read at the Annual Society of 
American Archivists’ Meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, 27 October 1952, published in AA, 16.1 
(1953), 3-12. 
5 Ibid., 7. Twenty years later, Maynard Brichford implored the American archival profession to 
undertake the same self-reflection as historians, stating ‘We know what the archivist does and how he 
does it but are only dimly aware of the rationale behind many of his activities’, Maynard Brichford, 
‘Historians and Mirrors: A Review Essay’, AA, 36.3 (1973), 397-402, (402). Later archivists have 
continued to comment on the lack of critical self-examination in the profession at large, notably, 
Terry Cook, ‘What is Past Is Prologue: A History of Archival Ideas Since 1898, and the Future of the 
Paradigm Shift’, Archivaria, 43 (1997), 17-63 and Richard J. Cox, ‘Professionalism and Archivists in 
the United States, AA, 49.3 (1986), 229-47, inter alia.  
6 Richard Pearce-Moses, ed., A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology (Chicago: SAA, 
2005), 398. Use of bold in the original. 
7 In linguistics, a definiens (pl. definientia) is a word used to define another word. Every definiens 
used here is a term whose meaning is already commonly understood, therefore one tends to arrive at a 
vague lexicon definition, leading to circularity and misinterpretation.  
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justifying their continued preservation’.8 To go a step further and try to identify the 
meaning of one of these explanatory terms, the archivist looks up ‘historical 
information’ but finds that this is not an entry in the Glossary; however, ‘historical 
value’ is, and it is defined as: ‘The importance or usefulness of records that justifies 
their continued preservation because of the enduring administrative, legal, fiscal, or 
evidential information they contain; archival value’.9 The lack of a clear distinction 
between ‘historical information’ and ‘historical value’ implies that the terms are used 
synonymously; ‘historical value’ is defined both in terms of, and contrasted with, the 
other types of value (administrative, legal, fiscal and evidential).10 Rather than 
clarifying the terminology, the Glossary thus adds further confusion as the archivist 
ends up in an infinite regress of definitions and is none the wiser as to what any of 
these concepts really mean.11 Not to mention the inconsistent use of other terms such 
as ‘usefulness’, ‘significance’, ‘quality’, ‘worth’ and ‘importance’ – none of which 
are further articulated in the Glossary. Another archivist has commented, ‘the terms 
“historical value”, “research value”, and “archival value” mean practically nothing, 
because in fact all three just add an adjective to the word “value” without in any way 
illuminating it’.12 The archival profession, whilst acknowledging the importance of 
conceptions of value within archival practice and theory, fails to explain coherently 
what such conceptions denote. 13  
The archival literature focuses on the concept of archival value in terms of 
archival appraisal; appraisal theory is therefore a natural starting point for this thesis. 
                                                 
8 Pearce-Moses, 29. 
9 Ibid., 192. 
10 As will be discussed in Chapter 2, this is especially problematic as some appraisal theories 
specifically draw a distinction between ‘information’ and ‘evidence’ as a basis for archival evaluation. 
11 The Glossary obfuscates further by pointing out that ‘historic’, meaning ‘significance’, should be 
distinguished from ‘historical’ which ‘implies nothing more than age’. Pearce-Moses, 191.  
12 Terry Eastwood, ‘How Goes It With Appraisal?’, Archivaria, 36 (1993), 111-21, (115). 
13 The problems of nomenclature have long been recognized by some writers, including Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson. Early attempts by the International Council on Archives to formulate a Lexicon of Archive 
Terminology in 1964 were furiously debated and questioned by some British archivists who accused 
the ICA of attempting to make the usage of certain terms ‘sound grander or a little more professional 
and technical than they are’ and of attempting to ‘normalize’ terminology, Archives, 7 (1965), 93, 58. 
More recently, the general difficulty of definitions has been explored by Geoffrey Yeo, ‘Concepts of 
Record (1): Evidence, Information, and Persistent Representations’, AA, 70.2 (2007), 315-43 and 
‘Rising to the level of a record? Some thoughts on records and documents’, Records Management 
Journal, 21.1 (2011), 8-27. See also Bjorn Lindh, ‘Accomplishing the Unfeasible: Defining and 
Describing Concepts in Archival Theory’, in The Principle of Provenance. Report from the First 
Stockholm Conference on Archival Theory and the Principle of Provenance 2-3 September 1993, ed. 
by Kerstin Abukhanfusa and Jan Sydbeck (Sweden: Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Riksarkivet 10, 
1993), 25-32.  
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Anne J. Gilliland has commented that appraisal ‘is one of the most prominent 
examples in the archival field of how conceptual frameworks can and should both 
inform and develop out of practice’.14 Yet, perhaps reflecting a continuing 
dichotomy between theory and practice within the professional archival community, 
many articles that discuss value tend to do so within the limited practical concerns of 
appraisal programmes with a focus on processes and operational models.15 If theory 
appears at all, it is usually in the form of an unquestioning quotation from the 
writings of archival luminaries such as Sir Hilary Jenkinson (1882-1961) or 
Theodore R. Schellenberg (1903-1970). The practice of archival appraisal varies 
greatly from institution to institution and can often vary between individual 
archivists at a single institution. There is a whole range of possible appraisal 
methodologies to choose from, including Jenkinsonian Integrity of the Evidence 
Approach, Schellenberg’s Informational and Evidential Model, Functional Analysis, 
Documentation Strategy, Content Analysis, Macro-appraisal, Use Analysis and The 
Minnesota Method.16 Each methodology is underpinned by a different theoretical 
approach, or at least, a different interpretation of the particular theoretical approach, 
to archives. These various approaches have resulted from attempts to deal with the 
challenges of archival appraisal, notably concerns from the mid-twentieth century 
about the sheer volume of modern records and, into the twenty-first century, 
trepidation about the advent of digital records. This thesis will not detail the various 
                                                 
14 Anne J. Gilliland, ‘Archival appraisal: practicing on shifting sands’, in Archives and 
Recordkeeping: Theory into Practice, ed. by Caroline Brown (London: Facet Publishing, 2014), 31-
62, (43). 
15 For example, Margaret J. Dixon, ‘Beyond Sampling: Returning to Macroappraisal for the Appraisal 
and Selection of Case Files’, AS, 5 (2005), 285-313; Catherine A. Bailey, ‘Turning Macro-appraisal 
decisions into Archival Holdings: Crafting Function-based Terms and Conditions for the Transfer for 
Archival Records’, Archivaria, 61 (2006), 147-179; Doris J. Malkmus, Documentation Strategy: 
Mastodon or Retro-Success?’, AA, 71.2 (2008), 384-409; Courtney C. Mumma, Glenn Dingwall and 
Sue Bigelow, ‘A First Look at the Acquisition and Appraisal of the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic 
Winter Games Fond: or, SELECT * FROM VANOC_Records AS Archives WHERE Value = “true”’, 
Archivaria, 72 (2011), 93-122.  
16 Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (London: Lund Humphries, 1937); 
Theodore R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 
1956); Helen Willa Samuels, Varsity Letters: Documenting Modern Colleges and Universities 
(Lanham, MD: Society of American Archivists and Scarecrow Press, 1998); Helen Willa Samuels, 
‘Who Controls the Past’, AA, 49.2 (1986), 109-124; Gerald F. Ham, Selecting and Appraising 
Archives and Manuscripts (Chicago: SAA, 1993); Terry Cook, ‘Mind Over Matter: Towards a New 
Theory of Archival Appraisal’, in The Archival Imagination: Essays in Honour of Hugh A. Taylor, ed. 
by Barbara L. Craig (Ontario: Association of Canadian Archivists, 1992), 38-70; Mark A. Greene, 
‘”The Surest Proof”: A Utilitarian Approach to Appraisal’, Archivaria, 45 (1998), 127-169; Mark A. 
Greene and Todd J. Daniels, ‘Documentation With Attitude: A Pragmatist’s Guide to the Selection 
and Acquisition of Modern Business Records’, in The Records of American Business ed. by James M. 
O’Toole (Chicago: SAA, 1997), Ch. 7. 
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methodologies on offer but will instead examine the, often competing, theories that 
support them. The author takes an opposite stance to writers such as John Roberts or 
Lester Cappon who believed ‘high-falutin’ archive theory’ to be a ‘rather 
superfluous and unpromising diversion’.17 Instead, the author follows the approach 
of Preben Mortensen by linking theory and practice together as co-dependents.18 The 
author agrees with Mortensen that although it is possible to carry out the practice 
without articulating its supporting theory, this can result in ‘blind engagement’.19 
Rather, it is the aim of this thesis to explore ‘[the] self-conscious reflection on a 
particular practice in order to bring to light the presuppositions unconsciously 
assumed in that practice’.20  
Gilliland asserted that appraisal is ‘an example of the ways in which the 
archival field, consciously and subliminally, has responded to wider intellectual and 
social movements and the value systems they have promoted’.21 In this thesis the 
author will examine the intellectual frameworks in which appraisal theories have 
developed, in an attempt to better understand and articulate the different influences 
that have shaped professional archival theory. However, the author will not limit her 
study to appraisal theory. Archival appraisal is one of several examples which will 
be used to illustrate the issues surrounding the concept of archival value. The author 
will also explore other areas of the archival literature that involve concepts of 
archival value, namely: archival arrangement and description theory. In doing so, she 
will demonstrate that, although the term ‘value’ is rarely used explicitly in these 
theoretical areas, they are nonetheless implicitly shaped within an evaluative 
framework.22 
A number of recent writers have begun to question and challenge established 
archival theory, particularly in the areas of appraisal and value conceptions of 
archives and records.23 Two writers in particular, Shauna McRanor and Brien 
                                                 
17 John W. Roberts, ‘Archival Theory: Much Ado About Shelving’, AA, 50.1 (1987), 66-75, (75). 
18 Preben Mortensen, ‘The Place of Theory in Archival Practice’, Archivaria, 47 (1999), 1-26. 
19 Mortensen, 17. 
20 Ibid., 17. 
21 Gilliland, 43. 
22 See Chapter 3. 
23 For example, Terry Cook, ‘Archival Science and Postmodernism: New Formulations for Old 
Concepts’, AS, 1.1 (2001), 3-24; Richard J. Cox, ‘The End of Collecting: Towards a New Purpose for 
Archival Appraisal’, AS, 2.3-4 (2002), 287-309; Robyn Sloggett, ‘Valuing Significance or Signifying 
Value? Culture in a Global Context’, AM, 33 (2005), 110-229; Keli Rylance, ‘Archives and the 
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Brothman, have drawn upon ideas from the philosophical discipline of axiology to 
explore notions of archival value.24 Their work, together with genuine concerns as a 
practitioner about which records should be kept, led the author to believe that the 
potential interplay between the two disciplines merits a more substantial exploration.  
Axiology is a sub-branch of Ethics and deals specifically with notions of 
value and value judgements, or evaluations. The basic premise of axiology is that 
there might be something different going on when we talk about something as being 
good (in the sense of ‘being valued’), as compared to a type of descriptive or factual 
statement such as ‘it is raining’.25 Axiology is concerned with trying to answer the 
following questions:  
- what sort of property or characteristic of something means that it ‘has 
value’ or ‘is of value’?;  
- is having value an objective or a subjective matter – does the value reside 
in the object or is it about how we feel about it?; and 
- what things have value or are valuable?26  
These are also pertinent questions to ask about records because they help to inform 
the processes behind the creation of archives. Archives are not formed by accident, 
there is a purpose and a design behind the formation (whether it is articulated or not); 
and the decision to keep (or destroy) records is justified by the responses to these 
questions.27  
                                                                                                                                          
Intangible’, Archivaria, 62 (2006), 103-20; Mark A. Greene, ‘The Power of Archives: Archivists’ 
Values and Value in the Postmodern Age’, AA, 72.1 (2007), 343-57; Jennifer Meehan, ‘The Archival 
Nexus: Rethinking the Interplay of Archival Ideas About the Nature, Value and Use of Records’, AS, 
9.3-4 (2009), 157-64. 
24 Brien Brothman, ‘Orders of Value: Probing the Theoretical Terms of Archival Practice’, 
Archivaria, 32 (1991), 78-100 and Shauna McRanor ‘A Critical Analysis of Intrinsic Value’, AA, 59 
(1996), 400-11. Additionally, Geoffrey Yeo refers to axiological approaches in ‘”Nothing is the same 
as something else”: significant properties and notions of identity and originality’, AS, 10.2 (2010), 85-
116. Joy Thomas also discusses axiological concepts of value in her unpublished MA thesis, What is 
the value of archives? (UCL: School of Library, Archive and Information Studies, 2007). 
25 A more detailed examination of axiological notions of goodness and value will follow in Chapter 5. 
Here, the author will also discuss the so-called ‘fact-value distinction’ which is crucial to 
understanding moral theories of the mid- to late-twentieth century.  
26 Prof Nicholas Dent, ‘Value’, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 895. 
27 This statement should not be read as an outright rejection of Jenkinson’s concept of the ‘natural 
accumulation of archives’, but instead that the author believes that a nuanced approach, which 
acknowledges the role of individual agency, is more appropriate. These different approaches will be 
explored further in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Ideas about who might be responsible for the formation of archives are also 
linked to philosophical questions about value. There are several roles that can be 
identified as having the potential responsibility for forming archives. For example, 
archivists may practice appraisal but records creators originate the record in the first 
place and can determine whether or not the record survives. These two roles can 
have different objectives and priorities that underpin their appraisal choices, and 
dilemmas can arise when they disagree. Which, if either, should make the final 
decision? Jenkinson believed it was the responsibility of the records creator alone, 
whilst other archival theorists have argued that is the archivist who is best-placed to 
do appraisal.28 Others also have a role to play – one researcher using certain archives 
for a particular research project may regard them as valuable, whereas another 
individual may have no regard for them whatsoever. Decisions about whether or not 
to keep archives may therefore be influenced by the perceived value that users will 
make of them. Society itself may also have a large part to play, in the sense that all 
of these positions (archivist, creator and user) exist within a social context with all its 
contingency.  
Conceptions of a wider, public value of archives also give a broader context 
to the issue of archival value. In the twenty-first century it has become commonplace 
to talk about the value and significance of a society’s culture, and especially about 
the perceived public value of such culture.29 The term ‘culture’ is not itself without 
difficulties and contested meanings,30 but it is generally recognized within a Western 
context to include things like library and museum collections, performing arts such 
as theatre and ballet, historic buildings, and archives. In the last thirty years 
justification for the public subsidy of these types of cultural activity in the UK has 
shifted from a democratization of culture – access for all and the civilizing effect of 
                                                 
28 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration; Maynard J. Brichford, Archives and Manuscripts: 
Appraisal and Accessioning (Chicago: SAA, 1977)  
29 The term ‘significance’ has recently come to the fore in allied fields such as archaeology and built 
heritage; it is the preferred term used by UNESCO to judge the importance of world heritage sites and 
has more recently been used in connection with the Memory of the World Programme which seeks to 
preserve the world’s documentary heritage collections, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/flagship-project-activities/memory-
of-the-world/homepage/ [accessed 4 August 2013] Moreover, the terms ‘significance’ and ‘value’ are 
often used synonymously in the archive literature, see for example, Pearce-Moses; and Intrinsic Value 
in Archival Materials, National Archives and Records Service Staff Information Paper 21 
(Washington DC: NARS, 1982). See also Chapter 4, section 4.3.  
30 Dave O’Brien, Measuring the Value of Culture: A Report to the Department of Culture Media and 
Sport (UK: AHRC, ESRC and DCMS, 15 Dec 2010), 11. Report available online: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/publications/7660.aspx [accessed 4 August 2013]. 
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culture – to a progressive attempt to justify culture on economic grounds.31 Archives 
have increasingly been viewed by some as being part of a larger public cultural 
policy that can be measured in terms of social and economic impact. Whilst this 
thesis will not examine issues of UK public policy in detail, the author nonetheless 
acknowledges that such issues form an important background context to this study 
and, in particular, have contributed to the formation of a concept of archival value 
that can be defined, and in which the value can be measured. This thesis will 
investigate whether such a concept is valid.  
The discussion so far has implied that there is something valuable about 
archives, but that different groups of interested parties may disagree on exactly what 
it is. There is an implicit assumption that keeping archives is a good thing to do 
because the archives have intrinsic value, even if there are different methods that can 
be applied to discover what that value is.32 However, the assumption that there is 
something intrinsically valuable about archives is not without its critics in the 
archival literature.33 Equally, some philosophers have argued that there is no such 
thing as intrinsic value.34 The phrase commonly used is that ‘value is in the eye of 
the beholder’ – in other words, that there may not be anything intrinsically valuable 
about the object, the value may not reside in the object itself, but instead be a 
projection onto the object by an individual or a community. Value is thus viewed as 
an individual’s subjective opinion, or, in the words of the philosopher David Hume 
                                                 
31 Examples include: Charles Landry, Lesley Green, Francois Matarasso and Franco Bianchini, The 
Art of Regeneration: Urban Renewal Through Cultural Activity (Stroud, UK: Comedia, 1996). Report 
available online: http://www.britishcouncil.org/indonesia-charleslandry-
artofregeneration.pdf; Michelle Reeve, Measuring the Economic and Social Impact of the Arts 
(UK: Arts Council, 2002). Report available online: 
http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/publication_archive/measuring-the-economic-and-
social-impact-of-the-arts/ and John Holden, Capturing Cultural Value. How Culture Has 
Become A Tool of Government Policy (London: Demos, 2004). Report available online: 
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/CapturingCulturalValue.pdf [all accessed 4 August 2013]. 
Although the UK is the focus for this particular aspect of the study, reference will also be made to 
similar developments elsewhere (see Chapter 4). 
32 For example, Intrinsic Value in Archival Materials, National Archives and Records Service Staff 
Information Paper 21; Harrison and Schuursma. In the philosophy literature there are also writers 
who advocate concepts of intrinsic value including G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, Franz Bretano, John 
O’Neill, and Thomas Hurka. Some of their work will be explored further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
33 For example, Brien Brothman, ‘Orders of Value’ and Verne Harris, Exploring Archives: An 
Introduction to Archival Ideas and Practice in South Africa (Pretoria: National Archives of South 
Africa, 2000). 
34 For example, the works of John Dewey, William James, A. J. Ayer, Charles L. Stevenson and R. 
M. Hare. 
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(1711-1776), ‘a matter of sentiment and taste’.35 This view contends that attempts to 
search for value should not seek to discover what is special about the particular 
object of value, but rather should try to understand the motivations of those doing the 
valuing. Following Hume, other philosophers have put forward competing theories 
that discount notions of intrinsic value, however, there remains little consensus 
within the field.36 In the author’s view some of the most persuasive arguments 
attempt a middle-ground, admitting that whilst everything, including value, is 
ultimately shaped by social contingency, there can still be an objectivity, which 
makes value judgements capable of being right or wrong; and that there can be such 
a thing as intrinsic value.37 One possibility is that evaluation may be a form of social 
behaviour as human beings behave variably but within fixed frameworks of 
reference or social mores.38 These differing accounts of the possible loci of value 
will be explored further in the later chapters of the thesis. 
1.3. Research questions 
In the light of the issues discussed in section 1.2., the primary research 
questions of this study are:  
- is there something intrinsically valuable about archives? Does such a 
thing as ‘archival value’ exist?; 
- if so, can we define what this value is?; and 
- can we measure it? 
In considering whether a concept of archival value really exists, and in what form, 
further questions will also be considered regarding how and when value is ascribed 
to archives, and by whom. Using axiology as a framework, the thesis will explore 
what sort of property or characteristic of archives gives value and will consider 
                                                 
35 ‘Morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives 
to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary’. David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Appendix 1 Concerning Moral Sentiment, Section 1. 
Reprint of the 1777 edition, available online: www.gutenberg.org [accessed 4th August 2013]. 
36 Michael J. Zimmerman, ‘Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value’, in The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. by Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2010 edn.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/value-
intrinsic-extrinsic/ [accessed 3 August 2013]. 
37 This is a view held by Hilary Putnam and Risieri Frondizi, and will be explored further in Chapter 
5. 
38 Barbara Hernstein Smith, Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1988); Robin Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation (Kent: 
Croom Helm Ltd., 1987). 
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whether archival value resides in the records, or in the subjective judgement of the 
valuers, or, perhaps, somewhere in-between.  
1.4. Some definitions: life cycle and records continuum 
 As section 1.2. has indicated, the issue of terminology in archival theory is 
problematic. Nuanced differences in meaning between terms such as ‘record’ and 
‘archive’ can be significant and can affect the way in which we might consider the 
value of such terms. In order to evaluate something one has to understand what that 
something is and be able to distinguish it from another thing. To facilitate the 
exploration of a conception of archival value one must be able to define exactly what 
archives are, and what they are not. One commentator has noted that, ‘though many 
archival concepts may be approximately the same, the terms used to represent the 
various concepts differ from one language area and administrative context to 
another’.39 This can be evidenced through two distinct approaches, which developed 
in the twentieth century: the Life Cycle Model40 and the Records Continuum 
Model.41 These models have affected not only the management of records and 
archives, but also the ways in which the terms are defined.  
The Life Cycle Model was developed by the US National Archives in the 
1940s, based on the work of Emmett J. Leahy and Philip C. Brooks; and 
subsequently reinforced by the writings of Theodore R. Schellenberg.42 The model 
represents the life of a record as analogous to that of a living organism, with distinct 
stages from creation to final disposition. Different models of varying complexity 
exist, but all include phases of creation, use and disposition.43 When studying to 
become an archivist, the author was taught to think of the model in terms of a 
Christian life-journey, whereby the records are born, live the first stage of their life 
being used by the records creator and then are appraised by the archivist for the next 
stage of their existence: to go either to heaven (the archival repository), to hell 
                                                 
39 Lindh, ‘Accomplishing the Unfeasible’, 25. 
40 Philip Coolidge Brooks, ‘The Selection of Records for Preservation’, AA, 3.4 (1940), 221-234. 
41 Jay Atherton, ‘From Life Cycle to Continuum: Some Thoughts on the Records Management-
Archives Relationship’, Archivaria, 21 (1985/86), 43-51; The Records Continuum: Ian Maclean and 
the Australian Archives First Fifty Years ed. by Sue McKemmish and Michael Piggott (Victoria, 
Australia: Ancora Press, Monash University, 1994). 
42 Emmett J. Leahy, ‘Reductions in Public Records’, AA, 3.1 (1940), 13-38; Brooks, ‘The Selection of 
Records’; Schellenberg, Modern Archives. 
43 Pearce-Moses, 232. 
22 
 
(destruction) or to purgatory (the records centre and ongoing review). As well as 
identifying who was responsible for the records at each stage, the separate stages 
also defined the records themselves as being current, semi-current or archival. In 
comparison, the Records Continuum Model emphasizes the whole extent of a 
record’s existence. The earliest continuum concepts were promoted by Australian 
National Archivist, Ian Maclean in the 1950s and the label ‘continuum’ was applied 
retrospectively by Canadian archivist Jay Atherton in 1985.44 But it was not until the 
mid-1990s that the Records Continuum Model was formally articulated by 
Australian archival theorist, Frank Upward.45 In the Records Continuum Model the 
various characteristics of a record are seen as overlapping so that recordkeeping and 
archiving activities are combined rather than viewed as separate activities that take 
place at different times. There are no separate phases in a record’s existence, but 
rather creation, use and appraisal are seen as recurring and integrated processes.46 
Both models continue to have supporters and critics within the archival 
community. Some archivists have argued that the Life Cycle Model is ill-suited for 
twenty-first century recordkeeping as it cannot deal satisfactorily with digital records 
which challenge notions of fixed stages in a record’s existence.47 In response, other 
archivists have re-conceived the Life Cycle Model as being essential for the control 
and maintenance of digital records and archives. The most well-known example is 
the work undertaken by the InterPARES Project, at the University of British 
Columbia in Canada.48 Although some archivists have questioned whether 
                                                 
44 Atherton, 43-51. 
45 The Records Continuum ed. by McKemmish and Piggott. See also Frank Upward, ‘Structuring the 
Records Continuum – Part One: Postcustodial Principles and Properties’, AM, 24 (1996), 268-85 and 
‘Structuring the Records Continuum – Part Two: Structuration Theory and Recordkeeping’, AM, 25 
(1997), 10-35. 
46 Sue McKemmish, 'The Archives', in Archives: Recordkeeping in Society, Topics in Australasian 
Library and Information Studies No. 24, ed. by Sue McKemmish, Frank Upward, Barbara Reed and 
Michael Piggott (Wagga Wagga, NSW: Centre for Information Studies, Charles Sturt University, 
2005), 159-95. 
47 For example, Angelika Menne-Haritz, ‘What Can Be Achieved With Archives?’ in The Concept of 
the Record, ed. by Erik Norberg (Stockholm: Skrifter utgivna av Riksarkivet 4, 1998), 11-25; David 
Bearman, ‘An Indefensible Bastion: Archives as a Repository in the Electronic Age’, in Archival 
Management of Electronic Records, ed. by David Bearman (Pittsburgh: Archive and Museum 
Informatics, 1991), 14-24; Greg O’Shea, ‘The Medium Is Not The Message: Appraisal of Electronic 
Records by Australian Archives’, AM, 22.1 (1994), 68-93. 
48 Heather MacNeil, ‘Providing Grounds for Trust: Developing Conceptual Requirements for the 
Long-Term Preservation of Authentic Electronic Records I’, Archivaria, 50 (2000), 52-78 and 
‘Providing Grounds for Trust: Developing Conceptual Requirements for the Long-Term Preservation 
of Authentic Electronic Records II’, Archivaria, 54 (2002), 24-58. See also Authentic Records in the 
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traditional archival theory and practice applies to digital records, an increasing 
majority have argued that it remains more relevant than ever, albeit perhaps in need 
of minor tweaking in some areas to meet the new challenges.49 Many authors have 
argued that what technology has done is broaden the concept of archives and records 
and the ways in which they are created, selected and preserved.50  
Another challenge to traditional archive and recordkeeping has been 
postmodernist theory. Postmodernism is a late twentieth-century set of critical 
practices, which have pervaded many aspects of society, yet is also extremely 
difficult to define with certainty.51 One commentator perhaps speaks for many when 
he described how: 
The more I try to tie down post-modernism, the less coherent it seems. 
I see ‘it’ happening all around me – in architecture, art, literature, 
philosophy, fashion and music. There is, of course, a growing 
literature by cultural analysts seeking to capture the new essence and 
create a theory out of the disparate events. […] Yet somehow the 
growth of the style seems bigger than any individual analyst’s 
attempts to characterize it. Ultimately it engulfs any attempt to fix it.52 
Although the term ‘postmodernism’ was in use in the field of architecture from the 
1950s, where it designated a move away from the ‘modernist’ design style, it first 
entered the philosophical lexicon in 1979, with the publication of The Postmodern 
Condition by Jean-François Lyotard.53 Linked with other concepts such as 
deconstructionism, hyperreality, post-structuralism and différence, postmodernism is 
often defined in the negative, as a phenomenon in which established concepts of 
coherence, meaning, authenticity, and truth are dissolved and what remains is a 
plurality of meanings, narratives, truths, where there is no certainty or stability, only 
                                                                                                                                          
Electronic Age. Proceedings from an International Symposium ed. by Luigi Sarno (Vancouver: 
InterPARES Project/Instituto Italiano di Cultura, 2000). 
49 See Luciana Duranti, ‘Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science, Part VI’, Archivaria, 33 
(1991/92), 6-24; Terry Cook, ‘Electronic Records, Paper Minds: The Revolution in Information 
Management and Archives in the Post-Custodial and Postmodern Era’, AM, 22.2 (1994), 300-29; 
David Bearman, Electronic Evidence: Strategies for Managing Records in Contemporary 
Organisations (Pittsburgh: Archives and Museum Informatics, 1994). 
50 See Sarno; Norberg. 
51 Gary Aylesworth, ‘Postmodernism’, in Zalta (Summer 2013 edn.) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/postmodernism/ [accessed 3 August 2013]. 
52 Ian Hodder, ‘Post-modernism, post-structuralism and post-processual archaeology’, in The 
Meaning of Things. Material Culture and Symbolic Expression, ed. by Ian Hodder (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), 65. 
53 Aylesworth. See also The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, ed. by J. 
O. Urmson and Jonathan Ree (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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flux.54 As a result, postmodernism questioned the traditional approach to archive and 
recordkeeping that viewed truth, authenticity and integrity as being tangible concepts 
against which archives could be judged and evaluated.55  
The impact of postmodernism on the archival profession can be seen in the 
writings of several archival theorists who have viewed postmodernist thinking as an 
opportunity to revitalize the profession and its mission. Some believe that 
postmodernism can provide a framework for archivists to deconstruct records and 
understand them as the cultural products of society;56 others see it as an opportunity 
for ‘celebrating difference, multiple narratives, personal and local’;57 and yet others 
as a source of power.58 Whatever the varying views of individual thinkers towards 
specific aspects of postmodernist theory, there has nonetheless been a recognition by 
most that we cannot escape its general implications; in particular, that what and how 
we record is influenced by socio-cultural factors. Archivists, records creators and 
users are all part of society and therefore our behaviour is, to one extent or another, 
influenced by that society. No one and no thing exists in a vacuum. In the words of 
Eric Ketelaar, this means that ‘archiving is a “regime of practices” which varies in 
any given time and in any given place. People create, process, appraise and use 
archives, influenced consciously or unconsciously by cultural and social factors’.59 
This thesis will explore ideas about how archival value might be mediated, and even 
created, by social and cultural interaction with archives and records. 
 Although the Continuum Model was not developed as a result of 
postmodernism, many of its proponents argue that it works successfully within a 
postmodern paradigm because it allows for a broad conception of archives. At the 
core of the divergence between the two models is a distinction about the nature of 
archives. The Life Cycle approach distinguishes clearly between ‘records’ and 
                                                 
54 Aylesworth; Urmson and Ree; Life After Postmodernism: Essays on Value and Culture, ed. by John 
Fekete (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988). 
55 As exemplified in the writings of Jenkinson in particular, but also others including J. L. Burke, 
Margaret Cross Norton and Ernst Posner. See also Rachel Hardiman, ‘Under the Influence: the impact 
of philosophy on archives and records management’, in Caroline Brown, ed., Archives and 
Recordkeeping: Theory into Practice (London: Facet Publishing, 2014), 171-226. 
56 Carolyn Heald, ‘Is there room for archives in the postmodern world?’, AA, 59.1 (1996), 88-101. 
57 Terry Cook, ‘Fashionable Nonsense or Professional Rebirth: Postmodernism and the Practice of 
Archives’, Archivaria 51 (2001), 14-35 (31-2). 
58 Eric Ketelaar, ‘Archival Temples, Archival Prisons: Modes of Power and Protection’, AS, 2.3-4 
(2002), 221-38; Randall C. Jimerson, Archives Power: Memory, Accountability and Social Justice 
(Chicago: SAA, 2009). 
59 Eric Ketelaar, ‘Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives’, AS, 1.2 (2001), 131-41, (136). 
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‘archives’ – a distinction that can be traced back to US archivist Theodore R. 
Schellenberg. Schellenberg believed that in order to be archives, records ‘must have 
been created or accumulated to accomplish some purpose’ and ‘must be preserved 
for reasons other than those for which they were created or accumulated’.60 
Schellenberg’s views contrasted with the ideas of English archival theorist, Sir 
Hilary Jenkinson, who had laid the emphasis instead on preservation for the creator’s 
own information and in his own custody.61 In Jenkinson’s view, the chief 
responsibility of the archivist was to ensure the line of unbroken custody, with any 
subsequent needs of researchers being secondary. Jenkinson thus defined archives as 
records that had the archival quality of the integrity of this unbroken custody, whose 
features of impartiality and authenticity were integral to the circumstances of their 
creation and care.62 Writing some twenty years later, Schellenberg discounted the 
reliance on custody, arguing that it was a futile exercise when dealing with the bulk 
and variety of modern records. He instead emphasized research use as an essential 
characteristic of archives.63 Schellenberg established two distinct types of value – 
primary value, which is the use made of records by the creator – and secondary 
value, which is the use made of archives by researchers.64 As a result, it can be 
argued that Schellenberg created a distinction between records and archives which 
was based on these different values. Whereas Jenkinson can be perceived as locating 
the establishment of value as solely during current use, before a record reached the 
archival repository, Schellenberg allowed that value could be attributed after current 
use, thus projecting it into the possibilities of future use.65 The resulting dualism of 
archives (and/or records) – their use for administrative and legal purposes and their 
use for historical, cultural and scholarly purposes – continues to be a sustaining 
concept upon which much contemporary archival theory is constructed. As will be 
explored further in later chapters, this perceived dualism also has a significant 
impact on the search for a concept of archival value.  
                                                 
60 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 13. 
61 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration.  
62 Ibid., 11-3 
63 Richard Stapleton, ‘Jenkinson and Schellenberg: A Comparison’, Archivaria, 17 (1983/84), 75-85; 
Reto Tschan, ‘A Comparison of Jenkinson and Schellenberg on Appraisal’, AA, 65.2 (2002), 176-95. 
64 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 133. 
65 Ciaran B. Trace, ‘On or Off the Record: Notions of Value in the Archive’, in Currents of Archival 
Thinking, ed. by Terry Eastwood and Heather MacNeil (Santa Barbara, CA: Libraries Unlimited, 
ABC-Clio, 2010), 47-68, (56). 
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 In comparison, the Continuum Model makes no strict division between 
‘archives’ and ‘records’. In fact the various elements in the Continuum are by 
definition indeterminate, as Sue McKemmish, a leading proponent of the model, 
explained: 
In Australia and North America, the use of the terms 'records' and 
'archives' to refer to current archival documents and archival 
documents selected for preservation respectively has created a 
distracting division within the recordkeeping profession between 
records managers and archivists. The unifying concept of the archival 
document encompasses both records and archives. It directs attention 
to the continuum of processes involved in managing the record of a 
transaction so that it retains its evidentiary quality. […] The effective 
creation and management of archival documents are critical to their 
use and the role they play in governing relationships in society over 
time and space.66 
By introducing an all-encompassing term of ‘archival document’, the Continuum 
Model attempts to transcend the strict boundaries adhered to by the Life Cycle 
Model. The Continuum Model thus allows for a broad conception of archives, which 
is particularly in tune with postmodern notions about the plurality of meanings and 
narratives.67  
However, despite this seeming advantage of the Continuum approach, some 
contemporary archivists have sought to make the Life Cycle Model successfully 
work for twenty-first century archives. Although much of the inspiration behind the 
Life Cycle Model can be found in the work of Schellenberg, many contemporary 
supporters of the approach have revisited the theories of Jenkinson in an attempt to 
bridge the dualistic gap of primary and secondary values and to successfully manage 
records of all formats in a postmodern world.68 For example, Terry Cook, has argued 
that ‘post-modern sensibilities do not mean we are abandoning archival principles, 
                                                 
66 Sue McKemmish, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: A Continuum of Responsibility’, originally 
published in Proceedings of the Records Management Association of Australia 14th National 
Convention, 15-17 September 1997 (Perth: RMAA, 1997). Online version available: 
http://www.infotech.monash.edu.au/research/groups/rcrg/publications/recordscontinuum-
smckp2.html [accessed 4 August 2013]. 
67 Tom Nesmith, ‘Re-Exploring the Continuum, Rediscovering Archives’, AM, 36.2 (2008), 34-53; 
Currents of Archival Thinking.  
68 For example, Luciana Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, AA, 57.2 (1994), 
328-44; Cook, ‘Electronic Records, Paper Minds’; Richard J. Cox, Managing Records as Evidence 
and Information (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2001); Tschan; Jonathan Furner, 
‘Conceptual Analysis: A Method for Understanding Information as Evidence and Evidence as 
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Manuscripts (Chicago: SAA, 2005), 23-36. 
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but [are] rather reconceiving our traditional Jenkinsonian guardianship of evidence 
from a physical to a conceptual framework’.69  
 It is against this problematic background of the various conceptions of 
archives and records that the author has undertaken her exploration of notions of 
archival value. This brief discussion has demonstrated that terms such as ‘archive’ 
and ‘record’ are not simply empty labels but convey explicit and implicit meanings 
depending on how they are used, and by whom, within the archival literature. There 
is an additional problem because the noun ‘archive’ in the English language is 
unusual as both the singular and plural forms can mean the same thing.70 
‘Archive(s)’ can commonly mean (i) a collection of documents or records; (ii) the 
place where they are kept; or (iii) the institution responsible for keeping them.71 The 
author prefers to use the plural ‘archives’ throughout this thesis, and it should be 
understood in the sense of (i) above. Where senses (ii) or (iii) are intended, this will 
be made explicit. It is the aim of the author to explore conceptions of archival value 
in a way that transcends any particular approach to archive and recordkeeping. The 
author does not hold that there are strict boundaries between records and archives, as 
might be followed by a Life Cycle approach, but nor does she hold that records and 
archives are exactly the same. Many records are created but not all of these records 
are retained as archives.  
Archival theorist Geoffrey Yeo has discussed the difficulties of definition, 
and has explored alternative terminology, in several articles.72 Yeo has defined 
records as ‘persistent representations of activities’, whereby ‘representations’ are 
‘“things that stand for something else” and are usually assumed to have some kind of 
correspondence to the things they represent’ and ‘persistent’ signifies a ‘capacity to 
                                                 
69 Cook, ‘Electronic Records, Paper Minds’, 320. 
70 See The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, ed. by Joyce M. Hawkins and Robert Allen 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Similarly, the related adjective can also take two forms: ‘archive’ or 
‘archival’. Throughout this thesis, preference has been given to the latter, to avoid unnecessary 
confusion with the noun; except in cases of a direct quotation.  
71 The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary; see also Pearce-Moses. The author will use the term 
‘records’ in preference to ‘documents’ throughout the thesis. However, both terms should be 
understood in their broadest possible sense, as components of archives. If a different sense is intended 
by a particular writer this will be noted. 
72 See in particular, Yeo, ‘Concepts of Record (1)’; Geoffrey Yeo, ‘Concepts of Record (2): 
Prototypes and Boundary Objects’, AA, 71.1 (2008), 118-43; Yeo, ‘Nothing is the same as something 
else’; Geoffrey Yeo, ‘Rising to the Level of a Record?’. 
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endure beyond the immediate circumstance leading to its creation’.73 The author 
perceives two advantages of Yeo’s definition – firstly, it avoids any reference to 
either the reasons for creating or for keeping the records, and, secondly, it is equally 
applicable to all types of record media. Therefore, the author’s use of the term 
‘archives’ throughout this thesis should be understood in a broadly similar sense; 
namely, as those persistent representations of activities that are capable of being 
preserved beyond the activity itself. 
1.5. Methodology 
The methodology employed in this thesis is Theory Derivation. Theory 
Derivation is based on the fairly straightforward proposal that ideas and concepts in 
one discipline can be used through a process of analogy to give new insight and 
explanations for phenomena in another discipline. Derivation employs analogy or 
metaphor in transposing and redefining a concept, statement or theory from one 
context to another; and can be applied to areas where no theory base exists or where 
existing theories are felt to have become outmoded, and new innovative perspectives 
are required.74  
The methodology originates in Education Theory in the US in the 1960s.75 
Elizabeth Steiner Maccia, George S. Maccia and Robert E. Jewett worked on several 
projects to develop value-open empirical theory for American education practice. 
Their method began with exploring concepts from other fields, in a process 
described as ‘retroductive’, and defined as ‘the utilization of a point of view as a 
model for devising (education) theory’.76 Maccia et al explained that there is no 
completely a priori way of knowing whether a given theory in another discipline can 
be used to solve problems in the discipline of interest, and they detail how ‘the 
                                                 
73 Yeo, ‘Concepts of Record (1)’, 334, 337. 
74 Lorraine Olszewski Walker and Kay Coalson Avant, Strategies for Theory Construction in 
Nursing, 2nd edn. (Connecticut: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1988), 25. 
75 Construction of Educational Theory Models, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
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discover, the usage of the term ‘retroduction’ in this specific sense was invented by Maccia and has 
not been used in this way by subsequent theorists. Maccia’s use of the term differs slightly from 
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evidence.  
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formal theory as is may not be utilizable as a model. We may have to change it, and 
so construct what will be a model’.77 Maccia et al described the technical stages of 
the process: ‘Through retroduction, one devises characterizations – statements or 
theory about objects. Through deduction, one clarifies and completes such 
characterizations. Finally, through induction, one determines the objects falling 
within the range of the characterization. Retroduction devises, deduction explicates 
and induction evaluates’.78  
The authors gave an example of this process as they explained that ‘through 
the point of view from within the discipline of physiology, a theory of eye blinking, 
a conjecture or characterization of certain phenomena of the educational process, a 
theory of learning, was devised’.79 The authors considered various physiological 
statements concerning eye blinking, e.g. that either the eyes are or are not covered by 
lids, and that blinking may be either reflexive or non-reflexive; and then they 
transposed these statements into an education context: either the student is distracted 
or attentive and the distraction may be either voluntary or involuntary.80 
In the UK, Theory Derivation has been used primarily within Nursing Theory 
where it was extensively applied in the 1980s, at a time when the nursing profession 
was coming of age both as a practice-based profession and as a scholarly 
discipline.81 In 1983, Lorraine Walker and Kay Avant adapted the work of Maccia et 
al, arguing that Derivation is a particularly useful means of building theory.82 Walker 
and Avant described the methodology at length and gave practical examples of its 
application within the nursing milieu. According to Walker and Avant, the advantage 
of the methodology is that it is a relatively quick and easy way to obtain formal 
theory in the areas of interest; furthermore: it is an ‘exciting exercise that requires the 
theorist to use creativity and imagination in seeing analogies from one field and 
modifying them for use in a new field’.83 However, Walker and Avant identified two 
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disadvantages of the methodology, which must be taken into account. They stated 
that there is a danger that ‘novice theorists become so excited about their new 
generalizations that they fail to take into account any dissimilarities or dis-analogies 
present in the parent theory’.84 Consideration must be given to these dis-analogies as 
they may also provide useful information for the new theory. The second 
disadvantage is more of a challenge, in that it requires the theorist to be familiar with 
other disciplines or fields of interest other than her own, as well as requiring a 
thorough understanding of her own field to be able to choose appropriate boundaries 
for the new theory.85 
Although nursing theory may not immediately be one that is usually or 
naturally associated with archival theory, on examining the work of Walker and 
Avant, and other nursing theorists, it became apparent to the author that the 
differences between the two disciplines might not be so great as at first imagined, 
and even that there are arguably many parallels between them. For example, Walker 
and Avant wrote of the need for theory development within nursing as the profession 
came of age, not only as a practice-based profession but also as a scholarly 
discipline. They firmly believed in the benefits of a theoretical foundation for 
nursing and argued that a ‘commitment to practice based on sound reliable 
knowledge is intrinsic to the idea of a profession and practice discipline. Theories 
integrate aspects of practice and aid in making new and important discoveries to 
advance practice’.86  
This statement is equally true for the archival profession. Since the 1980s, in 
the archival literature several writers have expressed a similar belief in the linkage 
between theory development and the establishment of the archival profession. For 
example, Frederick J. Stielow wrote about archivists requiring ‘a grander vision of 
archival theory as essential to professionalization, the building of a distinct 
knowledge base, and the unlimited prospects of a new Information Age’.87 Heather 
MacNeil has also commented on the need for the debate and discussion of new ideas, 
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especially conflicting ideas about archival theory, because such discussions ‘are 
constructive as a means of moving the profession forward’.88 
A key aspect of Theory Derivation is its application in areas where current 
theory is thought to have become outmoded and new ideas and perspectives are 
required. In nursing practice in the 1980s, the traditional division between the 
concepts of medical, surgical, obstetrical, paediatric and psychiatric nursing began to 
break down as more became known about how developmental, environmental and 
psychological factors interact with the human body to produce disease and health. 
Walker and Avant argued that, as a result, a new perspective was required to classify 
nursing specialties.89 A comparison can be drawn with archival practice which has 
undergone its own evolutions as practitioners fought to establish it as a discipline in 
its own right alongside history and librarianship.90 The phrase ‘handmaiden to 
history’ was first coined in reference to the archaeology profession in the 1960s,91 
but since then there have been many debates within the archival community as to 
whether the phrase also applies to archivists. Early attempts to define an archivist’s 
role often compared and contrasted the role with either that of historians or 
librarians. The account is too rich to include in detail here, but a few illustrations 
should suffice: in the US the formation of an independent association for archivists 
in 1935, as a replacement for the specialized section within the American Historical 
Association, was a result of the acknowledgement that ‘there is somewhat of a 
conflict of interest between what historians want and archivists need’.92 Hilary 
Jenkinson commented that ‘the Profession of Archivist may be said to have arrived’ 
in his inaugural lecture for a new course in Archive Administration at UCL in 
October 1947.93 In the lecture, Jenkinson acknowledged the debt archivists owed to 
librarians and historians, before giving a lengthy description of all the different skills 
required by this new professional which included book-binding, palaeography, 
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Medieval Latin, chemistry, architecture, engineering and fire-fighting, among others. 
In Canada too there was a recognition that the archival professional required ‘areas 
of knowledge and skills far beyond the traditionally allotted confines’.94 The desire 
to create a separate, expanded skill-set for archivists, which set them apart from 
allied professions, continued through the twentieth century, often emphatically 
expressed such as in Felix Hull’s provocatively titled article ‘The Archivist Should 
Not Be A Historian’.95 More recently, technological developments and 
postmodernist theory have challenged traditional archive and recordkeeping practice. 
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, these developments have led many to 
re-examine and challenge established archival theory.96 
The final similarity identified by the author between archiving and nursing 
concerns the appropriateness of seeking inspiration from other disciplines. Much of 
the theory and practice in nursing overlaps with that of other disciplines, therefore 
looking outside of nursing to other fields is a logical step for the advancement of 
nursing theory. This view is substantiated by the work of other nursing theorists, for 
example, Barbara J. Stevens: ‘As an applied science, much of nursing’s theory is 
‘borrowed’ from other disciplines’, and Suzie Hesook: ‘Nursing […] has the 
responsibility to bring forth theories and knowledge developed in other fields’.97 
Furthermore, Walker and Avant emphasized several times in their work that 
Derivation ‘is not limited to any discipline or phenomenon’.98 They cited various 
examples of the cross-disciplinary possibilities of Theory Derivation, including the 
use of an analogy with submarine design and the concept of compartmentalizing to 
explain inconsistencies within mothers regarding parenting functions; and the 
application of the design and use of maps in geography to patients in primary care 
situations, where the patient is seen as the traveller and the nurse as a travel 
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information source, with both trying to get to a specific destination.99 Another 
example is direct derivation from systems theory which was applied to several 
theories about nursing process in the late 1970s and early 1980s.100 Coincidentally, 
systems theory thinking about functions and processes has also been used by several 
archival theorists in recent years.101 In parallel with nursing, the act of drawing upon 
other disciplines has been consistently practised by the archival profession; examples 
include law,102 communications,103 literary theory,104 and archaeology.105  
There is an existing precedent of the use of Theory Derivation within the 
archival field. Pekka Henttonen’s 2007 published thesis from the University of 
Tampere used Theory Derivation as the methodology by which he explored how 
concepts in Speech Act Theory can elucidate discussions about the nature of records 
and archives.106 Henttonen cited Walker and Avant as the basis for the methodology, 
which he described as ‘an interdisciplinary framework to open up concepts in 
archival theory, to give new insight into what records and archives are and to provide 
new concepts for analysing them’.107 Henttonen quoted directly from Walker and 
Avant to outline his methodological approach:  
Theory derivation is the process of using analogy to obtain 
explanations or predictions about a phenomena in one field from the 
explanations or predictions in another field. Thus a theory (T¹) from 
one field of interest (F¹) offers some new insights to a theorist who 
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then moves certain content or structural features into his own field of 
interest (F²) to form a new theory (T²).108  
Henttonen detailed the five steps in the Theory Derivation methodology, 
outlined by Walker and Avant, and which he also employed as subsections in his 
thesis structure: 1. becoming familiar with literature on the topic of interest, 2. 
reading widely in other fields for ideas, 3. selecting a parent theory for use in 
derivation, 4. identifying what content and/or structure from the parent theory is to 
be used, and 5. developing or redefining new statements from the content and/or 
structure of the parent theory in terms of the phenomenon of interest to the 
theorist.109 Henttonen further explained that the methodology is an iterative process 
and that some or all of the steps can be repeated until an acceptable level of 
sophistication is attained. Henttonen also explained the difference between Theory 
Derivation and simply borrowing a theory, quoting again from Walker and Avant:  
In theory derivation a whole set of interrelated concepts or a whole 
structure is moved from one field to another and modified to fit in the 
new field. When a theory is “borrowed” it is moved unchanged from 
one discipline to another.110  
The cross-disciplinary approach of Theory Derivation is reflected in its migration 
from Education Theory to Nursing Theory, and more recently, to Archival Theory.  
 The methodological framework for this thesis is based on reading literature in 
both the fields of interest: archives, and the field from which the parent theory is 
derived: axiology. The literature consists primarily of published works in the English 
language, although some non-published sources have also been consulted. The 
personal knowledge of the author as a professional archivist for over sixteen years 
provided background information and a useful starting point for research into the 
archival literature. Professionally-recognized monographs and journals were 
supplemented by citation index searches on keywords (e.g. appraisal, value) and 
authors.111 Philosophy Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries identified ‘classic’ works in 
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the field of axiology. The author browsed monographs in the subject area for 
citations which led to specific works and authors. The author also undertook a 
systematic search of citation indexes for philosophical journal articles on keywords 
(e.g. intrinsic value, organic unity, commensurability, Moore) and authors.112  
Henttonen stated that he had a kind of revelation, when he read the work of 
media theorist John Fiske relating to communication models, which led to his 
study.113 In his justification for the relevance and application of speech act theory to 
archival theory, Henttonen cited other examples of references made to speech act 
theory within the archival literature before detailing which specific speech act 
theorists he planned to concentrate on for his study and the various ways in which 
their work can be applied to archival theory. In much the same way the author of this 
present thesis underwent a similar revelatory experience, when reading the work of 
philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958) and his ideas about intrinsic value. The author 
has been an archivist and records manager since 1997 and during her career has 
faced the practical challenges of archival appraisal and records selection. Ideas about 
the value of archives seem to go hand in hand with appraisal theory, and as has been 
previously discussed, this is reflected in much of the professional archival literature. 
Appraisal theory was therefore the starting point of this study. As the author began to 
read the archival literature extensively, it became apparent to her that there is a 
general lack of clarity about what is meant by the term ‘value’. A desire to try to 
understand the concepts behind the term, led the author to philosophical concepts of 
value and to axiology. It was through exploring some of these concepts that the 
author realized that there are philosophical ideas about value that relate not only to 
appraisal but to other key tenets of archival theory, including provenance and respect 
des fonds. This thesis will seek to demonstrate that the concept of value therefore has 
a wider resonance in the archival field than has been previously examined.  
1.6. Thesis outline 
Chapter 2. A chronology of the development of archival appraisal theory 
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Chapter 2 represents the first step in Theory Derivation methodology, 
namely, becoming familiar with the literature in the topic of interest.114 The chapter 
details the main approaches toward the valuation of archives taken by archival 
appraisal theorists, and follows a chronological exposition to demonstrate the 
influence and development of ideas. Each significant development, as widely 
discussed in the literature, and, arguably, accepted by the profession at large, is 
detailed including the context within which a given theory developed, its immediate 
impact and the subsequent evolution of the theory. The chapter is split into three 
sections – the early twentieth century, the late twentieth century and the twenty-first 
century. Within this chronological structure, it will be shown how key periods of 
development in archival appraisal took place within specific countries at different 
times, concentrating particularly on the UK and US, but also with reference to 
Canada and Australia. The chapter also shows how wider society impacts upon 
archival appraisal theory, often influencing the nature and direction of debates about 
archival value. The chapter argues that over the course of nearly one hundred years 
archival appraisal theory has shifted from a single dominant approach within a 
positivist frame of reference towards a multiplicity of appraisal theories that both 
reflect, and respond to, a postmodernist frame of reference. 
Chapter 3. Value and the archival principle of provenance 
Chapter 3 continues the exploration of literature in the topic of interest by 
expanding the review of archival literature to include wider discussions about 
archival value other than appraisal. The chapter explores the archival principle of 
provenance, together with the related principles of respect des fonds and original 
order. The theorization and application of the principles have been primarily in 
approaches to archival arrangement and description, and this chapter examines the 
various interpretations of provenance taken by these approaches, and their 
implications for concepts of archival value. The chapter discusses in particular an 
interpretation of provenance which focuses on a concept of the archival fonds as an 
organic whole and explores some ideas about wholes and parts which have been 
influential in archival theory. 
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Chapter 4. The evolution of archival theory: influences, impacts and underlying 
assumptions 
This chapter continues the first step of Theory Derivation methodology and 
begins to widen the perspective by considering the literature in other fields, 
including the cultural and built heritage, records management and information 
management.115 Ideas from these fields are discussed with a particular focus on the 
evolution of archival theory as a whole, concentrating in particular on the ‘paradigm 
shift’ in archival thinking which took place at the end of the twentieth century. The 
author argues that a coalescence of specific factors during this period led to the 
opening-up of the archival profession to new ideas and theories from other 
disciplines. As a result, influences from different sectors began to significantly 
impact and contribute to ideas about the value of archives which informed archival 
theories of appraisal, description, and arrangement. The chapter explores some of the 
dominant theories of influence including perceptions of archives as giving an 
instrumental value to society through social and economic regeneration; the intrinsic 
value of archives as evidence for accountability and good governance; and the value 
of information as a commodity. 
Chapter 5. Value in axiology literature  
This chapter develops the second step of Theory Derivation methodology: 
reading widely in other fields for ideas; and lays the foundations for step three in the 
methodology: the selection of a parent theory for use in derivation.116 This chapter 
presents an overview of the philosophical discipline of axiology and outlines some of 
the main areas of debate within the discipline. Whilst it is impossible to describe all 
of the different theories and approaches that exist or have existed within axiology, 
this chapter summarizes those which have been particularly influential or long-
standing within the discipline, and which have a particular relevance to discussions 
about archival value. A brief introduction to the historical development of axiology 
is followed by a more detailed exploration of several key themes within axiology, 
namely: objectivism and subjectivism; intrinsic, extrinsic and instrumental value; 
and the commensurability of value.  
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Chapter 6. Moore’s Principle of organic unities 
Chapter 6 represents step three in Theory Derivation methodology, namely 
the selection of a parent theory for use in derivation.117 The chosen parent theory is 
the Principle of organic unities, defined by G. E. Moore as holding that ‘the intrinsic 
value of a whole is neither identical with nor proportional to the sum of the values of 
its parts’.118 This chapter outlines the Principle in detail, including the context in 
which Moore wrote and the influences on his work. Moore’s aims and objectives in 
devising the Principle are discussed as well as its implications for value theory. An 
analysis is made of how successful Moore was in his aims by exploring critiques of 
the Principle by other contemporary and later philosophers.  
Chapter 7. Archival value: a re-interpretation 
 This chapter consists of the two final steps in Theory Derivation 
methodology, namely: identifying what content and/or structure from the parent 
theory is to be used, and developing or redefining new statements from the content 
and/or structure of the parent theory in terms of the phenomenon of interest to the 
theorist.119 The axiological Principle of organic unities – in both its strong and weak 
interpretations – will be considered in application to various concepts of archival 
value. The application of both interpretations of the Principle allows the author to 
explore the ways in which different writers have defined ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ in 
relation to archives; and the ways in which they have ascribed values to parts and/or 
wholes.  
 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 This chapter reflects on the research methodology and considers the 
advantages and limitations of the approach. A summary of the thesis and its main 
findings is presented, together with recommendations for further research. 
The next chapter will present an overview of the development of archival 
appraisal theory by the English-speaking archival profession from the late nineteenth 
century to the present.
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2. A chronology of the development of archival appraisal theory  
2.1. Chapter summary 
 Chapter 2 represents the first step in Theory Derivation methodology, 
namely, becoming familiar with the literature in the topic of interest.1 This chapter 
presents a narrative chronology of the development of archival appraisal theory as 
published in the English-language archival literature. The style of presentation is a 
deliberate attempt by the author to describe archival appraisal theory in as neutral a 
manner as possible and to avoid the attribution of categories or labels, which may be 
misleading to the reader. Each significant theoretical development, as widely 
discussed in the literature and, arguably, accepted by the profession at large, is 
detailed including the context within which a given theory developed and its 
immediate impact. Subsequent evolution of the theory is also shown, together with 
any perceived relationships or links between different theories and ideas. 
 The chapter is split into three sections – the early twentieth century, the late 
twentieth century and the twenty-first century. The narrative follows a chronological 
structure, but, as will be shown, key periods of development in archival appraisal 
theory took place within specific countries at different times. In particular, the 
influence of UK archival theory, which was prominent in the early twentieth century, 
began to recede as American and Canadian theorists came to the fore in the second 
half of the century. 
 The chapter also shows how wider society impacts upon archival appraisal 
theory, often influencing the nature and direction of debates about archival value. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century in particular, postmodernism led to a 
questioning of many of the traditional concepts and ideas about archive and 
recordkeeping. 
2.2. The early twentieth century 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed two significant publications 
relating to archival appraisal theory. These publications dominated the professional 
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literature and thinking on appraisal during much of the twentieth century and both 
remain on core reading lists for twenty-first century archivists-in-training. The 
publications are Hilary Jenkinson’s A Manual of Archive Administration2 and 
Theodore R. Schellenberg’s Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques.3 Written 
over forty years apart in two different countries both books are a response to the 
practical challenges of recordkeeping faced by each author at the time. Yet whilst 
they address the immediate particularities of each situation, both also suggest a 
universality of principle that transcends the specificity of the period. 
2.2.2. 1920s-1960s (UK) 
Sir Hilary Jenkinson (1882-1961) is regarded by many archivists as the 
founding father of English archival theory. Oft-quoted, his ideas have dominated 
archival practice particularly in the UK, and he has been variously described as ‘one 
of the most influential archivists in the English-speaking world’, a ‘giant’ of his 
profession, and an ‘archival pioneer’.4 Jenkinson’s 1922 publication, A Manual of 
Archive Administration, set out his theory for archive and recordkeeping and is 
‘indisputably part of the archival canon’.5 With the exception of three years military 
service with the Royal Garrison Artillery during the First World War, and 
secondment to the War Office during the Second World War, Jenkinson spent his 
entire career at the Public Record Office in London.6 He worked on the medieval 
records of the exchequer, and the reorganization of the repairing department and the 
repository, before rising to the rank of Deputy Keeper in 1947. In addition to his 
considerable experience working with central government records, Jenkinson was 
also instrumental in the creation of a university diploma course for the training of 
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archival professionals in the UK, and in the establishment of local record offices 
throughout the UK after 1945.7 
 Jenkinson’s Manual was published as part of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Series of Works on the Economic and Social History of the 
World War, and the first edition included the subtitle: the problems of War Archives 
and Archive Making. The Manual was written as a response to the increasing volume 
of records being produced in the First World War period and the corresponding need 
for archivists to appraise and select archives.8 In his book, Jenkinson attempted to 
provide a definition of archives and the selection criteria for their long-term 
preservation in order to assist archivists dealing with modern records. In fact, 
Jenkinson was not the first English archivist to attempt a formal archival theory, as a 
colleague, Charles Johnson, had published a small booklet entitled Care of 
Documents and Management of Archives four years previously.9 Jenkinson 
acknowledged the debt owed to Johnson (among others) in the introduction to his 
Manual and commented that he was attempting to fill a gap as he believed Johnson’s 
work to be ‘limited by its format – it runs to only 47 pages’.10 Jenkinson’s 
publication in comparison ran to over 200 pages and became the de-facto guide for 
the English archival profession. A second edition of the Manual was published in 
1937, and was re-issued again nearly 30 years later, in 1965. In the second edition, 
Jenkinson stated that his views ‘upon matters of principle’ had not changed and that 
the revisions applied primarily to ‘small practical matters’ only.11 The author has 
read both editions of his text closely and confirms that this statement is correct. The 
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British Archival Theory and Thought at the Turn of the Twentieth Century’, Archives, 33.119 (2008), 
140-161, who detailed the other developments already underway which influenced Jenkinson’s own 
thinking. Another example was the work of British archivist, George Herbert Fowler (1861-1940), 
who published The Care of County Muniments (London: County Councils Association) in 1923 and 
who was instrumental in the establishment of Bedfordshire Record Office and the British Records 
Association. 
10 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 17. 
11 Hilary Jenkinson, Preface to Second Edition, A Manual of Archive Administration (London: Lund 
Humphries, 1937), re-issued in 1965. 
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second edition included some updated citations and greatly expanded on the 
technical developments available to archivists in the areas of conservation and 
preservation. A few sections had been substantially re-written (for example, 
Secondary Duties of the Archivist), but the overall sense and meaning of the text had 
not changed. The only sections that are missing from the second edition are an entire 
fifth chapter on War Archives and two appendices, one on examples of rules for an 
archival repairing department, and the other on rules for transcribing records.12  
In the Manual Jenkinson described what constitutes archives as follows: they 
are the facts of a transaction of which they are themselves a part; they are set aside 
for a use which is different to that for which they were created; and they are 
preserved in official custody.13 Additionally, he explained that archives can be 
artefacts as well as records made of paper or parchment; and they can be created by 
both private and public individuals and businesses. Throughout his text, Jenkinson 
referred to what he termed ‘archive quality’ – that which distinguishes archives from 
other records. Although he did not offer a neat definition of this concept, we can 
attempt to infer what Jenkinson meant by examining the way in which he used the 
concept. Jenkinson explained archive quality with reference to two further notions: 
impartiality and authenticity, stating that these are necessary characteristics of 
archives. He argued that the first characteristic of impartiality results from his 
definition of archives as evidences of administrative transactions. Jenkinson stressed 
that ‘archives were not drawn up in the interest or for the information of Posterity’.14 
Jenkinson contrasted what he saw as the natural accumulation of archives as a result 
of their creation and preservation for administrative purposes with the conscious 
selection of records practised by museums.15 He believed that ‘provided, then, that 
the student understands their administrative significance, [archives] cannot tell him 
anything but the truth’.16  
The second characteristic of authenticity results from their preservation in 
official custody. Jenkinson explained that archive quality is ‘dependent upon the 
                                                 
12 As the second edition is more readily accessible, and the changes from the first edition only minor, 
the author has quoted extensively from the second edition throughout this thesis.  
13 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 4-11. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
15 Ibid., 41-3. See also Chapter 3, section 3.4.1. 
16 Ibid., 12. 
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possibility of proving an unblemished line of responsible custodians’.17 In 
Jenkinson’s ideal world-view records are transferred, from the government 
department in which they are created and used, directly to the archival repository; the 
only possible detour en route being a departmental records centre for semi-current 
records. Jenkinson believed that this lineage of official custody guaranteed that 
archives would be free from the suspicions of prejudice or of having been tampered 
with.18 He believed that from these strict guidelines relating to the ‘evolution of 
Archives and the stages by which they have reached us [can be] discovered therein 
the foundation of those qualities which give to Archives their distinctive character 
and value’.19  
Jenkinson’s greatest concern, indeed his reason for writing the Manual, was 
to ensure that future archives – resulting from the appraisal of modern records – 
would equally possess archival qualities and values. Jenkinson believed that the task 
of appraising records based on the interests of historical research was one that 
neither an archivist nor an historian could undertake as he asked, ‘who can project 
himself into the future and foresee its requirements?’.20 He argued that an archivist 
would not be able to avoid ‘personal judgement’ and that an historian’s subjectivity 
could damage ‘the archives’ reputation for impartiality in the future’.21 The solution 
presented by Jenkinson was that destruction should take place before the records 
reached the archive. He argued that the only end that the preservation of records 
should fulfil was that of ‘a convenient form of artificial memory’, which serves the 
business or administration that has created the records in the first place.22 
Although Jenkinson wrote prolifically throughout the rest of his life, he did 
not radically revise his appraisal theory. As has been discussed already, the second 
edition of his Manual was minimally updated despite the passing of 15 years; and 
later, in an inaugural lecture for a new course in Archive Administration at UCL in 
October 1947,23 Jenkinson repeated his definition of archives as being ‘an actual part 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Ibid., 12. 
19 Ibid., 156. 
20 Ibid., 144. 
21 Ibid., 149. 
22 Ibid., 153. 
23 Hilary Jenkinson, The English Archivist: A New Profession (London: H K Lewis & Co. Ltd., 1948). 
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of the activities which gave them birth, material evidences surviving in the form of 
writing’.24 He also re-iterated the importance of official custody, re-stating that: 
the impartial quality which we have seen in Archives, being due to 
the circumstances of their preservation in the custody of persons not 
concerned with the interests which they eventually serve, is dependent 
on there being a reasonable presumption that this custody has been 
continuous and undisturbed.25  
In his last public speech, a Presidential Address to the Annual General 
Meeting of the UK Society of Archivists which was delivered on 7 December 1960, 
five weeks before his death; and which was subsequently published in the Journal of 
the Society of Archivists the following year, Jenkinson was forthright in his defence 
of his original ideas.26 Referring to the definition of archives, which he had 
propounded forty years earlier, Jenkinson stated:  
I still believe that the Essentials and First Principles of which I have 
spoken are expressed or inherent in that Definition: with its insistence 
on Natural Accumulation (as opposed to artificial collection), 
Administrative Basis, Preservation primarily for Office Reference, 
and Custody; and on the Applicability of this Definition to Documents 
of all Kinds and Dates.27  
Jenkinson further concluded that ‘I will make bold to say that there is nothing in my 
old Definition which the nature of Modern Archives will compel me to withdraw or 
qualify’.28 Elizabeth Shepherd has noted how this failure to evolve archival practice 
beyond his early thinking, together with Jenkinson’s sheer force of personality, 
essentially stunted the theoretical development of the UK archival profession.29 
Margaret Procter wrote that the pre-eminence of Jenkinson in the UK was principally 
a result of circumstances – the coincidental publication of the second edition of the 
Manual at a time when the UK archival profession was being formalized, together 
with a lack of other contemporary archival writing.30 As a result, Jenkinson acquired 
iconic status and his theories became the orthodoxy against which others were 
measured. 
                                                 
24 Jenkinson, The English Archivist, 2. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Sir Hilary Jenkinson, ‘Roots’, JSA, 2.4 (1961), 131-138. 
27 Jenkinson, ‘Roots’, 131. Italics and capitals in original. 
28 Ibid., 136. Capitals in original. 
29 Elizabeth Shepherd, Toward Professionalism? Archives and Archivists in England in the 20th 
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Through the writings of Jenkinson we are thus presented with a discussion of 
archival quality that relies on the characteristics of impartiality and authenticity 
which reside in the archival record and which are themselves a result of a specific 
process of creation and custody. This viewpoint was to be challenged by a younger 
contemporary of Jenkinson’s in the US.  
2.2.3. 1930s-1960s (US) 
Theodore R. Schellenberg (1903-1970) worked in the US National 
Archives31 from 1935-1963. During the Second World War he was Chief of the 
Division of Agricultural Department Archives, before becoming Director of Archival 
Management, and later Assistant Archivist of the US. Schellenberg formulated 
procedures for scheduling records for disposal and his experience led him to 
introduce an appraisal programme to cope with the large volume of new government 
records.32 Schellenberg has been described as ‘the great American writer on 
appraisal’.33 His 1956 publication, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques, 
remains an influential work, both in the US and abroad, and suggests a different 
approach to that of Jenkinson, with whom Schellenberg is often compared and 
contrasted.  
Although it was the publication of Modern Archives that made Schellenberg 
a household name amongst archivists, much of the content of his book is prefigured 
not only in earlier pamphlets and articles he produced for the US National Archives, 
but also in the work of many of his colleagues.34 Schellenberg’s archival theory did 
not appear in a vacuum, instead the 1930s and 1940s in the US witnessed several 
important developments in the formation of an archival profession: the US National 
Archives was founded in 1934, and the Society of American Archivists was created a 
                                                 
31 Since 1985, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington DC, US. 
32 Wayne C. Grover, Archivist of the United States, Foreword to T. R. Schellenberg, ‘The Appraisal 
of Modern Public Records’, Bulletins of the National Archives No. 8, (Washington DC, National 
Archives and Records Administration, October 1956). 
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(1940), 221-234; Philip G. Bauer, The Appraisal of Current and Recent Records, Staff Information 
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year later. The newly-fledged profession was keen to create a professional national 
identity with an emphasis on training and standards.35 Many American archivists 
were also keen to establish their own archival theory, believing that existing 
European theory needed to evolve to meet their specific needs and challenges. For 
example, in January 1940, Emmett J. Leahy presented a summary and comparison of 
various European approaches to appraisal in The American Archivist.36 His article, 
whilst acknowledging some of the beneficial elements of these approaches, 
concluded that the US National Archives could improve upon them by formulating 
its own disposal policy. Schellenberg was more explicit in his rejection of some of 
the long-standing existing theory; writing to a friend in July 1954, he stated:  
In my professional work I’m tired of having an old fossil cited to me 
as an authority in archival matters. I refer to Sir Hilary Jenkinson, 
former Deputy Keeper at the British Public Record Office, who wrote 
a book that is not only unreadable but that has given the Australians a 
wrong start in their archival work.37  
Schellenberg had spent time giving a lecture tour in Australia as the recipient of a 
Fulbright Award in 1954 and had witnessed at first hand some of the challenges 
facing modern recordkeepers. Modern Archives was based on his lecture series, and 
was published in Melbourne, leading one Australian commentator to proclaim that 
‘the book can perhaps claim to be Australia’s first important contribution to the 
world’s archival literature’.38 Schellenberg was probably influenced by his 
Australian trip, but Modern Archives presented an archival appraisal theory which 
was rooted in his US experience. 
 In Modern Archives Schellenberg attempted to define archives by first 
critiquing various definitions given by other archivists, including Muller, Feith and 
Fruin, Jenkinson, Casanova and Brenneke.39 Schellenberg summarized these 
definitions as including tangible and intangible elements. He stated that the tangible 
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elements, such as form, source and place of preservation, were not essential to 
archival quality as the elements could be various in nature. In comparison, he felt 
that the intangible elements were indispensable. Schellenberg believed that there 
were only two such elements – reasons for creation and values for preservation – 
which could be found in all the definitions. 40 Importantly, he dismissed Jenkinson’s 
belief in a third intangible element – that of custody – noting that this view differed 
from the other archival theorists and concluding that whilst it might be applicable to 
the medieval records with which Jenkinson was so familiar, ‘in dealing with records 
produced under modern conditions of government, proof of an “unblemished line of 
responsible custodians” or of “unbroken custody” cannot be made a test of archival 
quality’.41  
Schellenberg concluded that: 
It is obvious, therefore, that there is no final or ultimate definition of 
the term “archives”, that must be accepted without change and in 
preference to all others. The definition may be modified in each 
country to fit its particular needs.42 
Schellenberg believed that any definition of archives that was applicable in the US 
should implicitly involve an element of selection.43 In doing so, he drew a distinction 
between ‘records’ and ‘archives’ which had not previously been formalized. 
Schellenberg defined records as: 
All the papers, maps, photographs or other documentary materials, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by 
any public or private institution in pursuance of its legal obligations 
or in connection with the transaction of its proper business and 
preserved or appropriate for preservation by that institution or its 
legitimate successor as evidence of its functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, operations, or other activities or because of the 
informational value of the data contained therein.44 
He defined archives as ‘those records of any public or private institution which are 
adjudged worthy of permanent preservation for reference and research purposes and 
which have been deposited or have been selected for deposit in an archive 
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41 Ibid., 14. 
42 Ibid., 15. 
43 Ibid., 16. 
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institution’.45 Schellenberg thus introduced the notion of two different types of value 
in public records: what he called the ‘primary values’ to the originating department 
or creator, and the ‘secondary values’ to others outside of the originating department, 
including researchers.46 Schellenberg further divided the secondary values into two 
categories: ‘evidential’ and ‘informational’. The first he defined as ‘the value that 
inheres in public records because of the merit of the evidence they contain.47 
Schellenberg made explicitly clear that he did not mean a sanctity of evidence in the 
sense of ‘unbroken custody’ as proffered by Jenkinson, but that instead he referred to 
a value ‘that depends on the importance of the matter evidenced, i.e. the organization 
and functioning of the agency that produced the records’.48 Informational values, in 
contrast, were derived ‘from the information that is in public records on persons, 
places, subjects and the like with which the public agencies deal’.49 Unlike evidential 
values, the appraisal of informational values was not concerned with how and why 
the records were created, but only with the information contained within them.50  
Schellenberg believed that the primary values of records could be easily 
judged, by examining the position of the creating department in the administrative 
hierarchy, and by understanding the functions and activities performed by the 
creator.51 However, he believed that judging secondary values was less 
straightforward, depending on a knowledge of research needs and resources, and 
could never be based on absolute standards. Schellenberg argued that not only were 
such judgements likely to be relative to time and place but that this was also 
desirable, suggesting that ‘diverse judgments will spread the burden of 
documentation of a country among its various archival institutions, making one 
preserve what another may discard. Diverse judgments, in a word, may well assure a 
more adequate social documentation’.52 Furthermore, Schellenberg believed that 
archivists were ideally placed to make such judgements, due to their training as 
historians.53  
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Through the work of Schellenberg we arrive at a very different notion of 
appraisal to that proposed by Jenkinson. Schellenberg held that the appraisal of 
records should be based on certain characteristics, which are established in the 
record during current use (the primary values), and in characteristics which can be 
attributed to the record later during research use (the secondary values).  
Schellenberg republished his ideas in The Appraisal of Modern Records, 
Bulletin of the National Archives, No. 8 in October 1956.54 This pamphlet made 
explicit his view that whilst the primary values are of importance, it is the secondary 
values which are the reasons why public records are preserved in an archival 
institution: ‘because they have values that will exist long after they cease to be of 
current use, and because their values will be for others than their current users’.55 
Schellenberg also expanded on his theory of secondary value, suggesting that there 
were a number of tests that might be applied to judge the evidential and 
informational values of records. Schellenberg suggested that a practical test was 
required to judge the evidential value in records, describing the test as ‘an objective 
approach’ that depended on thorough knowledge of the source of the records and 
their relation to the activity for which they were first created.56 In order to judge the 
informational value of records, Schellenberg suggested that three tests could be 
applied; that of uniqueness, form, and importance.57 In the first two tests, 
consideration should be given to both the information contained in the record and the 
record itself, with judgement being seemingly straightforward; but Schellenberg 
admitted that in the test of importance the archivist ‘is in the realm of the 
imponderable, for who can say definitely if a given body of records is important, and 
for what purpose and to whom?’.58 Nonetheless he believed that such evaluation was 
possible by an archivist who had a ‘specialized knowledge of subject-matter fields 
                                                 
54 Theodore R. Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Archives, Bulletin of the National Archives 
No. 8 (Washington DC: NARA, 1956).  
55 Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Archives, 4. Interestingly, Schellenberg’s creation of a 
hierarchy of values in this way contrasted with an earlier viewpoint he had held which implied a 
neutral grouping of different record values, each equally important. In 1949, Schellenberg had listed 
four types of value in records as follows: 1. Values for administrative, legal, and fiscal uses by the 
Government; 2. Values for the protection of the civic, legal, property, and other rights of the citizen; 
3. Values for purposes of functional documentation, and; 4. Values for research purposes. He further 
noted that ‘the various types of values constitute four aspects of a single problem and that all must be 
taken into account in any appraisal. Records may have sufficient value to justify their permanent 
retention if only one type of value is attached to them’, Disposition of Federal Records, 5. 
56 Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Archives, 5. 
57 Ibid., 19. 
58 Ibid., 22. 
50 
 
pertinent to the records’ and ‘a general knowledge of the resources and products of 
research’.59  
Schellenberg provided several examples of the different types and series of 
records, which should be preserved, before acknowledging that ‘the standards should 
never be regarded as absolute or final. At best they will serve merely as guidelines to 
steer the archivist through the treacherous shoals of appraisal’.60 He concluded that 
appraisal standards must be applied with ‘moderation and common sense’ and must 
be based on thorough analyses of ‘the documentation bearing on the matter to which 
the records pertain’.61 Schellenberg also argued that the archivist should seek the 
advice of scholars, but must assume ‘a role of moderator’ in making the final 
decision.62 The text of Schellenberg’s pamphlet continues to be published on the 
NARA website, accessible in the ‘Archives and Records Management Resources’ 
section.63 
Although Schellenberg did not radically alter his views on values, he did later 
revise some of his initial theory. In 1965 Schellenberg published another book, 
entitled The Management of Archives.64 In this volume Schellenberg traced the 
development of the archival profession in the US.65 He determined that his principles 
and techniques, borne out of his experience at the US National Archives, were 
equally applicable to private records as they were to public records.66 Throughout 
the publication Schellenberg also drew specific comparison and contrast with the 
methodology and techniques applied by the library profession. 
2.2.4. Influence of Jenkinson and Schellenberg in US, UK and Australia 
English-language archival appraisal theory during the first half of the 
twentieth century was dominated by the ideas of Jenkinson and Schellenberg. Their 
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theories had an impact in non-English-speaking countries67 and support was not 
confined to the theorist’s own country of origin. For example, in the US, Margaret 
Cross Norton (1891-1984) echoed many of Jenkinson’s views. In 1922 Norton 
became the first head of the Illinois State Library, a position she held until retirement 
in 1957. Norton agreed with Jenkinson that the interests of history and research 
should be of secondary concern to the archivist. In her view the archivist’s primary 
duty was as a public official, as a ‘custodian of the legal records of the state’.68 
Norton defined archives as ‘business records of a government, a business firm, an 
ecclesiastical body or even of an individual, preserved as a memorandum of business 
transactions, and particularly because they are potential evidence for any court or 
other legal proceedings’.69 Whilst she acknowledged that these same archives often 
held significant value for the historian, she believed that this was not the primary 
purpose for keeping such records. Norton warned archivists of ‘consciously created’ 
history, which she viewed as being ‘dangerously close to propaganda’.70 She 
believed that ‘historians of the future will be best served if the records are well 
organized and present a true representation of the administrative purposes they 
served’.71 
Like Jenkinson, Norton talked about ‘archive quality’, as well as the 
uniqueness and authenticity of archival records. She also viewed official custody as 
an important condition for the existence of this archival quality, stating that ‘the 
value of the original […] is impaired if it has been out of the custody of its own 
archival agent and therefore may have been tampered with or without his 
knowledge’.72 Norton also agreed with Jenkinson about the importance of 
provenance and the preservation of the archival fonds. Although she used different 
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language to Jenkinson, her views on the natural accumulation of archives are similar 
in content as she stated that ‘the records systems of most government offices, like 
Topsy, “just growed”. Records have come into existence as a by-product of 
governmental activity rather than as planned activities’.73  
Norton was writing at a time when the volume of documentation produced by 
the US Government was dramatically increasing and she recognized that there was a 
need to apply selection criteria to determine what records to keep as archives. Norton 
believed that a democracy enabled the process of archive-keeping by embedding 
within its laws the rights of its citizens to their records; that government officials ‘do 
not own the records that result from their activities but merely act as custodians of 
the records on behalf of the people’.74 Norton viewed the primary purpose of 
preserving archives as that of facilitating business administration. She also regarded 
appraisal as a relatively straightforward matter, commenting that ‘it is comparatively 
easy to select records of permanent value [and] relatively easy to decide on those of 
no value’.75 However, she also acknowledged that many records were ‘borderline’. 
Norton also recognized that whilst historical research was a secondary concern for 
archivists, it nonetheless played a role in archival appraisal and often presented the 
archivist with the most difficult decisions about which records to keep.76 Norton 
suggested that one possible solution to assist the archivist was to select an arbitrary 
date prior to which all records must be kept.77 Norton believed it was the archivist 
who was best placed to make appraisal decisions, ‘though he will of course be 
guided by advice from the responsible records officials of the departments’.78  
In the UK, articles in the two professional journals of the period – the 
Journal of the Society of Archivists and the British Records Association’s Archives – 
suggest a lack of professional debate about archival appraisal theory; at least in terms 
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of published work.79 Many articles reinforce support of Jenkinson’s theories; some 
on nationalistic grounds, with one archivist dismissing articles in the International 
Council on Archives’ new journal, Archivum, introduced in 1952, because they 
appeared to regard ‘archives neither as documentary arsenals of the administration 
nor as national shrines, but simply as granaries for the historian’.80 The sense that the 
English profession knows better comes across strongly; for example, debate occurred 
later in the 1960s about attempts by the ICA to publish a Lexicon of Archival Terms. 
Contributors complained about ‘bowdlerization’ as they protested that the accepted 
English usage of certain terms like ‘archives’ and ‘records’, based on Jenkinson’s 
sense of the words, differed to the definitions presented by the ICA.81 Jenkinson was 
a regular contributor to both journals and appears to have cast a long shadow among 
his UK contemporaries.  
Australian archival theory and practice in the early twentieth century is 
influenced by both Jenkinson and Schellenberg in turn. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
given their shared history, British archival practice was easily applied to Australian 
recordkeeping and there were regular international exchanges as Australian 
archivists undertook placements at the PRO in London.82 However, compared to the 
UK journals, articles in the Australian Archives and Manuscripts give the impression 
of a very outward looking profession, with regular reviews of foreign language 
literature and reports from international conferences.83 Schellenberg’s visit to 
Australia in 1954, and the subsequent publication of Modern Archives based on his 
lecture series there, cemented his influence in the development of Australian archival 
theory. However, perhaps due to a comparative lack of urgent need to reduce large 
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volumes of records, the Australian archival profession made no further significant 
contribution to archival appraisal theory until the mid 1990s.84 
2.2.5. Concluding remarks 
 Archival appraisal theory in the early twentieth century was dominated by 
British archivist, Sir Hilary Jenkinson, whose theories were in turn challenged by 
American archivist, Theodore R. Schellenberg. The two archivists had different 
views on the nature of archives, on selection and on the role of the archivist.85 Their 
differing approaches to appraisal greatly influenced the archival profession, both in 
their own countries and elsewhere; and provided the foundations for profoundly 
distinctive methods of archival appraisal that were to develop later. 
2.3. The late twentieth century 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The last forty years of the twentieth century can be split into two halves in 
terms of the development of archival appraisal theory. The decades from the late 
1960s through to the early 1980s can be characterized as seeing the development and 
consolidation of existing theories as archivists, particularly in the US, began to apply 
the theories of Schellenberg and Jenkinson to non-central government records.86 
Taxonomic approaches to archival appraisal came to the fore, with attempts to 
provide criteria to identify the intrinsic value of archives. In Canada, a new approach 
following the theories of German archivist, Hans Booms, developed. The last 
decades of the twentieth century, however, witnessed significant changes in archival 
theory in general, and in thinking about appraisal in particular. The word ‘paradigm’ 
has perhaps become over-used in recent archival literature but several writers have 
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used this term to describe the perceived shift which took place during this later 
period.87 Developments in archival theory have, of course, taken place within a 
much wider context and have therefore been influenced by critical thinking in the 
fields of philosophy, literature and history, most notably by postmodernist theory.88 
Influenced by new thinking in other fields, archival theorists began to question their 
traditional approaches and sought alternative appraisal theories that could work 
within a postmodern paradigm. The advent of new technologies and the proliferation 
of digital records in the later twentieth century also impacted on the archival 
profession. Appraisal theories had to work in practice not only for traditional paper-
based records, but also for electronic records. In particular, the writings of a non-
archivist, David Bearman, were to have a significant impact on thinking about 
archival appraisal in North America and Australia. 
2.3.2. 1970s and 1980s (US) 
  In the 1970s and early 1980s many appraisal theories, especially in the US, 
were based on a taxonomic approach. In 1977 University of Illinois archivist, 
Maynard J. Brichford, authored the first manual to be published by the Society of 
American Archivists (SAA), entitled Archives and Manuscripts: Appraisal and 
Accessioning.89 Brichford expanded Schellenberg’s appraisal theory, arguing that the 
archivist’s role was to appraise records by analyzing their ‘functional, evidential and 
informational characteristics’.90 Brichford suggested various criteria for this analysis 
including the age, volume, and form of the records; administrative, legal and fiscal 
value; and research value – which could be judged by attributes such as uniqueness, 
credibility, understandability, time span, accessibility, frequency of use and type and 
quality of use.91 Brichford argued that any determination of ‘archival value’, which 
he defined as ‘the lasting value in records’, had to take into consideration the 
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relationship with other records.92 Referencing the earlier work of Philip Bauer, 
Brichford argued that any such evaluation also had to include the costs of processing, 
preservation and storage.93  
In the 1980s a Committee on Intrinsic Value was set up by the US National 
Archives with the specific aim to write a comprehensive definition of intrinsic value 
– to define the qualities and characteristics of records that, in the Committee’s 
opinion, had inherent value and therefore should be preserved. Against the 
background of large-scale microfilming programmes, which claimed to provide a 
cost-effective solution to the long-term retention of originals, the Committee aimed 
to demonstrate the applicability of the concept of intrinsic value in appraisal decision 
making. The Committee reported its findings in September 1980, published as 
Intrinsic Value in Archival Material, Staff Information Paper No. 21 in 1982.94 The 
definition of intrinsic value proposed by the Committee stated that ‘intrinsic value is 
the archival term that is applied to permanently valuable records that have qualities 
and characteristics that make the records in their original form the only archivally 
acceptable form for preservation’.95 It continued to state that these qualities could be 
both physical (relating to the physical form or the means by which information is 
recorded on the record) and intellectual (relating to the information contained in the 
record, or the purposes for which the record might be used). The Committee set out a 
list of nine criteria for establishing intrinsic value, stating that for a record to have 
intrinsic value it must possess at least one of these criteria; and the more criteria 
possessed, the greater the archival value it is likely to have, although the Committee 
established no explicit hierarchy among the criteria. The criteria were:  
1. Physical form that may be the subject for study if the records 
provide meaningful documentation or significant examples of the 
form; 
2. Aesthetic or artistic quality; 
3. Unique or curious physical features; 
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4. Age that provides a quality of uniqueness; 
5. Value for use in exhibits; 
6. Questionable authenticity, date, author, or other characteristic that 
is significant and ascertainable by physical examination;  
7. General and substantial public interest because of direct association 
with famous or historically significant people, places, things, issues, 
or events; 
8. Significance as documentation of the establishment or continuing 
legal basis of an agency or institution; 
9. Significance as documentation of the formulation of policy at the 
highest executive levels when the policy has significance and broad 
effect throughout or beyond the agency or institution.96 
The Committee admitted that whilst it believed the concept of intrinsic value 
to be absolute, it believed that the application of the concept was relative and that 
‘opinions concerning whether records have intrinsic value may vary from archivist to 
archivist and from one generation of archivists to another’.97 The report concluded 
with three examples that applied the criteria for intrinsic value to particular series of 
records in the US National Archives. The approach taken by the Committee 
remained popular within the archival profession both in the US and elsewhere as 
archivists developed and expanded their own lists of criteria for appraising 
archives.98 
The development of archival appraisal theory in the US in the 1980s was 
affected by a wider discussion about the relevance and interaction of theory in 
archival practice, led by a polemical debate in The American Archivist journal 
between several archivists including Frank G. Burke, Harold Pinkett, Lester J. 
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Cappon and John W. Roberts.99 On one side, Roberts commented that ‘with so much 
to work on, high-falutin’ archival theory seems a rather superfluous and unpromising 
diversion’.100 On the other side there was agreement that archival theory was of 
benefit to the profession, but disagreement as to the state of American archival 
theory. Burke argued that contrary to popular belief Schellenberg did not develop a 
theory but instead merely ‘developed a series of lectures that were practical and 
reportorial rather than contemplative and theoretical’.101 In contrast, Pinkett 
defended Schellenberg and others, and contended that US archival theory was real 
and was characteristic of American thought in general, being ‘tentative, fragmented, 
directed at the immediate objective and intense practicality’.102 Cappon, for his part, 
firmly defended the European tradition, arguing that it was the theory of Jenkinson, 
with his emphasis on distinguishing between ‘archival truth’ and ‘historical truth’, 
that was fundamental to the development of the American archival profession.103  
The call for American archival theorists did not go unheeded as several new 
models for appraisal theory were published in the 1980s. In 1985 university 
archivists Frank Boles and Julia Marks Young produced an appraisal model for 
institutional records which followed earlier taxonomic approaches.104 Boles and 
Young developed the theories of Schellenberg, arguing that this was necessary due 
to the narrow context of central government records in which he had worked. They 
argued that Schellenberg’s ideas about the primacy of evidential values over 
informational values reflected the legal priorities of NARA and therefore were not 
necessarily applicable outside a government context.105 Instead Boles and Young 
believed that ‘archivists mix together a variety of values and record characteristics 
and pull from the box a determination of the records’ value’.106 The model they 
produced took into consideration several components including the value of the 
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information, the costs of retention and the implications of the appraisal 
recommendations. Importantly, Boles and Young argued that appraisal decisions 
were cumulative, with no components standing alone but instead each interacting 
with the others.107 
 A new approach to archival appraisal was proposed the following year by 
Helen Willa Samuels, archivist at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who 
published an influential article entitled ‘Who Controls the Past’.108 In the article 
Samuels argued for a co-operative approach to archive-keeping, suggesting that 
complex relationships between institutions and individuals in modern society mean 
that records are increasingly integrated and therefore cannot be treated separately by 
single archival institutions.109 Samuels urged that archivists must widen their 
concept of ‘collection’ beyond the boundaries of their own institution and should co-
operate in acquisition strategies and planning.110 Samuels called this new proposed 
programme of co-operative appraisal, ‘Documentation Strategy’, and explained that 
it consisted of four activities:  
1) choosing and defining the topic to be documented, 2) selecting the 
advisors and establishing the site for the strategy, 3) structuring the 
inquiry and examining the form and substance of the available 
documentation, and 4) selecting and placing the documentation.111 
Samuels detailed how each activity might be carried out by partnerships or networks 
of archival institutions and concluded that such activities would enable ‘each 
collection and each repository [to become] a part of a larger collection – our nation’s 
collection’.112  
Samuels’ theory was a response to the ‘GAP Report’ of the SAAs’ task force 
on identifying goals and priorities for the profession, of which she was a member. 
The report named the first priority to be ‘the identification and retention of records of 
enduring value’.113 Two years later, as part of two special issues of The American 
Archivist devoted to the US archival research agenda, Samuels and Richard J. Cox, 
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archivist in New York State Archive and Records Administration, published an 
article that reiterated the principles of the documentation strategy approach.114 Cox 
and Samuels defined what they called ‘enduring value’ as information that 
documents modern society, and they argued that records cannot be evaluated in 
isolation but that archivists must see beyond the traditional notion of appraisal tied to 
single institutions and the collecting of historical records.115 They outlined several 
research projects, which they believed were necessary to improve theory in the area 
of archival appraisal, including an exploration of the nature of the documentary 
record and the interrelated nature of archival records, automated records, and 
automated record systems. The article cited Samuels’ earlier definition of 
documentation strategy: 
a plan formulated to assure the documentation of an ongoing issue, 
activity or geographical area […] carried out through the mutual 
efforts of many institutions and individuals influencing both the 
creation of the records and the archival retention of a portion of 
them.116 
Cox and Samuels argued that documentation strategy provided an important tool in 
acting as the nexus to undertake this work. They emphasized an holistic approach, 
aimed at ensuring that what is preserved in archival institutions are records that are 
adequate to document modern society.117  
2.3.3. 1980s (Canada)  
 The 1980s also saw developments in appraisal theory in Canada. Although a 
professional archival body had existed under the auspices of the Canadian Historical 
Association since the 1950s, in 1975 the archival profession came of age with the 
formation of the Association of Canadian Archivists (ACA). Like their American 
counterparts some thirty years earlier, Canadian archivists were keen to create a 
professional national identity with an emphasis on training and standards.118 Former 
British archivist, Hugh A. Taylor, who emigrated to Canada in 1965, identified some 
of the unique features of Canadian archival practice, noting that the Public Archives 
                                                 
114 Richard J. Cox and Helen W. Samuels, ‘The Archivists’ First Responsibility: A Research Agenda 
to Improve the Identification and Retention of Records of Enduring Value’, AA, 51.1 (1988), 28-42. 
115 Cox and Samuels, 30. 
116 Samuels, ‘Who Controls the Past’, 115; cited in Cox and Samuels, 39. 
117 Cox and Samuels, 33-9. 
118 See Archivaria, (Ottawa: Association of Canadian Archivists), 1975-1990. 
61 
 
of Canada119 was founded on the concept that the national archives should have 
custody of both public records and private manuscripts – a concept that became 
known as ‘Total Archives’.120 Taylor also commented that in comparison to the UK 
and US, it was archives that led the historical profession in Canada and not vice 
versa.121 Nonetheless a debate about the relationship between archivists and 
historians took place in the ACA’s journal Archivaria in the 1980s. The debate arose 
against a background of technological developments within society at large, which 
led to a multiplicity of records media and an increase in non-paper records, as well as 
posing challenges to the archival profession from newly-developing professions such 
as records management and information science.122 It can be argued that at the core 
of the debate is a disagreement about the nature and value of archives.  
George Bolotenko, an archivist at the Public Archives of Canada, began the 
debate by challenging and rejecting Norton’s theories which prioritized the legal and 
administrative value of records over their historical value.123 Bolotenko also 
questioned Schellenberg’s perceived alliance with library science, arguing that such 
an alliance was futile given the vital component of historical context within archival 
theory. Bolotenko argued that archivists must remain rooted in historiography and 
should not become administrators, technicians or bureaucrats.124 Anthony L. Rees 
argued against Bolotenko, alternatively proposing that the first duty of an archivist is 
to provide administrative services to his parent body.125 Brian S. Osborne took issue 
with Rees’ viewpoint, suggesting that Rees ‘appears to be motivated more by 
economic pragmatism and an implicit belief in the old adage “whoever pays the 
piper calls the tune”’.126 Osborne questioned the ownership rights over archives, 
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which are implied by Rees, and argued that it is society as a whole that has the right 
to heritage and that the archivist’s true sponsor is the general public.127 
 The debate about the different perspectives on the value of archives sparked 
more discussion and analysis than ever before in the journal and the following issue 
of Archivaria included a special feature containing several articles on the subject, 
written from a variety of viewpoints.128 The articles demonstrate the range of 
opinion that existed at this time within the Canadian archival profession, with some 
praising Bolotenko and commenting that his article ‘should serve as a clarion call to 
those archivists who are being pushed into the abyss of “information 
management”’;129 whilst others argued that being a good archivist did not necessitate 
being an historian.130 Subsequent articles continued to illustrate what appeared to be 
a growing rift within the Canadian archival profession.131 Richard J. Cox 
demonstrated the extent of the close links between the Canadian and American 
archival professions when he contributed an article to Archivaria in Winter 
1984/85.132 Cox added his views to the debate, presenting a viewpoint from the US 
which argued against Bolotenko and praised Lester Cappon who, whilst 
acknowledging the links between archives and history, also saw the need for an 
alliance with records management theory. Cox argued that both the administrative 
and historical values of records should be acknowledged.133 
 Much of the discussion about archival theory in Canada throughout this 
period makes reference to, and is based on interpretations of, the existing appraisal 
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theories of Jenkinson and Schellenberg.134 Richard Stapleton presented a detailed 
critique of the two theorists, demonstrating the differences between them (i.e., their 
definitions of archives) but also the common ground between them (i.e., their shared 
emphasis on provenance).135 However, in 1987, an alternative approach toward 
archival appraisal was presented through the publication of a translated article by 
German archivist, Hans Booms.136 Booms, President of the Federal Archives of 
West Germany, believed that archives must be appraised for their value as a record 
of society and that archivists have an explicit social responsibility:  
The importance of archives in helping to resolve the question of 
sources makes it clear that the writing of history is possible only 
because of the existence of a documentary heritage in material form, 
and that the documentary heritage is the material source of a society’s 
historical consciousness.137 
Booms argued that the selection of documentary heritage should be based on the 
importance that the creating society gave to the particular social phenomena:  
Archivists must not follow the value concepts of their own time 
period, but rather, those of the time from which the material 
originated. […] Measuring the societal significance of past facts by 
analysing the value which their contemporaries attached to them 
should serve as the foundation for all archival efforts towards forming 
documentary heritage.138 
Booms believed that despite the inherent bias, which necessarily exists within any 
appraisal process, an interaction between archivists, scholars and administrators can 
lead to the creation of a documentary heritage that evidences the entire spectrum of 
social phenomena. He argued that although absolute objectivity in appraisal is 
unachievable, nonetheless his approach will enable archivists to ‘distance themselves 
from their subjectivity to the greatest possible extent’.139 
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 Hans Booms’ ideas were already known outside Germany; for example, in 
1976 Ake Kromnow gave a conference paper at the Eighth International Congress on 
Archives in Washington DC which made reference to Booms’ theories.140 Kromnow 
noted that there was an inherent difficulty in Booms’ method of judging records 
according to standards contemporary with the records because certain phenomena 
are noticed later, or after the passage of a considerable length of time.141 A 1980 
workshop on appraising contemporary collections, held in Boston’s JFK Library, 
also included reference to Booms and formed the basis of Nancy Peace’s 1984 
publication, Archival Choices: Managing the Historical Record in an Age of 
Abundance.142 Nonetheless, the publication of Booms’ translated article in 
Archivaria in 1987 directly inspired the development of a new approach to archival 
appraisal in Canada, called macro-appraisal, which was to be advanced by the 
National Archives of Canada and Canadian archivists including Terry Cook in the 
1990s. 
2.3.4. 1990s 
One archivist has described the 1990s as a period of ‘appraisal wars’ – a 
period in which contradictory ideas appeared, appraisal theory was fractured and 
there was a lack of consensus on what ‘good’ selection meant.143 Faced with 
challenges from new technology and postmodernist theory, archivists began to 
question traditional appraisal methodologies. Attempts to find appraisal solutions led 
to divergent approaches that highlighted fundamental differences in the ways in 
which archives, records, and notions of value were conceived. 
A re-interpretation of existing archival theory initially came from an 
unexpected source – from David Bearman, a specialist in designing and 
implementing IT systems for libraries, archives and museums.144 In Spring 1987, 
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Bearman established a consultancy business and a new quarterly journal entitled 
Archives and Museum Informatics.145 The aim of the journal was to conduct research 
and publish. Bearman explained that he used the term ‘informatics’ to ‘express a 
philosophy of looking at the cultural information missions of archives and museums 
broadly in order to address a range of new approaches, techniques, and technologies 
that can enhance an organization’s profile and achieve its mission’.146 
Bearman contributed articles to both Archivaria and The American Archivist; 
and through his own publishing venture, which included a series of Technical 
Reports, his views on archival appraisal reached a wide audience. Bearman noted the 
challenges faced by archivists, particularly the growing volume and variety of 
records compared to the lack of resources available to deal with them.147 Bearman 
argued that traditional approaches to archival appraisal, based on attempts to identify 
and classify values, had ‘serious shortcomings’ as tools for making appraisal 
decisions within a given institution, and were ‘fatally flawed in helping to make 
broader decisions’.148 Bearman criticized the implied cost-benefit analysis of many 
appraisal theories, commenting that it was impossible to calculate a ‘value’ of 
archives in this way. Instead Bearman proposed a methodology based on a risk 
management approach. He commented that ‘instead of asking what benefits would 
derive from retaining records, [archivists] should insist on an answer to the 
probability of incurring unacceptable risks as a consequence of disposing of 
records’.149 Bearman argued that efforts to create a ‘“representative” record’ were 
doomed to failure because of the inherent bias in the process. He suggested that the 
only way to ensure an adequate documentation that truly represented the whole of 
society was to shift the focus from the records themselves to the business functions 
of which the records were evidence:   
In the place of vague General Records Schedules based on media 
characteristics and types of records series, the archivist can require 
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that a record of a stated activity or event be kept that is adequate to 
reconstruct what happened and why.150  
Bearman argued that such an approach would allow appraisal judgements to be made 
prior to records creation as the archivist would work with the creating departments to 
ensure that they documented certain activities and functions.151 
 In order to cope with the challenges and costs of preserving electronic 
records, Bearman also suggested that archivists replace the concept of ‘permanent 
retention’ with ‘the more realistic concept of “retention for period of continuing 
value”’.152 Bearman was aware of the threats posed by new technologies which, 
through the physical volatility of the format, might prevent the communication of 
information over time. As a result he believed that it was vital to preserve the 
‘evidential context of information creation’; to preserve not only the records but the 
systems in which the records were created.153 Bearman argued that it was not 
sufficient to merely keep or store records; but rather that the professional role of the 
archivist should be to make sense of the documentation and to make it accessible to 
future generations.154 
Bearman has been described by some as a ‘neo-Jenkinsonian’ because he 
reinterpreted provenance, or the place from which archives originate. Bearman 
applied it to records’ functions rather than the records themselves, which has been 
viewed by some archivists as an updating of Jenkinson’s approach to appraisal.155 
By basing selection on risk management principles with a primary concern for the 
creation of records for organizational accountability, Bearman removed the need for 
archivists to appraise individual records. 
 Writing in 1997, Terry Cook argued that David Bearman ‘is the most 
important figure in contemporary archival thinking’ and that as a ‘destablizer, a 
questioner, a leader in challenging the old and envisaging the new’, he had 
‘revolutionalized thinking in archival circles around the world’.156 Bearman’s 
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approach to appraisal, laying the emphasis on evidence of business functions, was 
taken up by many archivists, including Richard J. Cox. Bearman and Cox worked on 
what became known as the Pittsburgh Project, which sought to define the functional 
requirements for preserving digital records. The requirements were based on law, 
customs and best practice, and focused on the preservation of evidence rather than on 
application requirements for specific archive or recordkeeping systems.157 The 
research undertaken at the University of Pittsburgh had a significant influence on the 
appraisal policies of many US and international archival institutions.158  
Another archivist who placed an emphasis on records as evidence of business 
transactions was Luciana Duranti, professor of archival studies at Canada’s 
University of British Columbia. Duranti presented a history of the development of 
European archival appraisal theory based on Roman Law and rooted in concepts of 
perpetual memory and public faith.159 Duranti argued that the archival mission is a 
by-product of administrative actions and that the role of the archivist is to preserve 
archives ‘uncorrupted, that is, endowed with the integrity they had when their 
creators […] set them aside for continuing preservation’.160 Using the writings of 
Jenkinson as a framework, Duranti argued that although the evaluation of content 
was an unavoidable element in appraisal judgements, it should always remain 
secondary to considerations of record origin, structure and function in order to 
minimize as much as possible the biases of archivists.161 Duranti believed that the 
‘moral defence of archives’, as promoted by Jenkinson and Norton, had been 
undermined by Schellenberg who instead promoted ‘the cultural identity of archival 
repositories and the role of archivists as appraisers of records’.162 Duranti stressed 
that ‘if what qualifies documents as archival is their nature – as Jenkinson believed – 
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the idea of attributing values to them is in profound conflict with archival theory’.163 
Duranti argued that in order to ensure the integrity and impartiality of archives, there 
must be no attribution of ‘externally imposed values’, but instead, there should be a 
careful definition ‘of archival jurisdictions and acquisition policies’.164 Furthermore, 
Duranti insisted that ‘archivists are mediators and facilitators, custodians and 
preservers of societal evidence, not documenters and interpreters, or even judges, of 
societal deeds’.165  
Duranti believed that the solutions to appraising modern paper and digital 
records could be found in the discipline of diplomatics, detailing her views in a 
series of articles published in Archivaria from 1989-1991.166 Diplomatics theory, 
grounded in business processes and transactions, informed the International Research 
on Permanent Authentic Records in Electronic Systems project, known as 
InterPARES, led by Duranti.167 Presenting an alternative model to that proposed by 
the Pittsburgh Project, the InterPARES research linked the determination of a 
record’s value with the notion of whether or not the record is authentic.168 
InterPARES made a significant contribution to archival appraisal theory and, as an 
ongoing project, continues to influence approaches to the appraisal of electronic 
records both in Canada and internationally.169 
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Despite the influence of the theories of Bearman and Duranti which 
reinterpreted Jenkinson for the digital age, some archivists began to question whether 
their approaches focused too narrowly on evidence of business transactions at the 
cost of a wider archival mission that included cultural and social dimensions. For 
example, Terry Cook, praised Bearman for his revolutionary thinking, but also 
suggested that his theories had significant weaknesses when it came to considering 
private sector and governmental archives, and that greater focus was needed on the 
actual record.170  
As has been previously noted, the National Archives of Canada171 had long 
followed a policy known as ‘Total Archives’ which meant that unlike many other 
National Archives its holdings included both public records and private archives and 
manuscripts.172 Terry Cook worked at the National Archives of Canada from 1975-
1998, his last position there was as a senior manager responsible for directing the 
institution’s appraisal and records disposition programme for all formats of 
record.173 A prolific contributor to the professional literature, Cook criticized 
typically North American approaches to appraisal that focused on establishing value 
taxonomies and attempted to systematize various ‘values’ such as evidential, 
informational, legal, primary and secondary.174 Instead, Cook proposed a shift in 
focus ‘from the appraisal of the record to the conceptual context of its creation, from 
the physical artifact [sic] to the intellectual purpose behind it’.175 Cook developed 
Bearman’s ideas about the business functions of records and applied them more 
broadly to include wider societal-cultural functions of records and recordkeeping.176 
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Cook’s self-named ‘macro-appraisal’ approach involved ‘researching, understanding 
and evaluating the degree of importance of the functions, mandates, programmes, 
decision-making processes, internal organisation and structure, and activities of the 
records creator’.177 Cook argued that such an approach was applicable to all media 
types as it avoided issues connected with the physical nature of records, which had 
challenged those archivists dealing with electronic records.178  
The macro-appraisal approach was a top-down approach that looked for 
values not in the records themselves but in the functions and structures that created 
the records. Underpinning Cook’s theory was a belief that these structures were ‘a 
manifestation of societal functions’.179 Cook was greatly influenced by the work of 
Hans Booms and Hugh A. Taylor, and believed that archives ‘should reflect more 
globally the society that creates them’.180 In Cook’s view, the goal of archival 
institutions was not merely to preserve the records of government, but was to 
‘preserve recorded evidence of governance’; in which ‘governance’ is broadly 
defined as ‘the interaction of the citizens with the state, the impact of the state on 
society, and the functions or activities of society itself’.181 Cook’s theory attempted 
to integrate notions of evidential and informational values by emphasizing the role 
records played as a nexus of activity (function), agency (structure) and citizen.182  
Cook enthusiastically embraced postmodernist theory, arguing that it 
provided an opportunity to re-examine traditional concepts and approaches in 
archival theory and to refresh and enlighten thinking about appraisal.183 As 
previously detailed in Chapter 1, postmodernism is a late twentieth-century set of 
critical practices which have pervaded many aspects of society, and have challenged 
ideas about narrative, meaning and truth.184 The work of postmodernist theorists 
                                                 
177 Terry Cook, An Appraisal Methodology: Guidelines for Performing an Archival Appraisal, 3rd 
Draft (Ontario: Government Archives Division, National Archives of Canada, 1991) 4. 
178 Cook, ‘Mind Over Matter’, 39. 
179 Ibid., 49.  
180 Terry Cook, ‘What Is Past Is Prologue: A History of Archival Ideas Since 1898, and the Future of 
the Paradigm Shift’, Archivaria, 43 (1997), 17-63, (30). 
181 Cook,’ What is Past is Prologue’, 34. 
182 Cook, ‘Mind Over Matter’, 55. 
183 Terry Cook, ‘Electronic Records, Paper Minds: The Revolution in Information Management and 
Archives in the Post-Custodial and Postmodern Era’, AM, 22.2 (1994), 300-29. 
184 Gary Aylesworth, ‘Postmodernism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward 
N. Zalta (Summer 2013 edn.): http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/postmodernism/ 
[accessed 1 March 2012]; John Ridener, From Polders to Postmodernism: A Concise History of 
71 
 
such as Jacques Derrida, in particular, raised questions about the nature of archival 
creation and preservation. Derrida argued that ‘the technical structure of the 
archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its 
very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization 
produces as much as it records the event’.185 Archival theorists began to draw 
inspiration from postmodernist theory and apply its critiques to archival theory.186 
In the mid-1990s a fierce debate took place in the pages of Archivaria, about 
the implications of postmodernism for archival theory and practice. The main 
protagonists were Brien Brothman, Terry Eastwood and Terry Cook, and the main 
point of contention centred on notions of archival value. Drawing heavily on the 
work of postmodernist theorists such as Michel Foucault and Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Brothman posited that archival institutions were bounded spaces that reflected 
cultural and social values.187 Brothman argued that ‘individuals are not the ultimate 
source of value and order creation. The point is that social communities create and 
destroy value’.188 Furthermore, he believed that in their efforts to process archives, 
to sort and catalogue archives, archivists actually create value:  
Archival appraisal, for example, is not merely a process of value 
identification but of value creation or destruction. It entails more than 
simply identifying archival or historical value that already exists in a 
document before archivists encounter it. As they make decisions 
about archival or historical value, archivists in effect create, initiate or 
perpetuate an axiological commitment which is manifested in the 
permanence of the order that emerges.189 
Brothman argued that the archival profession needed to question its traditional 
assumptions, particularly in the face of advances in information and communications 
technology.  
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Terry Eastwood published a highly critical retort to Brothman, suggesting not 
only that his writing was opaque and confusing, but, more importantly, that his ideas 
were leading archivists in entirely the wrong direction.190 Eastwood argued that 
whilst archives were indeed socially determined, it was from the original context in 
which they were generated, and not as historical sources. Eastwood argued that: 
the purpose of the archivist […] is to preserve the integrity of the 
archival documents as faithful and trustworthy evidence of the actions 
from which they originated. It is precisely the value of the documents 
as established before they come to the archives which the archivist is 
entrusted to protect.191  
Referring to the writings of Jenkinson and Norton, Eastwood defined this value as ‘a 
general value which all the documents possess. It pertains to no single purpose for 
which they may be used but equally to all purposes’.192 Eastwood expanded on this 
idea in a second article that emphasized the primary value of records as evidence: 
Archival documents do capture a moment in time, fix and freeze it as 
it were, in order to preserve some sense of it for future use, some 
sense of the unique character of the actions and events from which the 
documents arose. […] Archival documents are thus evidence first and 
information second.193 
Eastwood further suggested that the evaluation of archives should be based on 
provenance, pertinence, and use. Despite acknowledging the ‘abstract’ nature of all 
of these concepts, he nonetheless argued that, in particular, a determination of the 
use-value of records was both possible and desirable.194  
 Cook weighed in on the argument in the following issue of Archivaria, 
commenting that he found Eastwood’s refusal ‘to acknowledge that archivists are 
agents, conscious or unconscious, willing or unwilling, of the historical process in 
which they find themselves incomprehensible’.195 In 1997 Cook wrote another 
article that firmly defended his ‘macro’ approach to archival appraisal.196 Cook 
acknowledged the importance of postmodernist thought in helping archivists to 
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recognize their role as ‘active shapers of the archival heritage’.197 He argued that this 
shift in thinking, which took place during the second half of the twentieth century, 
coupled with the proliferation of multi-media records that required appraisal to begin 
at the point of records creation, had led to an overthrowing of traditional notions 
about the impartiality and passivity of the archivist.198 Debates about the changing 
perception of the archivist’s role, particularly in appraisal, would continue into the 
twenty-first century. 
Another strand in the development of archival appraisal theory during this 
period was ‘functional analysis’. Functional analysis demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of archival appraisal thinking in the 1990s as it can be seen to 
incorporate some of Cook’s macro-appraisal ideas within the function-based 
approach of Bearman.199 Functional analysis can be defined as ‘a technique that sets 
priorities for appraising and processing materials of an office based on the relative 
importance of the functions the office performs in an organisation’.200 It was a broad 
approach, whose application varied. Helen Willa Samuels was a main protagonist of 
the approach in the US. Samuels’ Varsity Letters, first published in 1992, established 
functional analysis methodology by arguing that archivists should focus on activities 
and functions rather than on structures and hierarchies in any given organization.201 
Samuels argued that whilst the latter can change considerably over time, the former 
remain relatively constant and are therefore a better basis on which to make appraisal 
decisions.202 Samuels situated her work within the context of the work of Bearman 
and his demands for a necessary revision in archival appraisal approaches; and in the 
work of Cook, Taylor and F. Gerald Ham and their calls for informed selection 
decisions based on an analytic process centred on contextual information.203 
Although written specifically about university archives, Samuels suggested that her 
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approach was equally applicable to any modern institution. She also viewed the 
approach as complementary to the documentation strategy approach, which she had 
earlier promoted, arguing that functional analysis can reveal ‘common patterns that 
permit comparison across traditional institutional boundaries’.204 The functional 
analysis approach was influential not only within the US higher education sector but 
it also transferred to a variety of applications. For example, Victoria Lemieux 
applied it to organizational models to explore how functions worked within an 
organization.205 Other archivists used it to assist in the design of classification 
schemes or applied it to other contexts including medical and local government 
archives.206 
The extent of the influence of Bearman’s ideas is underlined by their 
promulgation in Australia, where they enhanced existing strategies at the Australian 
National Archives to formulate the ‘records continuum model’ in the mid-1990s.207 
Frank Upward, a lecturer in librarianship, archives and records management at 
Monash University, developed the model in 1995 in an attempt to provide a multi-
dimensional, layered approach to recordkeeping centred at the point of records 
creation.208 Upward published two articles in Archives and Manuscripts in 1996 and 
1997 that outlined the model in detail.209 Responding to the challenges of multi-
media records, and drawing upon the work of Bearman, the Pittsburgh Project, Terry 
Cook and postmodernist theorist Jean François Lyotard among others, Upward 
suggested three principles for the model: (1) that the concept of ‘records’ should be 
inclusive of ‘archives’, defined as ‘records of continuing value’; (2) that archivists 
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needed to re-focus on records ‘as logical rather than physical entities’; and (3) that 
recordkeeping should ‘be integrated into business and societal processes and 
purposes’.210 The resulting records continuum model was continuous and 
constructed in space/time: ‘no separate parts of a continuum are readily discernible, 
and its elements pass into each other’.211 The model comprised four dimensions 
which, whilst not being strictly bounded, could be analysed as: creation; capture; 
organization; and pluralization. Upward argued that the different dimensions allowed 
the model to work for paper and electronic records, and enabled it to support both an 
evidence-based approach and a societal-collective memory approach to 
recordkeeping.212  
One commentator described the importance of the exchange of ideas between 
archivists in Australia and colleagues in North America and Europe, and noted how 
these exchanges re-invigorated Australian archival theory in the 1990s.213 Sue 
McKemmish argued that the records continuum model shifted the viewpoint from 
‘positivist notions about the existence of immutable, autonomous [principles]’, that 
were associated with ‘ideas about the objective and fixed nature of records and the 
impartial and neutral roles played by archivists in their preservation’.214 In her view, 
such notions had been replaced with postmodernist ideas that viewed records ‘as 
dynamic objects that are fixed in terms of content and meaningful elements of their 
structure, but linked to ever broadening layers of contextual metadata that manages 
their meanings and enables their accessibility and usability as they move through 
“space/time”’.215  
A different archival appraisal approach was formulated within the context of 
the appraisal of business records in the US. The approach became known as the 
Minnesota Method.216 Mark A. Greene and Todd J. Daniels-Howell, both archivists 
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at the Minnesota Historical Society, attempted to develop a pragmatic approach for 
the selection of modern business records for permanent preservation, based on the 
assumption that ‘all archival appraisal is local and subjective’.217 Nonetheless, the 
authors argued that by carefully analysing the records’ creators, appraisal criteria 
could be established that was ‘rational and efficient relative to a specific repository’s 
goals and resources’.218 Greene later summarized the methodology, stating that one 
of the primary reasons why the Minnesota Method was developed was as a response 
to the overwhelming volume of business records requiring appraisal at the Minnesota 
Historical Society.219 Greene explained that the large volume meant that appraisal 
had to take place on a series level rather than at an individual record level. In order to 
evaluate which records should be preserved the method analysed current holdings, 
took account of current and predicted staffing resources, studied the needs of users 
and considered institutional priorities and goals.220 The method categorized the 
various businesses (the record creators) into sectors and ranked them according to 
economic impact, extant documentation, identification with the state and the degree 
to which the particular sector was unique to Minnesota. These rankings in turn 
enabled Greene and his colleagues to determine which series of records should be 
preserved and actively collected by the Society.221 The Minnesota Method was 
applied to archival appraisal by other institutions, both corporate and non-
corporate.222 
Greene further developed the Minnesota Method by shifting the focus from 
records creators to the actual records, through the application of a concept of 
utilitarian value. Greene believed that an evaluation of records based on their use-
value was effective as an appraisal criterion and defended this view in a 1998 article 
in Archivaria entitled: ‘“The Surest Proof”: A Utilitarian Approach to Appraisal’.223 
Greene argued that use was ‘the only empirical measurement’ of the value that an 
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institution or society may have of its archives.224 He acknowledged that whilst an 
evaluation of use may not be entirely free of bias or wholly scientific, nonetheless, 
he regarded such an approach as ‘a step toward making more rational and thoughtful 
choices’.225  
2.3.5. Concluding remarks 
The 1990s was an extremely productive period in the development of 
archival appraisal theory. The cross-fertilization of ideas across international 
boundaries, aided by technological advances in international communications, led to 
a proliferation of related appraisal theories, many building upon and developing from 
others. Yet simultaneously greater divisions appeared within the archival community 
at large as fundamental differences in perceptions about archives, records and 
notions of value emerged. These differences were to inform archival appraisal theory 
in the twenty-first century as archivists sought to find ways to mend the divisions. 
2.4. Twenty-first century approaches to appraisal 
Broadly speaking, as yet, archival appraisal theory has not undergone any 
substantial revisions during the twenty-first century; however, it has been impacted 
by several wider-reaching phenomena including new ideas about memory, 
accountability and power, and developments such as community archives. 
Postmodernist theory has continued to shape archival theory – whether its influence 
is overtly embraced as a welcome catalyst;226 or whether it is regarded as a challenge 
against which traditional archival theory must be defended.227 In this context, the 
myriad of possible archival appraisal theories available can be seen as a series of 
adaptable guidance that provide different solutions for different situations.228  
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Existing archival appraisal theories continue to be consolidated and applied 
to a variety of archival institutions.229 The consolidation of existing theories has been 
reinforced by the publication of several compendiums detailing the development of 
archival appraisal theory from various different viewpoints; for example: Richard J. 
Cox’s No Innocent Deposits: Forming Archives by Rethinking Appraisal, bringing 
together several of his previously published articles into one monograph, emphasized 
the value of records as evidence;230 Barbara Craig’s Archival Appraisal: Theory and 
Practice promoted a Canadian perspective, comparing it with American and British 
approaches to appraisal;231 Frank Boles’ Selecting and Appraising Archives and 
Manuscripts summarized the development of appraisal theory in North America;232 
John Ridener’s From Polders to Postmodernism: A Concise History of Archival 
Theory presented a US-focused discussion of several perceived paradigm shifts that 
have shaped appraisal theory;233 Terry Eastwood and Heather MacNeil’s edited 
volume of essays, Currents of Archival Thinking, explored various aspects of 
archival theory under a broad theme of changing trends and approaches;234 and 
Controlling the Past: Documenting Society and Institutions presented a series of 
essays in honour of Helen Willa Samuels, edited by Terry Cook, that favourably 
critiqued the documentation strategy approach.235 
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 The advent of the twenty-first century also brought a sense of nostalgia and 
looking back to the previous century with the publication of the selected works of 
Hugh A. Taylor,236 Lester J. Cappon,237 and Ernst Posner.238 Journal articles also 
contributed to this sense of reviewing the past, with several articles presenting 
critical reviews of the theories of Jenkinson and Schellenberg.239 However, the new 
century also brought new ideas as interdisciplinary approaches came to the fore and 
archivists began to draw inspiration from theories in other disciplines including 
information theory,240 conceptual analysis,241 speech act theory,242 and genre 
theory.243 Changing theories about memory and identity, in particular, have also 
been used by several archivists to inform their approach towards archive and 
recordkeeping.  
For much of the early part of the twentieth century memory had been 
regarded by many archivists as ‘unreliable’ and ‘fragile’ and the primary purpose of 
archives was to counter this fragility.244 M. T. Clanchy’s influential work, From 
Memory to Written Record reinforced this common perception as he described the 
shift from orality to written records in Medieval England.245 Archives were regarded 
as providing the necessary vehicles for recollection, supplying the facts from which 
past events were revealed. The prevailing historiographical and archival discourse 
for much of the early twentieth century was that the actions and experiences of 
people in the past could be understood through the traces that those people left 
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behind in the present. The historian sought out these traces – the records and 
archives – in order to re-enact the past, to get inside the mind of the traces’ 
originators and attempt to see what really happened through their eyes.246 In the later 
twentieth century, notions about memory, especially collective memory, were re-
evaluated in postmodernist terms by some philosophers, historians and sociologists 
who posited that such concepts were social constructs.247 The writings of Maurice 
Halbwachs, Pierre Nora and Paul Ricoeur, among others, had a profound influence 
on many archivists. One of the earliest articles published in the archival literature 
that re-examined traditional concepts about memory was by Kenneth Foote in 
1990.248 A geography academic at the University of Austin, Texas, Foote introduced 
the notion of the ‘cultural effacement of memory’.249 Foote drew parallels with the 
built heritage and described how society often chooses not to remember certain 
difficult or tragic events by the ‘active effacement of buildings’ connected to those 
events; examples given by Foote included the site of the execution of witches in 
Salem, Massachusetts, and the former Gestapo headquarters in Berlin.250 Foote 
commented that the memorialization of certain events is often done through 
‘sanctification’ (the construction of a memorial) or by ‘rectification’ (whereby a 
place or building is ‘put right’ and reused).251 Foote explained that ‘all these cases 
show how social pressures shape landscape into an acceptable representation of the 
past’.252 Foote argued that there were parallels in archive and recordkeeping, that 
such shaping occurs to archives too as ‘attitudes toward the past, as well as visions of 
the future, can sometimes condition collecting policies’.253 Foote concluded that the 
challenge for archivists is to recognize the active role that appraisal can play in both 
preserving and effacing social memory. 
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Foote inspired the publication of many other articles in the archival literature 
on the theme of memory.254 The subject gained further prominence in the twenty-
first century with articles about memory and archives regularly appearing in all the 
archival journals, culminating in a special issue of Archival Science in March 2011 
entitled ‘Archives and the Ethics of Memory Construction’. Many archivists 
increasingly noted the apparent tension between concepts of memory and evidence 
in archival appraisal.255 This tension can be summarized as evolving from the 
different approaches to appraisal that can be traced back to Schellenberg and 
Jenkinson respectively. The first emphasizes the cultural role of archives in society 
to foster memory and understanding of the past; whilst the second is concerned with 
preserving record integrity and impartiality as evidence of past actions.256 Attempts 
to reconcile the perceived dichotomy between archives as memory and archives as 
evidence also dominated the archival literature in the twenty-first century as 
archivists sought unifying theories to heal the divisions within the profession. 
Macro-appraisal, as ‘an assertion of society as the origin of value in records’, was 
seen by some to provide a ‘third-way’.257 An alternative solution was suggested by 
Laura Millar who drew on the theories of contemporary sociologists about collective 
memory.258 Millar argued that archives were not in fact memories, but were rather 
the ‘triggers or touchstones that lead to the recollection of past events’.259 Ascribing 
a significant and quasi-political role to archives, Millar noted that the relationship 
between the two was complex, as archives provided a framework, but not necessarily 
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the complete picture for memory formation.260 Millar wrote that although archives 
and records ‘are not memories, and by themselves they do not imbue us with 
knowledge […] they are a means by which we gain knowledge of ourselves and our 
society, leading ultimately, one hopes, to greater understanding, compassion and 
wisdom’.261 
Jeannette Bastian attempted to reconcile postmodernist ideas, which dismiss 
the notion of a linear historical narrative, with ideas about collective memory by 
arguing that archives ‘provide the continuity of a narrative as it moves from the 
actual event into the fluid space of its remembrance. Through this continuum of 
event and memory, the past can be recalled in the ever-changing present’.262 
Other writers suggested a re-thinking of the concept of evidence. For 
example, in an article calling on archivists to re-examine their use of definitions, 
Geoffrey Yeo asserted that evidence might be better thought of as an ‘affordance’, or 
as a property or function that is provided by the records.263 Jennifer Meehan 
suggested that a re-interpretation of evidence as the relation between the record and 
the event it recorded, rather than viewing evidence as inherent in the record itself, 
might provide an alternative solution.264  
The twenty-first century also saw the appearance of new phenomena 
impacting on the archival profession, notably community archives and freedom of 
information. Community archives is generally understood to refer to collections of 
materials relating to a specific community of people and which is created, held and 
managed primarily within that community rather than by a professional heritage 
organization.265 Such collections have long existed but it has only been in the last 
thirty years or so that there has been formal recognition of them by cultural policy-
makers and professionals. New technology, particularly the use of social media, has 
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contributed to the sense that everyone is now their own archivist.266 Terms like 
‘archiving’ have taken on new meanings as they have become part of common 
parlance within the digital environment. Anne J. Gilliland has suggested that the new 
digital age might render obsolete traditional notions of appraisal, commenting that 
‘we exhibit much hubris in thinking we can actually eliminate all traces of 
networked digital material’.267 Concerns about the proliferation of de-contextualized 
records in cyberspace and society’s increasing inability to forget have led some 
archivists to re-examine provenance and context and their roles in appraisal 
decisions.268  
The growth of the use of the internet and other digital tools by society at 
large has coincided with concerns that the records held in many publicly-funded 
archival institutions are not representative of those marginalized by society.269 Many 
community groups established their own archival collections outside of the 
professional heritage sphere to challenge this perceived under-representation.270 
Whilst some archivists have felt threatened by the proliferation of community 
archives, many more have embraced the movement’s core ideas about the 
democratization of archives and have sought to evolve archival practices to 
encompass other perspectives and narratives outside of the mainstream.271 Eric 
Ketelaar has called for public archives to re-connect with people’s stories, for 
archives to be re-cast as ‘spaces of memory, where people’s experiences can be 
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transmitted into meaning’.272 Ketelaar believed that archivists should embrace Web 
2.0 technology as a means of facilitating the process and creating ‘communities of 
records’ with various layers of activity, meaning and relationships.273 The challenge 
for archivists is to allow space for these multiple meanings and to support the 
creation of opposing or complementary forms of record and remembrance. 
Freedom of information legislation has also contributed to a growing sense of 
awareness by the general public about the value and potential power of archives. The 
public’s right to know, enshrined in Access to Information laws in many countries, 
has raised demands from the public for greater accountability and transparency about 
how and why institutions hold records, including archives.274 Archivists and other 
information professionals have been forced to justify acquisition and disposal 
policies against accusations that they are wilfully destroying history or covering up 
wrongdoing by governments or corporations.275 Sue McKemmish first gave voice to 
a growing belief held by society at large that records about me are owned by me in 
an article entitled ‘Evidence of Me’, published in 1996.276 Modern legislation, such 
as the UK Data Protection Act 1998, acknowledges that the record subject has 
certain rights with regard to the record including the right that the information 
contained in the record is accurate.277 Archivists have realized that the boundaries 
between private and public records have blurred as the individual past becomes the 
collective present.278 Archivists recognized the role they play as ‘active agents of 
political accountability, social memory and national identity’279 with the publication 
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of a series of collected essays on the theme of Archives and the Public Good: 
Accountability and Records in Modern Society in 2002.280 
Thus far, the twenty-first century has seen the wider application of existing 
archival appraisal theories, with nuanced tweaks being made to the theories rather 
than any major revisions. Influences from outside of the archival discipline, notably 
theories about collective memory, the impact of community archives and the access 
to information agenda, have all shaped approaches to archival appraisal. The 
multiplicity of perspectives on history and society – one result of the prevailing 
postmodernist paradigm – has been mirrored by the archival profession. In seeking 
an appraisal approach that is more inclusive and democratic, archivists have tried to 
find a balance with traditional notions of authority and control. Wider society has 
realized the potential power of archives for public accountability and personal 
history; this has led to a greater spotlight being cast on the archival profession than 
ever before. Knowing why archivists keep archives, understanding their appraisal 
decisions, has become important to the general public and has led to a quest for 
greater transparency, and greater insight, within the archival profession as a whole. 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
Archival appraisal theory has come a long way since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Initially dominated by one specific approach, the archival 
profession today has a whole range of different appraisal theories and techniques 
from which to choose. These theories include, variously, concepts like impartiality, 
authenticity and uniqueness; ideas about administrative value and research value, 
cost of preservation and use; and views about memory and evidence. Advancements 
in technology have both challenged traditional principles about recordkeeping and 
have helped to disseminate new theories more widely. In practical ways the 
international archival community has never been closer, yet the divisions between 
archival theorists have never been more pronounced. The broader dynamic shift from 
a positivist to a postmodernist frame of reference during the second half of the 
twentieth century significantly impacted on archival theory, leading archivists to 
question not only their ideas about records but also their roles as recordkeepers. 
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Views about archivists as custodians of evidential records are juxtaposed with views 
about social responsibility as documenters of society and culture. There has been a 
recognition of the importance of archives – as sources of public and corporate 
accountability, of power – but also an acknowledgement that there is not just one 
story but multiple stories, multiple narratives and perspectives, multiple histories. 
The histories of ordinary citizens, of marginalized individuals and communities, are 
being told as never before. The archival profession, in response to the various 
challenges and opportunities, continues to evolve, to question its core tenets and 
principles, and to explore the nature and value of archives. 
This chapter has presented a chronological summary of the principal 
developments in archival appraisal theory of the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
The next chapter will continue the exploration of the archival literature and will 
consider concepts of archival value that can be found in discussions about the 
principles of provenance, respect des fonds and archival order. 
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Chapter 3. Value and the archival principle of provenance 
3.1. Chapter summary 
Chapter 3 continues the exploration of literature in the topic of interest by 
expanding the review of the archival literature to include wider discussions about 
archival value other than appraisal. The chapter explores the archival principle of 
provenance, which has been linked to concepts of archival value, together with the 
related principles of respect des fonds and original order. The theorization and 
application of the principles have been primarily in approaches to archival 
arrangement and description, and this chapter examines the various interpretations of 
provenance taken by these approaches, and their implications for concepts of 
archival value. The chapter discusses in particular an interpretation of provenance 
that focuses on a concept of the archival fonds as an organic whole and will explore 
some ideas about wholes and parts that have been influential in archival theory. 
3.2. Introduction 
 One of the challenges that must be faced when attempting to explore the 
nature of value concepts is that such concepts are all-pervasive. Archivists’ ideas 
about value naturally tend to focus on archival appraisal theory and practice; 
however, discussions of value concepts can be found elsewhere in the archival 
literature. Archival arrangement and description are core activities for the archivist, 
which involve value judgements at some level, whether explicitly stated or not. Once 
appraisal decisions have been made, the archivist is responsible for ensuring that 
archives are arranged and described in order to facilitate access and interpretation by 
present and future generations of users. Many archivists increasingly acknowledge 
that their decisions in how to arrange and what to describe necessarily involve a 
choice or selection, which is essentially an evaluative judgement about the archives 
concerned.1 Whilst some archivists suggest that the archival activities of 
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arrangement and description can reveal the value and meaning of the archives,2 
others argue that these activities actually contribute to its creation. For example, 
Wendy Duff and Verne Harris argued that ‘the power to describe is the power to 
make and remake records and to determine how they will be used and remade in the 
future’;3 whilst Brien Brothman argued that the ordering of archival records 
constitutes a ‘ministering gesture’ that both creates and destroys value.4 It should be 
noted that the term ‘value’ is infrequently used in discussions about archival 
arrangement and description; however, writers regularly refer to how such activity 
impacts on archives’ ‘meaning’, ‘significance’, and ‘importance’, arguably using 
these terms in a sense synonymous with ‘value’. Furthermore, it is the author’s 
contention that even when such terms are not explicitly used, the discussions are 
nonetheless implicitly shaped within an evaluative frame of reference. 
Archival arrangement and description are often treated as separate activities; 
even where archivists have acknowledged them as interrelated, they have tended to 
focus on one aspect rather than the other.5 However, the author takes the view of 
several writers in regarding ‘arrangement and description [as]… a linked process for 
establishing control over archival and manuscript collections’, and moreover, that 
‘arrangement is the basis of description, in fact the description is of the 
arrangement’.6 Therefore this chapter will consider both arrangement and description 
theories together in relation to ideas about archival provenance and value.  
 Archival arrangement and description can be broadly defined as a systematic 
scheme or process that is fundamental for the administrative and intellectual control 
of archives, ‘which together provide the foundation for effective retrieval of and 
intellectual access to archival documents’.7 In 1964, Oliver W. Holmes first 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Theodore R. Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of Arrangement’, AA, 24.1 (1961), 
11-24. 
3 Wendy M. Duff and Verne Harris, ‘Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records 
and Constructing Meanings’, AS, 2.3-4 (2002), 263-85, (272). Similar claims have been made by 
Elizabeth Yakel, ‘Archival Representation’, AS, 3.1 (2003), 1-25; and Heather MacNeil, ‘Picking Our 
Text: Archival Description, Authenticity and the Archivist as Editor’, AA, 68.2 (2005), 264-78. 
4 Brien Brothman, ‘Orders of Value: Probing the Theoretical Terms of Archival Practice’, Archivaria, 
32 (1991), 78-100. 
5 Richard C. Berner and Uli Haller, ‘Principles of Archival Inventory Construction’, AA, 47.2 (1984), 
134-55, (135). 
6 Berner and Haller, 154; see also Jennifer Meehan, ‘Making the Leap from Parts to Whole: Evidence 
and Inference in Archival Arrangement and Description’, AA, 72.1 (2009), 72-90. 
7 Terry Eastwood, ‘Putting the Parts of the Whole Together: Systematic Arrangement of Archives’, 
Archivaria, 50 (2000), 93-116, (95).  
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enunciated what has been held to be true by many archivists ever since, namely that: 
‘arrangement is the basic internal activity of an archival establishment. All other […] 
activities depend on its proper accomplishment’.8 However, whilst most archivists 
might agree on the importance and purpose of arrangement and description, there is a 
great deal of disagreement about how it should be done. This disagreement stems 
primarily from different interpretations of the underlying principle on which most 
archival arrangement and description theory is based, namely the principle of 
provenance.9  
Provenance is a word that often appears in the archival literature, with many 
associated terms including ‘context’, ‘relationship’, ‘fonds’, ‘hierarchy’, ‘natural’ 
and ‘organic’. One difficulty in pinning down an exact meaning of provenance is the 
multiple and varied use by different writers of these terms as synonyms or 
definientia.10 As has been previously indicated, a lack of critical analysis and clarity 
when it comes to the definition of concepts and the use of specific terminology is a 
particular problem within the archival literature as a whole. It is an issue of 
importance for this thesis because the author contends that the principle of 
provenance, together with the related principles of respect des fonds and original 
order, serves as a conceptual framework for understanding and creating the 
context(s) that give a body of records its meaning and value.11 The different 
interpretations of provenance underlie different concepts of archival value – for 
some archivists value is embedded in the nature and context of record creation; for 
others it is to be found in the multiple relationships between a record and its 
creator(s), custodians, archivists and users. The different interpretations of 
                                                 
8 Oliver W. Holmes, ‘Archival Arrangement – Five Different Operations at Five Different Levels’, 
AA, 27.1 (1964), 21-42, (41). 
9 See, for example, Max J. Evans, ‘Authority Control: An Alternative to the Record Group Concept’, 
AA, 49.3 (1986), 249-61; Chris Hurley, ‘Parallel Provenance (If these are your records, where are 
your stories?)’, published originally in two parts in AM, Part 1 (What, If Anything is Archival 
Description?) in 33.1 (2005) and Part 2 (When Something is Not Related to Everything Else) in 33.2 
(2005) www.infotech.monash.edu.au/research/groups/rcrg/publications/parallel-provenance-
combined.pdf [accessed 5 April 2013]; Heather MacNeil, ‘Archivalterity: Rethinking Original Order’, 
Archivaria, 66 (2008), 1-24; Eastwood, Putting the Parts of the Whole Together’; Yeo, ‘Debates 
about Description’. 
10 In linguistics, a definiens (pl. definientia) is a word used to define another word. A common 
problem in the archival sphere is the use of a definiens whose meaning is already commonly 
understood, thus resulting in a vague lexicon definition. See Chapter 1 for similar vagueness in 
archival definitions of ‘value’. In this thesis, the author will use the terms as employed by the 
particular writer, but will give further explanation where necessary in an attempt to make the intended 
sense more explicit. 
11 Meehan, ‘Making the Leap’, 76. 
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provenance also present differing views of the archive itself: as a closed, organic 
whole, or fonds, with a significance that can be discovered through an analysis of its 
constituent parts, or as open, ever-evolving archival entities with multiple meanings, 
narratives and counter-narratives.12  
This chapter will present the main arguments that have been put forward in 
support of the various interpretations of provenance. The next section will set the 
historical context for these arguments by detailing how the principle of provenance 
was first established. 
3.3. Historical origins of the principle of provenance 
 The English word ‘provenance’, meaning ‘origin’ or ‘source’, has its roots in 
the Latin provenire and the French provenir, both meaning ‘to come from’.13 There 
is a certain amount of debate and disagreement in the archival literature about the 
exact historical origins and development of the principle of provenance, and the 
related principles of respect des fonds and original order.14 Most writers seem to 
agree that the first enunciation of a theory of archival provenance can be dated to 
early nineteenth century France.15 In 1841, archivist Natalis de Wailly authored a 
circular on behalf of the French Ministry of the Interior that gave instructions for the 
classification of Departmental archives ‘to assemble the different documents by 
fonds, that is to say, to form a body, an organization, a family or an individual, and to 
arrange the different fonds according to a certain order’.16  
                                                 
12 An example of the first interpretation can be found in Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive 
Administration (London: Lund Humphries, 1937), first published in 1922 and re-issued in 1965; an 
example of the second can be found in Duff and Harris. 
13 The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary, ed. by Joyce M. Hawkins and Robert Allen (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991); Petit Larousse en couleurs (Paris: Librarie Larousse, 1990). 
14 See, for example, Raimo Pohjola, ‘The Principle of Provenance and the Arrangement of 
Records/Archives’, in The Principle of Provenance. Report from the First Stockholm Conference on 
Archival Theory and the Principle of Provenance 2-3 September 1993, ed. by Kerstin Abukhanfusa 
and Jan Sydbeck (Sweden: Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Riksarkivet 10, 1993), 87-101; Shelley 
Sweeney, ‘The Ambiguous Origins of the Archival Principle of ‘Provenance’’, Libraries and the 
Cultural Record, 43.2 (2008), 193-213; Jennifer Douglas, ‘Origins: Evolving Ideas About the 
Principle of Provenance’, in Currents of Archival Thinking , 23-43. 
15 There is evidence to suggest that provenance-based practices of archival arrangement long-
preceded this date but the specific terminology and formal theory only emerged at this point. See 
Sweeney, 195; Pohjola, 87-9; The Archival Fonds: From Theory to Practice, ed. by Terry Eastwood 
(Canada: Bureau of Canadian Archivists, 1992). 
16 Natalis de Wailly, ‘Instructions pour la mise en ordre et le classement des archives 
départementales’ first published 24 April 1841, re-published by Ministère des Affaires Culturelles, 
Manuel d’Archivistique (Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1970), cited in Nancy Bartlett, ‘Respect des 
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The classification of archives by their origin, as prescribed by de Wailly, 
broke with the previous tradition in France of arranging archives for the benefit of 
the historical researcher – often into subject or chronological series. The new method 
became widely known in both France and abroad as the principle of respect des 
fonds. However, although the French circular has been viewed by many archivists as 
a significant development in the theory of archival provenance,17 in 1992, Nancy 
Bartlett argued that far from being a theoretical tour de force, de Wailly’s circular 
was instead based on the practical assumption that this method of arrangement and 
description ‘was easier than any other method, the material in any one fonds was 
limited, older inventories could be followed, and interpretive re-classification was 
beyond the capabilities of the archivists’.18 As a result, Bartlett affirmed that much 
of the ‘intellectual mystique’ later assigned to the principle of respect des fonds is 
undeserved.19 Nonetheless, the principle gained widespread acceptance as an 
appropriate and efficient method of arranging archives. 
In 1898, Dutch archivists Samuel Muller, Johan Feith and Robert Fruin 
published their seminal work: Handleiding voor het ordenen en beschrijven van 
archieven which was translated into several languages, including English in 1940 as 
Manual for the Arrangement and Description of Archives.20 The Dutch Manual 
outlined in detail the authors’ principle of herkomstbeginsel (‘provenance’), which 
comprised two separate principles – the principle of respect des fonds and the 
principle of original order.21 The Dutch introduced an additional element to their 
theory of archival provenance – the principle of original order, basing their approach 
on that of Prussian archivists. Nearly twenty years earlier, Heinrich von Sybel, 
Director of the Prussian Privy State Archives, had issued a Regulation that stated the 
                                                                                                                                          
Fonds : The Origins of the Modern Archival Principle of Provenance’, Bibliographic Foundations of 
French Historical Studies : Primary Sources and Original Works, 1.1-2 (1992), 107-15, (107). 
17 For example, Ernst Posner, ‘Some Aspects of Archival Development since the French Revolution’, 
AA, 3.3 (1940), 159-72; Theodore R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques 
(Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1956); Michel Duchein, ‘Theoretical Principles and Practical Problems 
of Respect des fonds in Archival Science’, Archivaria, 16 (1983), 64-82. 
18 Bartlett, 111. 
19 Ibid., 111. 
20 S. Muller, J. A. Feith and R. Fruin, Handleiding voor het ordenen en beschrijven van archieven 
(Groningen: Erven B. Van der Kamp, 1898). English translation: Manual for the Arrangement and 
Description of Archives, transl. by Arthur H. Leavitt (New York: H. W. Wilson & Co., 1940), 2nd 
edn., with new introduction by Peter Horsman, Eric Ketelaar, Theo Thomassen and Marjorie Rabe 
Barritt (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2003), hereafter referred to as the Dutch Manual. 
21 Peter Horsman, ‘Taming the Elephant: An Orthodox Approach to the Principle of Provenance’, in 
Abukhanfusa and Sydbeck, 51-63; Douglas, 27. 
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rules for the arrangement and description of archives according to what he termed 
Provienzprinzip, which comprised a similar notion to the French respect des fonds, 
together with respect for original order (Registraturprinzip).22 This second principle, 
which states that records should be maintained in the order in which they were kept 
by the records’ creator, has also been termed Strükturprinzip,23 but it is more 
commonly referred to as Registraturprinzip – so-named after the Prussian Registry 
system of recordkeeping.24 The Prussian and Dutch approaches to arrangement and 
description thus allowed less flexibility than that of the French approach, by insisting 
that archival provenance entailed both respect for the original fonds and for the 
creators’ original order within that fonds.  
3.4. Interpretations of provenance 
By the end of the nineteenth century there was thus formulated a principle of 
provenance with related concepts of respect des fonds and original order, but already 
there was some disagreement about the exact definition of provenance. As it moved 
into the twentieth century, the archival profession was to further question the nature 
of provenance, leading to significant differences of interpretation and application of 
the principle in archival theory. 
3.4.1. Provenance = respect des fonds  
The principle of provenance as it was articulated in the early twentieth 
century decreed that ‘records originating from the same source should be kept 
together and not interfiled with records from other sources’.25 This interpretation of 
provenance was usually linked with the two related principles of respect des fonds, 
which defined archives in terms of fonds – an ‘organic whole’ – whose boundaries 
were determined in relation to the context of its creator; and original order, which 
held that the ‘original’ arrangement of records (normally that of the creator) should 
be retained. Theodore R. Schellenberg described how this classical interpretation of 
provenance came to be regarded as the ‘summum bonum’ for the classification of 
                                                 
22 Douglas, 26. 
23 Duchein, 68, 75. Duchein argued that respect des fonds amounted to respect for the ‘external’ 
integrity of the archives (the fonds), whilst Strükturprinzip amounted to respect for the corresponding 
‘internal’ integrity of the archives. 
24 Pohjola, 89; Douglas, 26. 
25 The Wilson Report (Ottawa: Bureau of Canadian Archivists, 1980), cited in Laura Millar, ‘The 
Death of the Fonds and the Resurrection of Provenance: Archival Context in Space and Time’, 
Archivaria, 53 (2002), 1-15. 
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archives,26 and as such, it underpinned the theory and methodology of many 
influential archivists from the end of the nineteenth century onwards.27 However, 
despite its wide acceptance there was not universal agreement, with some archivists 
questioning aspects of the interpretation, particularly in respect to original order.28  
Hilary Jenkinson drew heavily on the Dutch Manual in his 1922 publication, 
A Manual of Archive Administration. Jenkinson’s book preceded the first English 
translation of the Dutch Manual by nearly twenty years and greatly influenced the 
adoption of many of its authors’ ideas by British archivists.29 Jenkinson explicitly 
cited the Dutch authors in arguing that both respect des fonds and original order 
should be the basis of archival arrangement and description, insisting that it was 
necessary to ‘put ourselves in the position of the men who compiled them [the 
archives]; our object will clearly be to establish or re-establish the original 
arrangement; even if, when we look at it, we think we could have done better 
ourselves’.30 
However, other archivists disagreed with Jenkinson’s approach. For example, 
Schellenberg interpreted archival provenance in the narrower sense, as comprising 
only respect des fonds. In his 1956 publication, Modern Archives: Principles and 
Techniques, Schellenberg detailed the various principles of arrangement for archives 
and concluded that records ‘should be kept in separate units that correspond to their 
source in the government agency’.31 However, whilst Schellenberg agreed that 
records ‘should be maintained in the order given them by agencies creating them’, he 
also allowed that ‘records preserved for informational content should be maintained 
in whatever order will best serve the needs of scholars and government officials’.32 
For Schellenberg, the provenance-based arrangement of archives followed the 
                                                 
26 Theodore R. Schellenberg, ‘The Principle of Provenance and Modern Records in the United States’, 
AA, 28.1 (1965), 39-41, (39). 
27 See, for example, the Dutch Manual; Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration; 
Schellenberg, Modern Archives. 
28 For example, Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of Arrangement’; Graeme T. Powell, ‘Archival 
Principles and the Treatment of Personal Papers’, AM, 6.7 (1976), 259-68; Frank Boles, 
‘Disrespecting Original Order’, AA, 45.1 (1982), 26-32; Jennifer Meehan, ‘Rethinking Original Order 
and Personal Records’, Archivaria, 79 (2010), 27-44. 
29 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, Part II especially. 
30 Ibid., 99. 
31 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 187. 
32 Ibid., 187, 193. 
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principle of respect des fonds but the principle of original order was a flexible option 
depending on the nature and use of the archives.33  
The influence of Schellenberg’s writings, together with what Terry Cook has 
suggested is the result of a linguistic confusion of terminology, has led to the 
promulgation of equating ‘provenance’ with only respect des fonds among many 
English-speaking archivists, particularly in North America.34 This is a view that has 
been reinforced by the professional literature; for example, the Society of American 
Archivists’ A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology, defined provenance as 
follows: 
Provenance is a fundamental principle of archives, referring to the 
individual, family, or organisation that created and received the items 
in a collection. The principle of provenance or the respect des fonds 
dictates that records of different origins (provenance) be kept separate 
to preserve their context.35 
This approach was also favoured by 1930s German archivist Adolf Brenneke who 
rejected the broader interpretation of archival provenance that included original 
order.36 Brenneke objected to a strict adherence to the Registraturprinzip on the 
grounds that modern archives ‘lacked the strict, ordered quality of the past’.37 In his 
view, archivists should be ‘creative’ in arranging the internal order of the archival 
fonds rather than merely preserving ‘error-ridden, misfiled, or inaccurate’ filing 
systems.38 Brenneke’s critique of archival provenance has remained influential in 
modern German archival theory. However, archival practice in much of the rest of 
Europe, particularly in Scandinavia, Italy and the Netherlands, continues to be based 
primarily on the Prussian and Dutch articulations of provenance.39 The dominance of 
a concept of archival provenance that comprises both respect des fonds and original 
order was reinforced by the International Congress on Archives in 1910. At a 
meeting in Brussels that year the ICA endorsed a definition that, in the words of 
Dutch archivist, Peter Horsman, ‘is essentially a condensed summary of the most 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 193; Douglas, 29. See also Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of Arrangement’. 
34 Terry Cook, ‘The Concept of the Archival Fonds’, in The Archival Fonds: From Theory to 
Practice, 31-86, (4). See also Sweeney, 202. 
35 A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology, ed. by Richard Pearce-Moses (Chicago: SAA, 
2005), 317. 
36 Pohjola, 89; Peter Horsman ‘The Last Dance of the Phoenix, or the De-discovery of the Archival 
Fonds’, Archivaria, 54 (2002), 1-23,(2). 
37 Horsman, ‘The Last Dance of the Phoenix’, 3. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
39 Douglas, 28; Horsman, ‘The Last Dance of the Phoenix’, 11; Pohjola, 89-90. 
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important sections of the Dutch Manual’.40 The ICA’s definition of the principle of 
provenance read: 
The method of archive organization by which each archival document 
has to be brought to the archive (fonds) to which it belongs, and 
within that archive to the series to which it belonged at the time the 
archive was still a living organism.41 
This classic definition of provenance underpinned a theory of arrangement 
and description that held that archives had a value, which was derived directly from 
the way in which they were created; and that it was therefore necessary to respect the 
principle of provenance in order to preserve such a value.42 Jenkinson described this 
value in archives as follows: ‘They have […] a structure, an articulation and a 
natural relationship between parts, which are essential to their significance. […] 
Archive quality only survives unimpaired so long as their natural form and 
relationship are maintained’.43 Although Jenkinson rarely employs the term ‘value’ 
in his writings, it is the author’s contention that Jenkinson employs the terms 
‘significance’ and ‘quality’ in the above quotation in a sense that is synonymous 
with ‘value’. For Jenkinson the activity of arrangement and description of archives 
constituted what he termed ‘the moral defence of archives’.44 Jenkinson argued that 
the basis of arrangement and description was ‘the exposition of the Administrative 
objects which the Archives originally served’.45 In his view, this meant the 
separation of records originating from one creator from those originating from 
another, and the retention of the original order of the records.46 Jenkinson argued 
that if arrangement and description was accomplished on this basis, archival quality 
(in other words, the value of the archives) would be preserved. He asserted that 
‘what is to be guarded against is the alteration of anything done by the original 
administrator, the person or body who compiled the Archives: because what they did 
is a part of the Archive itself’.47 
                                                 
40 Horsman, ‘The Last Dance of the Phoenix’, 10. 
41 Ibid., 10.  
42 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration; Schellenberg, Modern Archives. 
43 Jenkinson, The English Archivist: A New Profession (London: H.K. Lewis & Co. Ltd., 1948), 4. 
Interestingly, Schellenberg included this citation in his own defence of the principle of provenance 
some twenty years later; see Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principle of Arrangement’, 13. See also 3.5.1. 
44 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 83. 
45 Ibid., 97. Italics in original. 
46 Ibid., 97-102. 
47 Ibid., 114. 
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Several Italian archivists similarly linked a record’s provenance and its value 
in this way. For example, Giorgio Cencetti argued that from the reciprocal 
relationships that arise in the course of the accumulation of records are derived the 
two essential characteristics of the record’s impartiality and authenticity.48 Luciana 
Duranti has termed this network of relationships that each record has with the other 
records in the same fonds as ‘the archival bond’.49 Although Duranti prefers the term 
‘record aggregation’, arguably, her definition of the nature of the aggregation as 
being formed and bounded by and as a result of the original transaction which 
produced the records is tantamount to the traditional concept of the archival fonds.50  
Provenance can thus be understood in terms of the relationship between the 
records and the nature of their creation. This approach, which understands the 
meaning and value of records to be inherent within the administrative context in 
which the records were created, is the basis of several archival arrangement and 
description theories which remain influential today.51 
3.4.2. Provenance = record context(s) 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the challenges of dealing with 
complex modern records and administrations, new technologies and electronic 
records, and the general shift from a positivist to a postmodernist framework of 
thinking, led some archivists to call for a new interpretation of provenance that they 
believed would better support their archival activity.52 For many of these archivists, 
the key element of this new interpretation was a shift from a focus on the fonds to a 
focus on record context(s).53 The practical reality of dealing with one body of 
                                                 
48 Maria Guercio and Kenneth E. Thibodeau, ‘Principles, Methods and Instruments for the Creation, 
Preservation and Use of Archival Records in the Digital Environment’, AA, 64.2 (2001), 238-69, 
(250). This article cites the original Italian text: Giorgio Cencetti, ‘Il fondamento teorico della dottrina 
archivistica’, Archivi, 2.6 (1939), 7-13. 
49 Luciana Duranti, ‘The Archival Bond’, Archives and Museum Informatics, 11 (1997), 213-8, (215-
6).  
50 See Duranti, 216-7. 
51 For example, Manual of Archival Description, 2nd edn., ed. by Michael Cook and Margaret Procter 
(Aldershot, UK: Gower Publishing Co., 1989); Canadian Committee on Archival Description, RAD, 
rev. edn. (Ottawa: Bureau of Canadian Archivists, 2008); ICA Committee on Descriptive Standards, 
ISAD(G), 2nd edn. (Ottawa: ICA, 2000). 
52 Examples include: David Bearman, ‘Documenting Documentation’, Archivaria, 34 (1992), 33-49; 
Chris Hurley, ‘Problems with Provenance’, AM, 23.2 (1995), 234-59; Sue McKemmish, Glenda 
Acland, Nigel Ward and Barbara Reed, ‘Describing Records in Context in the Continuum: The 
Australian Recordkeeping Metadata Schema’, Archivaria, 48 (1999), 3-37; Duff and Harris; Meehan, 
‘Making the Leap from Parts to Whole’. 
53 Hurley, ‘Parallel Provenance’; Douglas. 
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records that has many creators, or one creator leaving records in many different 
physical locations, was seen by some archivists to invalidate the traditional concept 
of the organic unity of the fonds that was characterized by a one-to-one relationship 
between record and creator.54 The complexities of the digital environment, with its 
fluidity of creation, alteration, transmission and deletion only added to the sense that 
the principle of provenance also had to become more flexible in order to remain 
relevant into the twenty-first century.55 In addition, there was a growing recognition 
of the active role that archivists and others, besides records creators, play in the 
formation of archives which led some archivists to ‘widen’ the principle of 
provenance to include concepts of ‘multiple-provenance’.56 In this viewpoint, ‘the 
provenance of a given record or body of records consists of the social and technical 
processes of the records’ inscription, transmission, contextualization, and 
interpretation, which account for its existence, characteristics, and continuing 
history’.57 This approach is grounded in the belief that records creation is only one 
aspect of provenance and that ‘contextual entities may be of very many different 
kinds and that the relationship each has with various records entities is manifold’.58 
Rather than a single context of creation, or a single relationship between creator and 
record, the emphasis is instead on multiple contexts and multiple relationships that 
are multi-layered and dynamic, and which can be found in all the actions of creation, 
custody and interpretation that take place during the record’s entire existence.59 In 
this interpretation, a record’s value is not regarded as being a permanent and 
unchanging attribute that is ‘fixed’ in the act and context of record creation, but is 
instead ever-evolving. In the words of David Bearman: ‘the fact of processing, 
exhibiting, citing, publishing and otherwise managing records become significant to 
                                                 
54 Cook, ‘The Concept of the Archival Fonds’; Millar, ‘The Death of the Fonds’. 
55 Douglas, 38. 
56 The concept of ‘multiple provenance’ is usually attributed to Peter Scott and the ‘Series System’ of 
arrangement; but as will be discussed further later in this chapter, Scott’s innovations were not so 
much revolutionary as evolutionary; and it was really the development of his ideas by later archival 
theorists that constituted a true break with traditional concepts of provenance. Hurley, ‘Parallel 
Provenance’, 34; See also Peter J. Scott, ‘Introduction’, in The Arrangement and Description of 
Archives Amid Administrative and Technological Change. Essays and Reflections By and About Peter 
J. Scott, ed. by Adrian Cunningham (Brisbane: Australian Society of Archivists, 2010). 
57 Tom Nesmith, ‘Still Fuzzy, But More Accurate: Some Thoughts on the ‘Ghosts’ of Archival 
Theory’, Archivaria, 47 (1999), 136-50, (146). 
58 Chris Hurley, ‘The Australian (‘Series’) System: An Exposition’, in The Records Continuum. Ian 
Maclean and Australian Archives First Fifty Years, ed. by Sue McKemmish and Michael Piggott 
(Australia: Ancora Press, 1994), 150-172, (155), cited in Duff and Harris, 269. 
59 McKemmish et al, ‘Describing Records in Context in the Continuum’; Duff and Harris. 
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their meaning as records’.60 It is the author’s contention that Bearman uses 
‘meaning’ here in a sense synonymous with ‘value’. 
Tom Nesmith argued that postmodernism has led to an understanding of 
archives as ‘products of open-ended processes of knowing […] [that] participate in 
processes of knowing as active agents in them’.61 Nesmith argued that, as a result, 
concepts like provenance need to be re-conceptualized. Instead of ‘original order’, 
Nesmith proposed that archivists consider ‘the received order’ of the records when 
they are received by an archival institution; and described this order as ‘a snapshot of 
a moment in time, not the original order, but a possible approximation of it’.62 
Additionally, instead of the traditional concept of the fonds, Nesmith proposed the 
adoption of an alternative definition, quoting Horsman,: ‘a defensible grouping of 
records […] which resulted from “a series of recordkeeping activities and archival 
interventions”’.63 Linking with Eric Ketelaar’s notion of ‘tacit narratives’ that exist 
through records, Nesmith insisted that provenance should be concerned with the 
evolution of a body of records rather than with attempts to establish an original order 
tied to the administrative structure of the records’ initial creators.64  
Another re-interpretation of provenance identified by Jennifer Douglas is the 
idea of provenance as ‘socio-historical context’.65 This interpretation has also been 
greatly influenced by ideas in postmodernist theory, which have led many archivists 
to acknowledge that all archival activity, like any other human behaviour, is socially 
contingent. Archivists, records creators and users are all part of society and therefore 
our behaviour, to one extent or another, both influences and in turn is influenced by 
that society. In this light, Ketelaar defined archival activity as ‘a “regime of 
practices” which varies at any given time and in any given place’.66 Nesmith argued 
that it is not only the creator who shapes the archival record but that multiple 
individuals, including archivists, custodians and users, each have a relevant role to 
                                                 
60 Bearman, ‘Documenting Documentation’, 237. 
61 Tom Nesmith, ‘Reopening Archives: Bringing New Contextualities into Archival Theory and 
Practice’, Archivaria, 60 (2005), 259-74, (261). 
62 Nesmith, ‘Reopening Archives’, 264. 
63 Ibid., 266. 
64 Ibid., 266; Douglas, 32. See also Ketelaar, ‘Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives’, AS, 1.2 
(2001), 131-41. 
65 Douglas, 33-7. 
66 Ketelaar, ‘Tacit Narratives’, 136. 
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play.67 Nesmith called for a widening of the concept of provenance in order to 
recognize more complex origins including ‘the societal and intellectual contexts 
shaping the actions of people and institutions, functions the records perform, [and] 
custodial history’.68 Nesmith later expanded on this concept, which he titled ‘societal 
provenance’, with reference to a case study involving the nineteenth century archives 
of a Canadian fur trader.69 According to Nesmith, society itself ‘is a kind of 
information gathering and processing phenomenon’, and so must be analysed 
together with the archives themselves, because how and what is recorded is shaped 
by society.70 Nesmith argued that archivists need to acknowledge that records 
creators do not operate in isolation and to recognize that the ‘overall history of the 
record is the provenance of the record’.71 In a similar vein, Australian archivist, 
Chris Hurley has posited a radical extension of Scott’s ‘Series System’ by calling for 
a recognition of what he termed ‘parallel provenance’ which allows two or more 
record creators to be identified at one and the same time.72 Admitting that this 
represents a fundamental challenge to descriptive thinking, that is yet to be fully 
implemented in practical terms, Hurley nonetheless argued that parallel provenance 
is the only means of fulfilling postmodernist commitments to enable ‘the articulation 
of different voices in the way records are preserved and detailed’.73 
 Douglas identified that there has been an increasing interest within the 
archival professional literature in tracing the different narratives – especially those 
that have been marginalized or suppressed – that are intertwined with and part of the 
records themselves; citing writers such as Jeannette Bastian, Laura Millar, Eric 
Ketelaar, Michael Piggott, and Geoffrey Yeo in this regard.74 Many of these writers 
explore theories about collective memory and community archiving as they look 
beyond the social context of record creation to explore how records’ histories have 
evolved, and how records’ meanings have been interpreted and re-interpreted over 
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time.75 Douglas noted that whilst it is important to acknowledge the complexity of 
archival origins, nonetheless she identified that there is a danger in viewing 
provenance as socio-historical context because it becomes difficult to separate the 
two. She concluded: 
Provenance is viewed as an umbrella under which a growing list of 
contextual factors are gathered – its boundaries become infinite. 
There is an inherent difficulty in determining where context ends and 
therefore such an understanding of provenance has to admit the 
impossibility of its own endeavour.76 
In attempting to re-interpret provenance to reflect the increasing complexity and 
fluidity of records in the twenty-first century, the question may be asked whether 
archivists have ended up with a definition of provenance that is so open-ended and 
relative as to be ultimately meaningless. Is the locus of archival value, once the 
relation between record and creator, as exemplified in the archival fonds, now so 
nebulous and diluted in infinite networks of context, that it is no longer capable of 
being determined? Against this backdrop of postmodernist angst some archivists 
have called for new thinking on the subject which, rather than reject the fonds 
entirely, re-instates it as an essential component of provenance, but as a fonds re-
conceptualized.77  
3.5. The archival fonds 
 This chapter has already sketched several definitions of the archival fonds as 
they have been formulated within the different interpretations of provenance. The 
next section will give a more detailed analysis of some ideas about the fonds that 
have been particularly influential by tracing the development of the shift in 
conceptualization from the fonds as an organic whole to that of a conceptual fonds. 
3.5.1. Fonds as organic whole 
 The earliest formal articulation of the concept of the archival fonds can be 
found in the Dutch Manual of 1898. Muller, Feith and Fruin described an archief as 
‘an archival whole, a living organism, which grows, takes shape and undergoes 
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changes in accordance with fixed rules. If the functions of the body change, the 
nature of the archival collection changes likewise’.78 In 1940, Arthur Leavitt 
translated the Dutch word ‘archief’ with the term ‘archival collection’; twenty years 
earlier, Jenkinson translated it as ‘fonds d’archives’ or ‘Archive Group’, which he 
similarly defined as: 
The Archives resulting from the work of an Administration which 
was an organic whole, complete in itself, capable of dealing 
independently, without any added or external authority with every 
side of any business which could normally be presented to it.79 
It should be noted that Jenkinson’s ‘archive group’ should not be confused with the 
US National Archives’ term ‘record group’ which, as will be discussed later, 
interpreted the provenance of a fonds in a looser sense, establishing it arbitrarily on 
the convenient size and character of an archival unit for the ease of arrangement and 
description.80 
 The terms used by the authors of the Dutch Manual to describe an archival 
fonds were evocative of biology and medical science. This was perhaps a deliberate 
use of the language of Charles Darwin to underline the difference, as the authors 
perceived it, between archives which naturally evolved, and artificial museum 
collections which were deliberately assembled.81 Jenkinson employed similar 
language, using the analogy of ‘a palaeontologist reconstructing the skeleton of a 
prehistoric animal’ to describe archival arrangement.82 He drew specific analogies 
with botany and zoology in comparing the scientific treatment of a specimen: ‘as 
part of a living, or once living, organism; which is itself one of a larger family; 
which is in turn one unit in a yet larger division’ with the task of referencing archives 
into groups (or, fonds), categories and classes.83 Schellenberg also used an analogy 
from the physical sciences in his arrangement and description theory, arguing that 
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just as a chemical compound must be separated into its constituents in order to 
properly identify it, ‘all classification or arrangement work involves a breakdown of 
a whole into its parts’.84  
 Key to the understanding of the fonds as conceived by the Dutch is the notion 
of ‘organic’ or ‘natural’, in the sense of the records coming together and reaching 
their final arrangement ‘by a natural process […] as much an organism as a tree or an 
animal’.85 In this way, archives are not assembled for reasons of posterity or for 
historical research, but are instead brought together in the course of the business 
transaction of which they themselves form a part.86 Jenkinson described this natural 
accumulation of records as ‘a convenient form of artificial memory’ which served 
the business or administration that created the records in the first place.87 The 
resulting organic fonds is thus created according to ‘particular rules, laws, processes 
and idiosyncrasies. […] [which] lead to a certain design, structure and 
classification’.88 Furthermore, it is as a direct result of this organic process of 
accumulation that, Jenkinson asserted, the value of archives is both generated and 
maintained.89 As has been previously noted, Jenkinson rarely used the term ‘archival 
value’, preferring archival ‘quality’ or ‘significance’; but it is the author’s contention 
that he uses these terms in a sense synonymous with ‘value’ throughout his writings. 
Thus, Jenkinson argued that the ‘significance’ of a particular record was as ‘an 
essential part of the whole organism’.90 Jenkinson believed that archives have: 
a structure, an articulation and a natural relationship between parts, 
which are essential to their significance: a single document out of a 
Group of Archives is no more to be taken as expressing in and by 
itself all it has to tell us than would a single bone separated from the 
skeleton of an extinct and unknown animal.91 
Jenkinson identified three different aspects of this ‘natural relationship’: (i) the 
relation of the archives to the activity of which they are a product; (ii) the 
relationship between the individual records in a single Archive Group; and (iii) the 
external relationship, ‘a kind of cousinship’, between records in independent Archive 
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Groups.92 For the final category, Jenkinson gave an example of a typescript letter 
whereby the carbon copy is retained by the sender whilst the top copy is held by the 
recipient. Jenkinson stated that in such a case ‘their preservation to the Group to 
which they naturally belong gives to each a distinctive significance: but the 
relationship between the two is an important factor in the value and interpretation of 
both’.93 This view reinforced the importance of retaining original order within a 
fonds to ensure that the meaning (and therefore, the ‘value’) of the whole and of the 
individual parts was not destroyed. 
 Schellenberg also understood an archival fonds in the sense of an organic 
whole, asserting that this ‘organic character’ meant that ‘records that are the product 
of organic activity have a value that derives from the way they were produced’.94 
Schellenberg termed this value ‘evidential’, arguing that it comprised both a notion 
of ‘quality’, in ‘the unconscious and impartial record of the actions they record’, and 
‘content’, in the information contained in the records ‘as evidence of the actions that 
resulted in their production’.95 However, whilst Schellenberg agreed with Jenkinson 
that it was vital to keep records ‘in separate units that correspond to their sources in 
organic bodies’ in order to preserve the evidential value of the records, he departed 
from Jenkinson’s view in regard to the sanctity of the original order of series of 
records within the fonds.96 Schellenberg argued that whilst there might exist an 
‘organic value’ that could reveal the organic activity that resulted in the creation of 
the series, this was by no means ‘sacrosanct’.97 Furthermore, he argued that there 
was no value in the arrangement of the records that might reveal the information 
contained within the series: ‘in a word, the arrangement of the individual record 
items does not contribute to an understanding of the activity that is reflected in the 
series as a whole’.98 Schellenberg therefore concluded that records retained purely 
for their informational content ‘should be arranged solely with a view to facilitating 
their exploitation by scholars, scientists and others without regard as to how they 
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were arranged in the agency that created them’.99 This reasoning supported his 
rejection of original order within a fonds as a necessary component of provenance. 
3.5.2. The record group concept 
 A criticism made against the concept of the archival fonds as construed by 
the various archival theorists above-mentioned was its perceived impracticality when 
dealing with modern records originating from complex administrative bureaucracies. 
The definition of the fonds given in the Dutch Manual, which equated it to ‘the 
whole of the documents […] officially received or produced by an administrative 
body’, meant that the size of a fonds could potentially be huge, comprising millions 
of records.100 The US National Archives was faced with this possibility when 
considering the management of large volumes of records issuing from the US 
Federal Government during the Second World War. It therefore determined that a 
more practical methodology was required, which would still, nonetheless, adhere to 
the principle of provenance. They decided that since the records were accessioned 
according to provenance, namely ‘according to the administrative context in which 
they had been created and maintained – they were assigned for administrative 
purposes to various units within the archives according to record groups’.101 This 
‘Record Group’, based on the functions and activities of the particular government 
department, became the standard unit by which the archives were arranged and 
described. Whilst this proved to be a practical method for managing the archives, 
and which was actively implemented for over twenty years before it was critically 
examined, by the 1960s some archivists were questioning its validity as a means of 
preserving the ‘organic nature’ of archives.102  
 Mario D. Fenyo wrote the first published critique of the record group 
methodology of arrangement and description in The American Archivist journal in 
1966.103 In this article, he highlighted the arbitrary nature of the record group 
concept, arguing that its very inception was ‘established somewhat arbitrarily with 
due regard […] to the desirability of making the unit of convenient size and character 
for the work of arrangement and description and for the publication of 
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inventories’.104 Fenyo argued that although there was ‘a general consensus’ and ‘a 
kind of tacit understanding’ about what this meant, ‘no one seems to have an exact 
idea of what constituted or should constitute a record group’.105 Consequently the 
concept was applied inconsistently and arbitrarily, and therefore Fenyo concluded 
that it was time for the record group concept to be critically reviewed.106 However, 
elsewhere, the approach had already been abandoned.107 Later that same year, Peter 
J. Scott wrote an article in AA outlining how the Commonwealth Archives Office in 
Canberra, Australia, had, since 1964, adopted an alternative series-based approach to 
archival arrangement and description.108 Scott argued that issues of administrative 
and physical complexity relating to modern archives meant that the concept of the 
record group was no longer practical and that it additionally violated the principles 
of respect des fonds and original order.109 He cited the example of records that had 
been created by one agency, but had then been transferred to another in the course of 
changing administrative functions and responsibilities; and argued that neither the 
transferring agency, nor the creating agency, should be identified as the record group 
as this obscured the true complex nature of the records’ origins. Scott’s solution to 
this situation of ‘multiple-provenance’ was ‘to abandon the record group as the 
primary category of classification and to base the physical arrangement of archives 
on the record series as an independent element not bound to the administrative 
context’.110 
 Scott argued that his ‘series system’ restored the principle of provenance to 
archival arrangement and description. He maintained that provided ‘one respects the 
physical integrity of the records series and fully records its administrative context, 
one is in complete harmony with traditional principles’.111 Scott’s affirmation that 
the series system of arrangement supported the principle of provenance was based on 
an understanding of the record series, rather than the fonds, as a cohesive whole. In 
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his 1966 article, Scott affirmed ‘the organic unity of the series’.112 Max J. Evans 
later also described Scott’s understanding of the series by using a biology analogy as 
follows: ‘the records series is an organic unit: it can be decomposed for descriptive 
and access purposes into ‘molecular’ (file) and ‘elemental’ (document) units, but its 
internal structure cannot be changed without destroying its integrity and its essential 
nature’.113 Interestingly, this definition of a record series is extraordinarily similar to 
one posited by Schellenberg, an advocate of the record group concept. Schellenberg 
wrote that: 
each record item in it [the series] is thus a part of an organic whole. 
To separate it from the series in which it is embodied will impair its 
meaning, for the series as a whole has a meaning greater than its 
parts, that is, than the individual record items.114  
It is the contention of the author that both of these approaches are based on the same 
underlying concept of organic wholeness in which is embodied the archives’ 
meaning and value. Moreover, Scott and Schellenberg define the record series in 
relation to an organic whole in the same way that Jenkinson (and Schellenberg) 
define the archival fonds in relation to an organic whole. Although the location of the 
organic whole is perceived to be at different levels in the archival entity, all the 
approaches concur on the very concept of an organic whole – firstly, that it can be 
identified by an analysis of its component parts, and, secondly, that the sum of the 
whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts.115  
 The association of the archive with the concept of an organic whole has been 
made by many archivists, with the term ‘organic’ appearing throughout the archival 
literature of the twentieth century, very often without further comment or analysis. 
Not surprisingly, within the fonds or record group approaches to arrangement it can 
be found with frequent occurrence; for example, in 1950, Helen L. Chatfield wrote 
of the need to bring ‘together related material in organic fashion’ and of the enduring 
value of records that ‘find their place among the national archives as an organic 
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unit’.116 Over thirty years later, Richard C. Berner and Uli Haller referred to the 
‘organic components of an accession’ and ‘a body of organic records’.117 This trend 
has continued with more recent articles regularly using the term, although often in 
specific reference to the arrangement and description theories articulated by the 
Dutch or by Jenkinson.118 The use of the term ‘organic’ by the series system 
approach to arrangement and description has also been noted by other writers; for 
example, Sarah Flynn commented on how the use of the series system ‘resulted in 
[…] [the] series […] being described as an organic whole’.119  
The composition of the archival fonds in terms of a relationship between a 
whole and its parts has also informed the development of several widely-accepted 
international archival description standards including ISAD(G) and RAD. Various 
committees and working parties were formed during the last decades of the twentieth 
century in recognition of the need for descriptive standards that had arisen because 
of the opportunities presented by new technology to enable electronic data 
sharing.120 Many of these committees placed the fonds at the centre of their 
descriptive standards, arguing that archival description should be based on the 
origins and context of the records.121 The resultant standards reinforced a whole-part 
relationship in archival arrangement and description: 
Documentary relationships are revealed and preserved through the 
identification of the levels of arrangement of the fonds and their 
representation in structured descriptions, while administrative 
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relationships are revealed and preserved through the administrative 
history of the fonds and its parts.122 
The archives are thus arranged and described in a stable hierarchical structure that is 
perceived to accurately reflect the whole and its component parts, and thereby reveal 
the archives’ meaning and value. 
3.5.3. The ‘conceptual fonds’ 
Despite the wide acceptance of traditional conceptions of the fonds as an 
organic whole, there has been increasing discussion by archivists about the extent to 
which the analogy continues to work in practice. Several recent articles have 
questioned the concept of an organic whole in terms of whether it is an appropriate 
concept to apply to archives, regardless of the level at which it is applied.123 Laura 
Millar argued that the fragmentary nature of archives is in direct conflict with the 
notion of an organic whole, asserting that: 
the fond implies a wholeness, a completeness, a totality. I would 
argue that no archives now has, ever will have, or ever has had ‘the 
whole of the records of any creating agency’ […] Archivists manage 
the residue, not the entirety; the remains, not the totality.124 
Millar acknowledged that the Dutch Manual did allow for a fonds to consist of a 
single item or a small aggregate of records: ‘if that is all that is left, then that is the 
fonds’; but she questioned how the same logic can be applied in situations where 
records from the same creator are split physically across several different archives, 
and where each have been treated as fonds according to traditional concepts of 
provenance.125 Millar contended that ‘to refer to each […] as a fonds is to diminish 
the value of the parts and, ultimately, to render nonsensical of the very concept of the 
whole’.126 This argument is similarly expressed by Geoffrey Yeo who argued that as 
most archives hold only ‘non-current’ records, whilst the ‘current’ records remain 
with the records creator, ‘it seems erroneous to use the term fonds to refer to the non-
current records alone, since they are not the “whole of the records”’.127 Yeo’s 
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solution to this problem is to regard the fonds as a conceptual rather than a physical 
entity, arguing that: ‘the fonds is re-imagined as a concept; its components are 
logically interrelated but need not be physically brought together’.128  
The dangers of associating the fonds with a physical entity had been 
previously identified by Terry Cook.129 Cook gave several examples in which 
provenance can become unclear: for example, when the functions of one part of a 
particular agency are devolved to another, or outsourced to a private company; when 
a series is particularly long-living, generated by several different creators over 
decades, and continuing into the future; or when agencies and functions change, or 
the agency changes but the function remains, or vice versa.130 All these examples 
can be applied to traditional record formats, but Cook noted that electronic records 
magnified the problems of archival arrangement and description: ‘where 
“creatorship” is a fluid process of manipulating information from many sources in a 
myriad of ways rather than something leading to a static, fixed physical product’.131 
Cook’s solution was to regard the fonds as an ‘intellectual construct’; as a 
‘conceptual summary of descriptions of physical entities […] and descriptions of the 
administrators, historical and functional character of the records creator(s)’.132  
Yeo expanded Cook’s idea of the fonds as an intellectual construct rather 
than a physical entity, and argued that this allows archivists to recognize: ‘a fonds 
might have non-exclusive membership’, the existence of ‘overlapping fonds’, and 
also ‘of varying interpretations of their borders’.133 Yeo questioned the perceived 
dichotomy between ‘artificial’ and ‘organic’, which has become ingrained in the 
archival literature; reinforced by widely-accepted definitions of fonds as ‘natural 
accumulation, contrasted with the ‘collection’ as ‘artificial assembly’.134 Yeo argued 
that because a fonds is rarely whole in the sense of being complete, in practice they 
often resemble the traditional notion of an artificial collection, with missing records 
as well as supplementary items inserted by third parties at a later date. Although 
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Yeo’s article argued for greater flexibility in the concept of the archival fonds, he 
cautioned, however, that ‘the fuzziness of the limits of a fonds does not mean that we 
must see it as having no limits at all’.135 Yeo concluded by proposing that relational 
documentation systems might present a reliable alternative to physical ordering and 
hierarchical description, providing a means of documenting all the contexts of a 
record over time.136 
Millar also presented a solution to the problem of the non-wholeness of 
archival fonds by widening the definition of fonds to include more than just 
creatorship – as she rightly points out, many classic definitions of the fonds include 
the phrase: ‘the whole of the documents […] organically created and/or accumulated 
and used by a particular individual, family or corporate body’,137 yet often the two 
parts of the definition ‘accumulated and used’ have been generally ignored, despite 
also being elements of a record’s history.138 Millar drew comparisons with the uses 
of the term ‘provenance’ in the allied professions of archaeology and museum 
practice. She described how in archaeology the derived term ‘provenience’ is used, 
not to refer to the archaeological object itself, but rather to its ‘physical, logistical 
and spatial context’.139 In comparison, in museum art galleries, ‘provenance’ is 
‘intertwined with concepts of pedigree and authenticity’ as it is used to refer to the 
chronological history of a work of art.140 Millar proposed that archival concepts of 
the fonds should be expanded to include both archaeological provenience and artistic 
provenance, with the principle of provenance incorporating the history of the creator, 
the records and their custody over time.141 Millar concluded that by re-
conceptualizing the fonds in this way the ‘value’ of archives can still be revealed 
through provenance; by focusing on ‘how the records came to be parts, not wholes’, 
and how ‘the actual parts are greater than their sum as a hypothetical whole’.142 
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In 2009 Jennifer Meehan also questioned the assumed relationship between a 
whole and its parts that is implicit in traditional concepts of the archival fonds.143 
She explored the intellectual process undertaken by the archivist in the activity of 
archival arrangement and description in which the archivist attempts to identify the 
whole from its component parts. She described how this involves both an external 
and an internal dimension: firstly, identifying the creator(s) of a particular series of 
records amounts to: 
identifying and/or creating the relationships of ‘the external structure 
of provenance’ […] the relationships that place the records as a whole 
in their specific socio-cultural, administrative and provenancial 
contexts; 
and secondly, identifying the meaningful order of a group of records amounts to: 
identifying and/or creating the relationships of ‘the internal structure 
of provenance’ […] the relationships that place the records in their 
specific procedural, documentary and technological contexts.144 
Meehan argued that in the process of archival arrangement and description the 
archivist does not actually identify a relationship between the whole and its parts, but 
instead ‘infers’ such a relationship.145 Meehan argued that the process of arriving at 
an understanding of the contexts of the records ‘comprises a whole that is greater 
than the sum of its parts’ because it is necessarily incomplete.146 The archivist can 
attempt to arrive at this understanding either by taking a top-down approach, starting 
with known facts about the record creator, or by taking a bottom-up approach that 
begins with the records themselves; however, Meehan asserted that both approaches 
result in an ‘intellectual assembling’ of the existing parts, from which the archivist 
must then ‘sense’ the whole, and which is far from being conclusive or certain.147 
The archivist must ‘make a leap’ from the available parts – the information in and 
about the records – to ‘an imagined whole’ – an ‘understanding of the contexts of 
records creation, maintenance, transmittal and use’.148 The implication of Meehan’s 
argument is that a concept of archival value is not fixed in archival provenance, 
waiting to be discovered, but is instead created (and re-created) by the archivist 
                                                 
143 Meehan, ‘Making the Leap’. 
144 Ibid., 75. 
145 Ibid., 82. 
146 Ibid., 79. 
147 Ibid., 81-84. 
148 Ibid., 84. 
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through the very activity of arrangement and description. Meehan’s arguments can 
be placed in counter-position to those of Schellenberg writing some fifty years 
earlier: for Schellenberg the objective of arrangement and description is to break 
down the whole into its constituent parts, whilst for Meehan it is an activity of 
inference from the parts to an (imagined) whole.149 Yet, conversely, both writers 
agree that the resultant ‘[archival] whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.150 The 
difference seems to be whether the archival whole is real or imagined. 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
 The principle of provenance has remained a core tenet of archival theory and 
practice since its inception; yet varied and conflicting interpretations of the principle 
have been posited. From the late twentieth century in particular, the theoretical 
dimensions of provenance have been questioned in response to the challenges of 
modern recordkeeping and postmodernist theory. Broadly speaking, there has been a 
perceptible shift from the notion of a group of records whose boundaries are clearly 
delineated in relation to the context of its creator, to the view that archives are 
characterized within a much wider, and less strict, contextual grouping that includes 
multiple relationships and perspectives. Yeo has highlighted the recent changing 
vocabulary within the field as archival theorists have increasingly moved away from 
‘provenance’ in favour of ‘context’; although, as ever, there are differing views on 
whether the terms are synonymous or not.151 Yeo has argued that the capability to 
identify and capture context is increasingly important in the digital environment 
where information can become ‘desituated’, ‘de-contextualized’ or ‘isolated’.152 The 
digital world allows structures to be built dynamically as and when they are needed: 
The rules that seemed to determine the shaping and stabilizing of 
collections in earlier “orders” are absent or diminished. Hierarchies 
are said to be broken down, linear connections lose their monopoly, 
and binary choices disappear. Users make their own orderings, elect 
                                                 
149 See Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principle of Arrangement’, 11. 
150 Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of Arrangement’, 20; Meehan, ‘Making the Leap’, 89. 
151 Geoffrey Yeo, ‘Trust and Context in Cyberspace’, Archives and Records, 34.2 (2013), 214-34, 
(218). This observation is also made by Elizabeth Yakel, who described the changing emphasis on 
representing context in archival finding aids over the last thirty years. See Yakel, ‘Archival 
Representation’, AS, 3 (2003), 1-25. 
152 Yeo, ‘Trust and Context in Cyberspace’, 6. See also Francis X. Blouin Jr. and William G. 
Rosenberg, Processing the Past. Contesting Authority in History and the Archives (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 203. 
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their own collections, construct their own narratives in whatever way 
they wish.153 
This view is also one shared by commentators outside the archival field, 
including Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, professor of internet governance and 
regulation at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Mayer-Schönberger 
has written about the unforeseen consequences of digital technology, highlighting 
that it is impeding society’s ability to forget, as nothing is ever really erased in 
cyberspace.154 One possible response he offered to the twenty-first century reality of 
‘information overload’ is that of ‘perfect contextualization’, which would enable the 
comprehensive collection, storage and retrieval of digital information, and thereby 
enable the evaluation of such information.155 Archivist Jennifer Douglas has 
identified a similar need to be able to differentiate and delineate between different 
types of context;156 whilst Charles Bazerman argued that the evaluative judgement 
required in comparing texts and data is at the very core of the ‘knowledge-making’ 
process.157 It would seem, therefore, that the activity of archival arrangement and 
description, grounded in the principle of provenance, in all its conceptions, continues 
to provide a meaningful conceptual framework for understanding and creating the 
contexts of records – in both paper and digital formats. 
 Perhaps in the end it is necessary to follow the advice of Laura Millar who 
argued that ‘we should not get hung up upon ‘series’ versus ‘fonds’. They are both 
just terms’.158 The author would agree that the difference of meaning between these 
two terms is not so great as has sometimes been implied by their leading proponents 
in the literature, and that, arguably, the language used in the definitions strongly 
suggests that the difference is merely one of the level of application. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that it is time for the archival profession to abandon 
either, or the concepts which underpin them. Although the current postmodernist 
framework of thinking about archives insists that our attempts to accurately identify 
                                                 
153 Geoffrey Yeo, ‘Bringing Things Together: Aggregate Records In a Digital Age’, Archivaria, 74 
(2012), 43-91, (58). 
154 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete. The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (New Jersey, US: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
155 Mayer-Schönberger, 163-8. 
156 Douglas, 38. 
157 Charles Bazerman, ‘The Orders of Documents, the Orders of Activity, and the Orders of 
Information’, AS, 12.4 (2012), 377-88, (385). 
158 Laura Millar, ‘An Unnecessary Complication: International Perspectives on the Record Group, the 
Series and the Fonds’, in Cunningham, 312-245, (332). 
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relationships between records, creators, and users, through arrangement and 
description can only ever be partial, that does not mean such attempts are 
meaningless. Heather MacNeil acknowledged that even though ‘original order’ is 
only one of many possible orders of records, it still remains ‘essential as part of the 
records’ history’.159 The existence of a value in records, which results from the 
circumstances of the records’ creation, remains a compelling idea, even if most 
archivists would not consider it to be in isolation or to the exclusion of other, many, 
possible values in records. This value, which, as another commentator has noted 
‘Terry Eastwood pithily summarizes as the value of the documents “as a record of 
what occurred and how it occurred in the context in which it occurred”’160 relies on 
the principle of provenance. The principle of provenance provides a conceptual 
framework for understanding and creating the context(s) that give a body of records 
its meaning and value.161  
 The next chapter will step back from the analysis of specific theories of 
archival appraisal, arrangement and description, to examine some of the underlying 
concepts and ideas that have come from other disciplines into the archival discipline 
and which have been instrumental in influencing the direction and development of 
archival theory in general. 
                                                 
159 MacNeil, ‘Archivalterity’, 21. 
160 Ibid., 10. See also Terry Eastwood, ‘How Goes It With Appraisal?’, Archivaria, 36 (1993), 111-21, 
(115). 
161 See Meehan, ‘Making the Leap’, 76. 
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Chapter 4. The evolution of archival theory: influences, impacts and underlying 
assumptions 
4.1. Chapter summary 
 Building upon some of the points raised in earlier chapters, this chapter will 
discuss the evolution of archival theory, concentrating in particular on the ‘paradigm 
shift’ in archival thinking, which took place at the end of the twentieth century. It 
will be argued that a coalescence of specific factors during this period led to the 
opening-up of the archival profession to new ideas and theories from other 
disciplines. Influences from different sectors, including the cultural and heritage 
sectors, and the informatics and records management sectors, began to impact on the 
way archivists saw themselves, their role, and the archives they manage. They 
significantly contributed to ideas about the value of archives, which informed 
archival theories of appraisal, arrangement and description. This chapter will 
illustrate some of the dominant discourses that impacted upon archives and will 
explore the underlying value assumptions that are implicit in the discourses, and 
which in turn helped to shape archival thinking about value. This chapter continues 
to explore the archival literature; and begins to widen the perspective by considering 
the literature in other fields that have influenced the archival profession, namely 
those of the cultural and built heritage, records management and information 
management. 
4.2. Introduction 
Archival theory developed as a distinctive body of principles and ideas from 
the late nineteenth century as archival theorists began to publish manuals and 
guidelines to aid archivists in their work.1 John Ridener described how ‘a lack of 
codified professional training for archivists and a desire to create standardized 
archives created a need for normalization and regulation among archivists of the 
                                                 
1 For example, S. Muller, J. A. Feith and R. Fruin, Handleiding voor het ordenen en beschrijven van 
archieven (Groningen: Erven B. Van der Kamp, 1898); Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive 
Administration. The problems of War Archives and Archive Making (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922); 
Eugenio Casanova, Archivistica (Siena: Stab. Arti Grafiche Lazzeri, 1928); Adolf Brenneke, 
Archivkunde: ein Beitrag zur Theorie und Geschichte des europäische Archivwessens (Leipzig: 
Koehler & Arnelang, 1953); Theodore R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques 
(Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1956). 
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time’.2 Although some archivists have, at times, questioned the relevancy and role of 
theory for archival practitioners, as the previous two chapters have demonstrated, 
there is significant evidence to show that ‘archival theory is neither nonexistent, 
high-falutin’, mythical, banal, nor metaphysical. It consists, rather, of organized 
conceptual knowledge resulting from the analysis of basic archival ideas’.3  
Throughout a large part of the twentieth century, archival theory tended to be 
self-referential and self-contained, as archivists strove to establish clear boundaries 
between their professional activities and those of related fields, including 
librarianship, antiquarianism and history. The origins of the archival profession 
differ, depending on the country. In the UK, for example, the archival profession 
emerged from that of professional historians, asserting its independence early on and 
achieving it to a large extent by the first decades of the twentieth century.4 In 
comparison, the American archival profession remained in the shadow of librarians 
until a much later period, with a great deal of debate as to the professional 
differences between archivists and manuscript curators regularly appearing in the 
pages of its journal, The American Archivist.5 US archivist Theodore R. 
Schellenberg’s 1965 publication, The Management of Archives drew specific 
comparison and contrast with the methodology and techniques applied by the library 
profession.6 The Australian archival profession similarly emerged from its national 
Library Association in the mid-twentieth century.7 In Canada, archivists sought 
independence from historians, forming an independent body from the Canadian 
Historical Association in 1975.8 The nature of the relationship between archivists 
and historians continued to be debated by the Canadian archival profession into the 
                                                 
2 John Ridener, From Polders to Postmodernism. A Concise History of Archival Theory (Duluth, 
Minnesota: Litwin Books LLC, 2009), 29.  
3 Trevor Livelton, Archival Theory, Records and the Public (Chicago: Scarecrow Press/SAA, 1996), 
25. See also Chapter 1, section 1.2. 
4 See Elizabeth Shepherd, ‘Towards Professionalism? Archives and Archivists in England in the 20th 
Century, unpublished PhD thesis, (UCL: School of Library, Archive and Information Studies, 2004). 
This is also borne out in a reading of articles published in Archives and JSA. 
5 For example, Lester J. Cappon, ‘Historical Manuscripts as Archives: Some Definitions and Their 
Application’, AA, 19.2 (1956), 101-110; Robert L. Brubaker, ‘Archival Principles and the Curator of 
Manuscripts’, AA, 29.4 (1966), 505-10; Maynard J. Brichford, ‘Historians and Mirrors: A Review 
Essay’, AA, 36.3 (1973), 397-402.  
6 Theodore R. Schellenberg, The Management of Archives (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1965). 
7 ‘Report on Archives and Libraries by the Archive Section, Library and Archives Association’, AM, 
1.6 (1959), 27-35. 
8 See The Canadian Archivist (Archives Section of the Canadian Historical Association), 1963-1974 
and Archivaria (Journal of the Association of Canadian Archivists), 1976-present.  
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late 1980s.9 Although the timing of an independent archival profession varied from 
country to country, each was characterized by a determination to assert the 
uniqueness and distinctive nature of archival work, with little reference to ideas and 
theories in other disciplines beyond distancing themselves from those in which they 
originated.10 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how much of the archival thinking in the early 
twentieth century was dominated by two individuals who reinforced the idea that the 
archival profession was distinctive and had its own theory: Sir Hilary Jenkinson in 
the UK and Theodore R. Schellenberg in the US. Developments in archival theory 
throughout this period came about primarily as a result of archivists having to find 
practical ways to deal with specific types of records.11 The last decades of the 
twentieth century, however, witnessed significant changes in the nature and 
development of archival theory. As has been previously noted, several writers have 
used the term ‘paradigm shift’ to describe the perceived transformation that took 
place during this period.12 Although developments in archival theory, like those of 
any human group, have always taken place within a much wider context, the 
coalescence of several factors in the late twentieth century considerably affected the 
archival profession; including postmodernism, social policy, new technologies and 
the proliferation of digital records.13 In 1994, Heather MacNeil argued that: 
The paradigm shift that is taking place in the archival world has been 
provoked by a number of societal, technological, and professional 
developments that have thrown into question, if not crisis, some of the 
basic tenets concerning the nature and value of archives.14 
Influenced by new thinking in other fields, archival theorists began to question their 
traditional approaches from a range of diverse perspectives, and to seek alternative 
                                                 
9 For example, George Bolotenko, ‘Archivists and Historians: Keepers of the Well’, Archivaria, 16 
(1983), 5-25; Anthony L. Rees, ‘Masters in our Own House?’, Archivaria, 16 (1983), 53-9; R. Scott 
James, ‘A Wearisome Issue’, Archivaria, 17 (1983/84), 302-3. See also Chapter 2, section 2.3.3. 
10 For example, Waldo Gifford Leland, ‘The First Conference of Archivists, December 1909: The 
Beginnings of a Profession’, AA, 13.2 (1950), 109-20; Alan Ridge, ‘Chairman’s Letter’, Canadian 
Archivist, 1.4 (1966), 16; Library Association, ‘The Place of Archives and Manuscripts in the Field of 
Librarianship’, Archives, 9.41 (1969), 40-1. 
11 Ridener, 112. See also Chapter 2. 
12 See Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
13 William G. Rosenberg, ‘Historiographical Origins of the Archival Divide’, COMMA, 2005.1 – 
Wien 2004 (2005), 1-11. 
14 Heather MacNeil, ‘Archival Theory and Practice: Between Two Paradigms’, Archivaria, 37 (1994), 
6-20, (7). 
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theories for all aspects of archival practice, which could work within a twenty-first 
century archive and recordkeeping paradigm.  
Many archivists began to make explicit connections with theories in other 
disciplines, including archaeology, cultural studies, and museum studies, as they 
explored the application of concepts such as material culture and cultural 
significance as a means of realizing the importance of archives in understanding the 
past and the present.15 The physical placement of many local archival services in the 
UK within local government departments that comprised culture, leisure and sport 
led to a commonly-held view among many archivists, government officials and the 
general public, that archives are a cultural resource.16 This was not a solely British 
phenomenon as a similar trend was witnessed in many other countries.17 Broader 
debates about the value of cultural heritage and the arts as a whole, which were 
taking place at all levels of society, began to impact on archives. These debates 
became intertwined with the concept of public value, funding for the arts, and 
attempts to measure culture both economically and socially. Unsurprisingly 
therefore, archivists, particularly those working in the UK public sector, began to try 
to demonstrate the value of archives as a cultural resource to society.18 
Simultaneously, other archivists began to align themselves with developing 
fields such as informatics, and newly emerging disciplines like records management 
and information management.19 The emphasis was on preserving records to support 
                                                 
15 Examples include: Hugh A. Taylor, ‘The Collective Memory: Archives and Libraries as Heritage’, 
Archivaria, 15 (1982/83), 118-30; Kenneth E. Foote, ‘To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory 
and Culture’, AA, 53.3 (1990), 378-93; James M. O’Toole, ‘The Symbolic Significance of Archives’, 
AA, 56.2 (1993), 234-55; Hugh A. Taylor, ‘”Heritage” Revisited: Documents as Artifacts in the 
Context of Museums and Material Culture’, Archivaria, 40 (1995), 8-20. 
16 Mark Stevens, ‘Local Authority Archives: places and perceptions’, JSA, 20.1 (1999), 85-92; Victor 
Gray, ‘The English Regions: The archival dimension’, JSA, 21.2 (2000), 149-57.  
17 In the UK, since 1997, responsibility for the National Archives has been in the Government 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. In Canada, Library and Archives Canada has been in the 
Department for Canadian Heritage since 1995; in the Netherlands, since 1996, the Dutch National 
Archives have been governed by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science; and in France, the 
Archives nationales has been part of the Ministry of Culture since 1959. Australia has more recently 
followed this trend – the National Archives moved into the Department of Regional Australia, Local 
Government, Arts and Sport in 2011.  
18 London Archives Regional Council, Out of the Past – into the Future. Priorities for Archive 
Development in London (London: London Archives Regional Council, 2001); Museums, Libraries 
and Archives Council, Listening to the Past, Speaking to the Future (UK: MLA, 2004). 
19 Examples include: Glenda Acland, ‘Archivist: Keeper, Undertaker or Auditor’, AM, 19.1 (1991), 9-
15; Charles M. Dollar, ‘Archivists and Records Managers in the Information Age’, Archivaria, 36 
(1993), 37-52; Philip C. Bantin and Gerald Bernbom, ‘The Indiana University Electronic Records 
Project: Analyzing Functions, Identifying Transactions, and Evaluating Recordkeeping Systems – A 
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the record-creating administration rather than preserving cultural relics for historical 
research, as some archivists began to apply ideas from risk management and 
organizational theory to archive and recordkeeping.20 In particular, some archivists 
emphasized the value of archives for accountability, good governance and corporate 
memory.21  
This chapter will explore a selection of relevant examples that demonstrate 
the transfer of value concepts from an external discipline into the archival sphere.22 
These dominant strands of influence, with their different theoretical foundations, 
brought multiple conceptions of the term ‘value’ into archival theory. They drew on 
philosophical ideas about the characteristics and differences between intrinsic and 
instrumental values to broaden the debate about archival value. They also effectively 
reinforced a pre-existing dualism of archives – on the one hand, their use for 
administrative and legal purposes and, on the other, their use for historical, cultural 
and scholarly purposes – as a sustaining concept upon which much contemporary 
archival theory continues to be constructed.23  
4.3. The value of archives as cultural resources 
 The terms ‘culture’ and ‘cultural heritage’ are not without their difficulties 
and contested meanings.24 One of the earliest definitions of culture was made in 
                                                                                                                                          
Report on Methodology’, Archives and Museum Informatics, 10.3 (1996), 246-66; Richard J. Cox, 
Managing Records as Evidence and Information (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2001). 
20 David Bearman, ‘Archival Strategies’, AA, 58.4 (1995), 380-413; Victoria Lemieux, ‘Applying 
Mintzberg’s Theories on Organization Configuration to Archival Appraisal’, Archivaria, 46 (1998), 
32-85. 
21 Luciana Duranti, ‘Archives as Place’, AM, 24.2 (1996), 242-55; Heather MacNeil, Trusting 
Records: Legal, Historical and Diplomatic Perspectives (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000); Chris Hurley, ‘Recordkeeping, Document Destruction and the Law (Heiner, Enron and 
McCabe)’, AM, 30.2 (2002), 6-25; Elizabeth Shepherd, ‘Why are records in the public sector 
organizational assets?’, Records Management Journal, 16.1 (2006), 6-12. 
22 It should be noted that the author has chosen to focus on those examples which she believes 
resonate most strongly with a concept of archival value; arguably there are others, including 
perspectives that give the archivist a quasi-political role by re-conceptualizing archives as sources of 
power, with their unique ability to protect citizens’ rights and to support social justice. Such 
perspectives are exemplified in the writings of Verne Harris, Randall C. Jimerson and Eric Ketelaar 
among others. 
23 See also Chapter 1, section 1.4. 
24 Dave O’Brien, Measuring the Value of Culture: A Report to the Department of Culture Media and 
Sport (UK: AHRC, ESRC and DCMS, 15 Dec 2010), 11. Report available online: 
www.culture.gov.uk/publications/7660.aspx [accessed 28 February 2013]. See also J. Jokilehto, 
Definition of Cultural Heritage. References to Documents in History (ICCROM Working Group 
‘Heritage and Society’, 2005). Available online: 
www.cif.icomos.org/pdf_docs/Documents%20on%20line/Heritage%20definitions.pdf [accessed 28 
February 2013]. 
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1871 by British anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor who wrote that ‘culture […] is 
that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’.25 At the 
beginning of the twentieth century anthropologists began to study cultural symbols, 
experiences, and products as they sought to establish if culture was unique to 
humanity and how it evolved.26 In the 1920s and 1930s archaeologists began to shift 
their focus from merely dating artefacts as a supplement to history, to studying the 
people who created the artefacts and analysing the relationship between artefacts and 
social relations.27 Artefacts were regarded as the material manifestations of cultures. 
Archaeologists and anthropologists used material culture as an important concept for 
interpreting the past through the objects and artefacts left behind in the present by 
individuals and societies.28 It is assumed by proponents of material culture theory 
that such objects are created by someone and are produced to do something: 
‘material culture does not passively reflect society – rather, it creates society through 
the actions of individuals’.29 In the middle of the twentieth century, ‘cultural studies’ 
developed as a new discipline concerned with the study of culture in terms of its 
consumption goods and leisure activities (including art, music, film, food, sport and 
clothing).30 By the end of the twentieth century the discipline was heavily influenced 
by postmodernist thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, particularly in 
exploring the privileging of written records over non-written or oral texts, and the 
(re)-interpretation implicit in any reading of all text forms.31 This widened the 
concept of ‘culture’ yet further by encompassing all meaningful artefacts as cultural 
‘texts’.  
                                                 
25 Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture (1871), cited in Jokilehto, Definition of Cultural Heritage, 
1. The author acknowledges that this definition is from a Western-centric viewpoint and that other 
interpretations are possible. 
26 History From Things: Essays on Material Culture ed. by Steven Lubar and David W. Kingery 
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 
27 See, for example, V. Gordon Childe, The Danube in Prehistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1929). 
28 Ian Hodder, Reading the Past: Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology, 2nd edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Christopher Tilley, Reading Material Culture 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
29 Ian Hodder, Reading the Past, 6. Italics in original. 
30 In the UK, cultural studies had overtly political, Marxist, origins compared to the US where it was 
grounded in a more liberal-pluralist tradition. See Ian Hodder, Reading the Past. 
31 Ian Hodder, ‘The Interpretation of Documents and Material Culture’, in Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, 2nd edn., ed. by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, US: Sage 
Publications, 2000), 703-14. 
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Hugh A. Taylor was one of the first archivists to take the ideas from material 
culture theory and apply them to archives. In the early 1980s, Taylor wrote that 
archives provided ‘a powerful means of communication to the reader, providing a 
sense of immediacy with the past’.32 Fifteen years later, Taylor argued for a 
widening of the definition of material culture to include archival records, 
commenting that these records are ‘instruments’ for the conduct of affairs or 
relationships in the same way as museum objects.33 Taylor argued that ‘our records 
are more than a source for research, a means of ensuring accountability or as 
evidence in contradistinction to information without context’.34 Instead, he regarded 
them as powerful ‘signs’ which reveal society’s collective memory.35 Taylor blamed 
the failure by archivists to consider archives as material culture as being based on 
‘old ideas of emphasizing content […] based on several standards of value in the 
Schellenbergian tradition: a mountain of documentary ‘facts’ in evidential context’.36 
He argued that a shift was needed from considering ‘outputs’ (the volume of material 
generated by a creator and preserved by archivists) to ‘outcomes’ (the personal and 
social impact of the activity documented by the creator and the consequences of its 
accession by archivists). Taylor argued that:  
all archives will then be viewed not just as legal and social evidence 
but as material instruments fashioned by a culture bent on the survival 
of the whole creative process, which will be infinitely more aware of 
the humans who created these materials.37 
Taylor’s prolific output of published articles during his long career as an archivist in 
both the UK and in Canada meant that his innovative and boundary-pushing thinking 
reached many in the archival profession. In Taylor’s view, archives mattered because 
they ‘are an extension of ourselves’,38 or, as another colleague expressed it: ‘By 
existing, archives signify’.39 
Archivist Carolyn Heald also appealed to material culture theory in 1995 
when she argued for the preservation of electronic records and recordkeeping 
                                                 
32 Taylor, ‘The Collective Memory’, 122. 
33 Taylor, ‘“Heritage” Revisited’, 9. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
35 Ibid., 10-12. 
36 Ibid., 11. 
37 Ibid., 18. 
38 Ibid., 10. 
39 Terry Cook, Obituary: Hugh A. Taylor, 1920-2005’, Archivaria, 60 (2005), 275-82. 
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systems.40 Heald argued that ‘information technology is just as much a cultural 
artefact as paper, videotape, papyrus or stone; our mission as archivists is to 
understand the cultural role of computer records within society’.41 Heald re-iterated 
her views in another article in 1996, arguing that the task of the archivist is ‘to 
understand the cultural products of society, the cultural expressions that exist in 
concrete form, whether they be paper, film or electronic signals. We understand 
society from its cultural products, not vice versa’.42 As Heald noted, one definition 
of postmodernism is: ‘the consumption of sheer commodification as a process’, in 
which past, present and future have lost all meaning as everything is relative.43 
Heald argued that postmodernism had replaced the rational positivism of the 
nineteenth century, which had provided the framework for much of the existing 
theory in the archival and history disciplines. She drew analogies with how the 
historical profession has had to evolve from its dependence on earlier principles ‘of 
order and coherence’ to cope with ‘current philosophical trends [...] towards 
complexity, fragmentation, and incoherence’.44  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, historian Leopold von Ranke’s 
famous maxim that history can show ‘how things actually were’ (‘wie es eigentlich 
gewesen’), which became the guiding principle for many historians, had been 
overturned by the recognition that ‘History […] is an inter-textual, linguistic 
construct. […] we read the world as a text and, logically, such readings are 
infinite’.45 In her article, Heald acknowledged this challenge, but, rather than dismiss 
the importance of archives as a result, she instead insisted that there can be a 
continuing role for archives as the sources of history if they are re-conceptualized, 
using postmodernist theory, as ‘sources of discourse (context) rather than as sources 
of value (information)’.46 Heald suggested that this is what archivists have actually 
                                                 
40 Carolyn Heald, ‘Are We Collecting the Right Stuff?’, Archivaria, 40 (1995), 182-88. 
41 Heald, ‘Are We Collecting the Right Stuff?’, 183. Italics in original. 
42 Carolyn Heald, ‘Is there Room for Archives in the Postmodern World?’, AA, 59.1 (1996), 88-101, 
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43 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, x (Durham, NC.: 
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always done; that context has always been more important than content, whether 
approached top-down from the creator, or bottom-up from the records themselves.47  
Heald argued that archives are not valuable because ‘they have some 
objective and immutable status’, but rather, they are deemed valuable by society – 
for guaranteeing rights and privileges and for genealogical purposes.48 Heald 
concluded that traditional archival theories such as diplomatics remain vital for the 
understanding of records, provided that the archivist acknowledges that the self-
conscious act of ‘reading archives’ is as much a product of society as the records 
themselves.49 
The impact of postmodernist thinking in the late twentieth century was also 
felt by heritage conservation theorists who began to explore the ways in which 
historic buildings and sites provided a medium through which a society’s past could 
be better understood.50 The term ‘cultural significance’ was introduced, commonly 
used ‘to mean the degree to which a place possesses a certain valued attribute […] 
[valued] by elements of a community, by a whole community, or by our society as a 
whole’.51 The Burra Charter, adopted by the International Council on Monuments 
and Sites in 1979, defined cultural significance as ‘aesthetic, historic, scientific, 
social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations’ and stated that it is 
embodied ‘in the place itself, its fabric, setting, use, associations, meanings, records, 
related places and objects’.52 The Charter supported a new direction in heritage 
conservation, which used the idea of protecting the values embodied in cultural 
heritage to explain and justify its conservation.53 Subsequent theorists attempted to 
categorize heritage values, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that: 
                                                 
47 Heald, ‘Is there Room?’, 93, 95. 
48 Ibid., 96-7. 
49 Ibid., 101. 
50 Managing Built Heritage. The Role of Cultural Significance, ed. by Derek Worthing and Stephen 
Bond (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 
51 Looking After Heritage Places, ed. by Michael Pearson and Sharon Sullivan (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1995), 17, 18. It is the view of the author that the term ‘significance’ is 
used here in a sense that is synonymous with the term ‘value’, in an attempt to avoid a rhetorical 
tautology. The author believes the attempt is ultimately unsuccessful as it can be argued that the 
underlying assumptions behind cultural significance still lead to value being defined in terms of value, 
and thus the tautology remains.  
52 Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance (The Burra 
Charter), Article 1.2, Definitions. Available online: www.Australia.icomos.org/wp-
content/uploads/BURRA-CHARTER-1999_charter-only.pdf [accessed 28 February 2013].  
53 Worthing and Bond, 47. 
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In the final analysis, heritage places are not significant by their nature; 
they are given value by human beings. Their value rests in their 
perception by the community. Significance is wholly a human artefact 
or concept; as such it is as fluid, complex and dynamic as society’s 
multi-layered and changing value system.54 
Despite the recognition that there cannot be a truly objective evaluation of 
cultural significance, many theorists in the field argued nonetheless that there are 
widely-accepted values that can be identified within cultural heritage. Proponents of 
this approach use a process of value assessment based on the premise that all values 
are equal and can be placed in a hierarchy of ascending (or descending) values in 
order to compare relative significance.55 The author believes that parallels can be 
drawn between these attempts to identify and categorize value in cultural heritage 
theory and the taxonomic approaches to value made by some archival theorists, 
particularly in the 1980s US.56 For example, NARA’s Staff Information Paper No. 
21, entitled: Intrinsic Value in Archival Material, established a list of nine criteria 
against which archives could be evaluated;57 whilst Frank Boles and Julia Marks 
Young developed what they called ‘the Black Box’ appraisal model, in which a long 
list of values and record characteristics should be considered, with the archivist 
‘pulling from the box’ a determination of the value of archives.58 
The concept of cultural significance has been applied beyond the built 
heritage sector; for example, in 1992, UNESCO adopted the term ‘significance’ as 
an acceptance criteria in its Memory of the World Programme, aimed at safeguarding 
the world’s documentary heritage, including archives.59 The Programme has not yet 
been widely taken up by the archival sector60 and some archivists have questioned its 
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basic premises.61 Nonetheless, many of the ideas of cultural significance theory have 
influenced the quest by some archivists to determine the value of archives. For 
example, James O’Toole published several articles in The American Archivist in the 
1980s and 1990s in which he sought to identify the value in archives that could 
explain and justify their preservation.62 O’Toole employed the language of cultural 
theory, preferring the term ‘significance’ to describe the characteristics of archives 
that make them worthy of being preserved (the author argues that in doing so 
O’Toole used the term in a way that is broadly comparable with the term ‘value’). 
O’Toole challenged traditional arguments that linked preservation with age, or 
uniqueness, and questioned why it seems to be a particularly human characteristic to 
keep records in as near pristine conditions as possible for as long as possible.63 
O’Toole suggested that before one could evaluate archives it was necessary to 
understand how and why human beings created the records in the first place.64 He 
drew on ideas in the fields of history and anthropology about literacy in societies to 
explore the ‘symbolic’ nature of archives, suggesting that there are many examples 
of records whose ‘real meaning was more symbolic than practical’.65 Interestingly, 
O’Toole’s consideration of the different types of record significance mirror those 
listed by The Burra Charter – aesthetic, historical, spiritual, and social – as he 
explained the importance of seals and elaborate calligraphy in making documents 
attractive; or how the physical solidity and durability of baptismal registers made 
such volumes seem more official.66 The illustrations accompanying the text, as well 
as the examples given, indicated O’Toole’s wide interpretation of the definition of 
‘record’. For example, in this category he included family quilts and family bibles, 
arguing that they are ‘part record, part artefact. We make and value these records 
                                                                                                                                          
world/register/ (It should be noted that a separate listing on the UK Memory of the World Register 
(www.unesco.org.uk) includes a total of 50 inscriptions [accessed 22 June 2014]). 
61 For example, Robyn Sloggett commented that whilst the Memory of the World Programme is 
laudable in principle, its methodology is problematic and the process itself is ‘culturally determined 
self-selecting’. Robyn Sloggett, ‘Valuing Significance or Signifying Value? Culture in a Global 
Context’, AM, 33.2 (2005), 110-229.  
62 James O’Toole, ‘On the Idea of Permanence’, AA, 52.1 (1989), 10-25; O’Toole, ‘The Symbolic 
Significance of Archives’, and James O’Toole, ‘On the Idea of Uniqueness’, AA, 57.4 (1994), 632-58. 
63 O’Toole, ‘On the Idea of Permanence’, 16; O’Toole, ‘On the Idea of Uniqueness’. 
64 O’Toole, ‘The Symbolic Significance of Archives’, 235. 
65 Ibid., 240. 
66 Ibid., 241-3. 
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because of the way they reconstruct the family across time and space […] the power 
of that symbolic reconstruction of the family is substantial and often emotional’.67  
O’Toole argued that the symbolic significance of many records derives ‘from 
the act of recordmaking’ and he quoted fellow archivist, Hugh A. Taylor, in arguing 
there is a kind of implicit hierarchy of value therein: ‘handwritten, ‘personalized’ 
letters carry more weight, telegrams and telephone calls somewhat less, and 
preprinted postcards count practically not at all’.68 In this sense, O’Toole is basing 
value on how the record has been created rather than on the record’s content, or on 
what has been created.69 
The influence of the ideas that emerged from material culture theory and 
cultural studies can be found in the archival appraisal theories of Hans Booms and 
Terry Cook who explicitly repositioned appraisal theory within a socio-cultural 
perspective.70 Booms argued for appraisal based on the value of records as ‘the 
material source of a society’s historical consciousness’.71 He insisted that archivists 
could achieve a degree of objectivity in appraisal decisions by ‘measuring the 
societal significance of past events’ through an analysis of the value which the 
records’ contemporaries had attached to them.72 Booms argued that appraisal should 
be based on the archival principle of provenance because he believed that it is in the 
values of the record creators that the value of archives resides.73 In his view there is 
no value intrinsic in the record itself, rather archival value is found in the value 
systems of those who created the records.74 Booms argued that by considering the 
value of the record creators, by analysing at a macro-level their structures and 
functions, the archivist can achieve some distance from her own societal value 
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70 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.  
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system.75 Terry Cook agreed that societal values should be at the heart of archival 
appraisal.76 Like Booms, Cook’s theory of ‘macro-appraisal’ was based on the 
premise that value was not to be found in the records themselves, but in ‘theories of 
value of societal significance’ which archivists could identify by focusing on the 
organic relationship of the record’s creation.77  
Some archivists took the idea of the societal value of archives a step further, 
arguing that appraisal can never be anything but subjective because it is a process 
embedded itself within a societal value system.78 Heavily influenced by the theories 
of Jacques Derrida, archivist Tom Nesmith argued that whilst a record’s value is 
partly ‘inscribed in it by those who literally made it’, most of its value lies in ‘its 
context of interpretation’.79 For Nesmith, this meant that the act of appraisal – the 
placing a record in the archive – adds value by giving the record ‘a special status’.80 
Nesmith emphasized the importance of the principle of provenance in determining 
archival value, extending it beyond the records’ creator to include the subsequent 
actions of archivists:  
The destruction or exclusion of non-archival records ‘recreates’ the 
surviving records by repositioning them in the archives vis-à-vis 
related records, or by removing aspects of their context of 
interpretation. The records elevated to the status of archives then 
become the focus of the meaning-making or interpretive process, 
which in turn makes and remakes them.81 
Archivist Brien Brothman also argued that archival appraisal creates and destroys 
value rather than merely identifying it.82 Brothman suggested that archivists are ‘not 
simply ‘acquiring’ and ‘preserving’ records of value; we are creating value, that is, 
an order of value, by putting things in their proper place’.83 Furthermore, Brothman 
argued that the order created by archivists embodies society’s values in a self-
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perpetuating relationship in which archivists promote society’s documentary 
consumption.84 Brothman concluded by pleading for a greater consideration of 
archives as objects of historical and cultural analysis as a means of examining and 
elucidating archival processes.85 
4.4. Economic and social measurements of archival value  
The last thirty years have witnessed an increased awareness about the wider 
role that archives can play in society. The 1997 UK General Election saw the British 
Labour Party take power for the first time since 1979. Their political manifesto 
included the following statement:  
The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the 
sense of community, identity and civic pride that should define our 
country. Yet we consistently undervalue the role of the arts and 
culture in helping to create a civic society. […] Art, sport and leisure 
are vital to our quality of life and the renewal of our economy. They 
are significant earners for Britain.86 
In the decade that followed, a new cultural agenda began to take shape as 
government policies directly linked cultural activities – including archives – with 
economic and social change.87 Although this has been a global phenomenon;88 it has 
been particularly felt in the UK where notable changes within the archival 
profession, including the formation of the Museums, Libraries and Archives 
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Council,89 and the National Archives,90 together with political policies focusing on 
public value, social exclusion and community regeneration, have significantly 
impacted on the archival sector. Central to many of these policies was the concept of 
public value. Archivist Nicky Sugar has traced the origin of the concept of public 
value within UK archives to the publication of a Cabinet Office Strategy Unit paper 
entitled Creating Public Value in 2002.91 Sugar explained that the concept was first 
conceived in the US in the 1990s; its originator, Mark H. Moore, defined public 
value as ‘initiating and reshaping public sector enterprises in ways that increase their 
value to the public in both the short and long term’.92 The 2002 paper argued that the 
concept of public value could provide a useful way of thinking about the goals and 
performance of government policy, and a means of assessing activities produced or 
supported by government.93 The concept of public value was seen by many policy 
makers as a more inclusive means to justify expenditure on the arts and culture than 
traditional ‘arts for art’s sake’ appeals. It was also seen as a means to demonstrate 
empirically its return on public investment.94 Additionally, Sugar pointed out that 
‘crucially, moreover, it is characterized not as a way to react to public opinion, but as 
a tool with which to shape it’.95 The Cabinet Office Strategy Unit paper, for 
example, highlighted the importance of ‘public preference’ as lying at the heart of 
public value, and discussed the different factors in preference formation, including 
social relationships and behaviour.96  
The concept of public value drew on philosophical ideas about value by 
explicitly separating two types of value: intrinsic and instrumental. The first – 
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intrinsic – refers to value in itself, or for its own sake;97 for example, the personal 
experience individuals may have when seeing a painting or discovering an ancestor 
in a register of births. The second – instrumental – refers to value as a means to 
something else,98 or as one theorist described it ‘the “knock-on” effects’;99 for 
example, the boost to tourism by increased visitor numbers coming to see a new 
exhibition at the Museum of London, or the health benefits to the elderly 
participating in reminiscence groups using archives. The debate about whether 
culture is intrinsically valuable or not has long existed, but the application of the 
concept of public value to the cultural sector made the distinction between different 
types of value explicit and enabled new articulations of cultural value in the intrinsic 
value versus instrumental value debate.100  
Many aspects of the cultural sector in the UK actively embraced the concept 
of public value: in 2004 the British Broadcasting Corporation placed public value at 
the centre of its charter renewal,101 and subsequently the DCMS, Heritage Lottery 
Fund and Arts Council England all incorporated aspects of the concept into their 
service development.102 Sugar argued that the desire to find ways of evidencing 
value was rooted in various different issues, including dissatisfaction with existing 
target-based approaches, a growing public demand for accountability and spending 
justification, and ‘the need to mark a shift away from crude instrumentalist measures 
for valuing culture which have alienated many professionals and only partially stand 
up to detailed economic scrutiny’.103  
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John Holden, Head of Culture at think-tank Demos until 2008, promoted the 
application of ideas about public value within the cultural sector by organizing the 
‘Valuing Culture’ conference in June 2003 and by publishing several influential 
reports including Capturing Cultural Value in 2004 and Valuing Culture in the South 
East in 2005.104 Holden argued that many of the attempts to measure the 
instrumental value of culture – the social and economic impact of culture on society 
– were ‘complicated and contested assessments of causation’; and that even the 
DCMS had ‘confirmed that there is no ready-made and reliable methodology in 
place for calculating the economic impacts of cultural institutions’.105 Furthermore, 
Holden argued that attempts to justify culture on intrinsic value grounds were 
similarly problematic, often leading to accusations of elitism.106 He argued that: 
The postmodern questioning of concepts such as beauty, truth, 
delight, transcendence and the like, coupled with the insight that these 
ideas are temporally and geographically specific, have made using 
them in debate an embarrassment at best, contemptible at worst. The 
use of the word ‘culture’ itself now begs the immediate response 
‘whose culture?’. All judgements have become relative, suspect and 
tainted.107 
Holden proposed that instead of perpetuating the intrinsic versus instrumental value 
dichotomy, it should be acknowledged that cultural value actually comprises both 
types of value, as well as a third type which he called ‘institutional value’.108 Holden 
defined institutional value as relating ‘to the processes and actions that cultural 
organisations adopt when they interact with the public’.109 Cultural value therefore, 
according to Holden, comprised three types of value: instrumental, intrinsic and 
institutional; and evaluating how these types of value worked in practice also 
depended on a tripartite of the different parties involved: the public (who use the 
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services), professionals (who manage them) and politicians (who set the legal and 
policy frameworks).110  
Holden aimed to give power and confidence back to cultural professionals so 
that they are able to ‘explicitly articulate the values that they […] promote’.111 His 
model proposed a fundamental shift in the way that cultural institutions operate and 
view themselves:  
[They] must articulate the broad themes of value that they wish to 
encourage and create, and align their ethos, practices and processes to 
meet those aspirations. They must then adopt ways of discovering 
from those they deal with and those who are affected by their 
decisions what value has in fact and in perception been created.112 
Holden also cautioned that value creation is a subjective and unpredictable 
phenomenon.113  
Holden acknowledged that his model still required some form of value 
measurement, but he argued that rather than conforming to the target- and outcome-
based approaches which regarded value as a product, the new measures would 
recognize that ‘systemic processes themselves create value’.114 His model allowed 
for a wider range of factors to be considered in cultural value judgements, 
particularly those based on qualitative measures and on public perception, in which 
the institutions would work in partnership with policy-makers and the public to 
create cultural value in society.  
Robert Hewison, a colleague of Holden, developed Holden’s model further, 
by emphasizing the institutional value element of cultural value, which he argued 
could be mapped as the interaction between an institution and its stakeholders in 
terms of engagement, trust and service.115 Hewison argued that by developing their 
creative purpose, embracing change, and by showing due care to their public, 
cultural institutions can ‘improve their professional practice, the services they deliver 
and the value they create’.116 He argued that the end result is a cultural sector that 
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‘can enhance and expand the capacity to create the ideas, images and values upon 
which a future economy will increasingly depend, and which business and industry 
will need to support’.117 
 The UK public archival sector naturally began to align itself with the policies 
of its funders and key stakeholders, with national bodies like the National Council on 
Archives producing publications such as Taking Part. An Audit of Social Inclusion 
Work in Archives and Giving Value. Finding Priorities for UK Archives 2005-10.118 
These reports directly linked the value of archives with key government objectives 
including social inclusion and community regeneration. MLA also commissioned 
research into how core archival activities could be articulated in terms of wider 
social values.119 Throughout this period, articles can be found in the professional 
archival literature that explore how archives could demonstrate their relevance to 
society and gain greater public recognition and financial support by embracing a 
public value approach.120 In March 2006, a report co-published by MLA Yorkshire 
and the University of Aberystwyth examined the economic and social assessments 
that had been adopted by the archival sector with the aim of developing a taxonomy 
of usages and impacts that could be used to evaluate archival services.121 In the 
report Horton and Spence identified various measures of primary and secondary 
usage of archives; for example: reader visits, volume of archival records accessed, 
book sales, and TV viewing figures. Horton and Spence outlined various definitions 
of types of economic and social impacts, stating that these could be most usefully 
conceptualized in relation to ‘the difference made’; although they also admitted that 
exact definition was complex and that types were fundamentally inter-related.122 The 
report concluded that although impact assessments for the archival sector had been 
limited, there was enough existing evidence to indicate that a range of impacts could 
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be expected; and the authors called for further work to enable greater data collection 
across the sector. 
 It was not only public sector archives that felt the impact of policy drives 
towards measuring the public value of archives. Strategic partnerships between 
private companies and publicly-funded institutions were actively encouraged, 
particularly to support the funding of specific cataloguing and access projects in 
archives, museums and libraries. For example, the Heritage Lottery Fund supported 
the Pay and Power Project 2004-7 in the West Midlands, which brought together 14 
archival repositories from local authorities, universities, the Roman Catholic Church 
and the independent sector.123 The stated main objectives of the project included the 
development of new audiences: young people under 25 years, disadvantaged groups 
particularly ethnic communities, disabled people and isolated rural communities.124 
Other initiatives saw the inclusion of records of private businesses on the Access to 
Archives catalogue.125 In July 2009, TNA published The National Strategy for 
Business Archives (England and Wales)126 which presented the case for the 
preservation of business records in terms of public policy objectives, and stated that 
‘it is critical for social cohesion and cultural identity that the business legacy is 
neither forgotten nor captured only in transient human memory’.127 
 Attempts to measure the value of archives in quantifiable terms are not new. 
Since the early twentieth century many archivists have sought ways to appraise 
archives based on measurable standards. Many of these approaches focused on 
instrumental values of archives such as utility in a belief that instrumental values 
rather than intrinsic values were capable of objective measurement. One of the 
earliest proponents of a utility-based approach to appraisal was American archivist 
Phillip G. Bauer whose work greatly influenced other archivists including Maynard 
                                                 
123 MLA West Midlands Evaluation of the Pay and Power Project Final Report, February 2007 
(London: Creative Cultures, 2007), www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [accessed 19 May 
2013]. 
124 MLA West Midlands Evaluation of the Pay and Power Project Final Report, Executive Summary. 
125 Examples include: Reckitt Benckiser Plc., The Rothschild Archive London, and the Worshipful 
Company of Salters, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a [accessed 19 May 2013]. 
126 Katey Logan, The National Strategy for Business Archives (England and Wales) (UK: 
HMSO/TNA, 2009), 
www.businessarchivescouncil.org.uk/materials/national_strategy_for_business_archives.pdf 
[accessed 19 May 2013]. 
127 Logan, 3. 
135 
 
Brichford and Theodore R. Schellenberg.128 In June 1946, Bauer published a Staff 
Information Circular at the US National Archives (NARA) entitled The Appraisal of 
Current and Recent Records in which he argued that ‘a stern and true cost 
accounting is a prerequisite of all orderly appraisal’.129 For Bauer, this meant 
evaluating the use that will be made of the archives. Bauer argued that ‘public value 
in records […] is purely utilitarian. Future utility must appear to be probable if 
continued preservation is to be justified’.130 Bauer was clear that the evaluation of 
utility should not however be merely a quantitative calculation, but that it must also 
be qualitative in nature, stating that ‘the question is not simply one of the number 
and frequency of requests for the records, but one of the character of the use that will 
be made of them’.131 The circular presented an elaborate formula to determine the 
comparative value of records, suggesting four categories of use ((i) reference source 
for public officials, (ii) protecting the rights of citizens, (iii) historical or scientific 
research, and (iv) private curiosity or diversion) which could then be analysed in 
terms of three main elements ((i) cost of preservation, (ii) character of uses, and (iii) 
suitability for use). His view was not universally accepted however; the published 
circular was accompanied by a rejoinder by Herman Kahn, also a member of staff at 
NARA. Kahn questioned the basic premise of Bauer’s argument, preferring to 
defend the preservation of archives on intrinsic grounds, stating simply: ‘we keep 
records because we are civilized men and therefore must do so’.132 Kahn believed 
that the nature of the selective process meant any attempt to ‘make a dollars and 
cents evaluation of records the sole criterion of their worth’ is ‘impracticable and 
unwise if not impossible’.133 
 Although many archivists felt uncomfortable with monetary evaluations of 
archives,134 others continued to seek ways to quantify archival value against the 
costs of preservation and access. In the 1980s, archivist Lawrence Dowler embraced 
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the idea that the value of archives could be articulated through an examination of the 
use of archives.135 Dowler argued that archival processes should be examined from 
the perspective of the kinds of use that might be made of the records. He believed 
that it was from the relationship between the use of information and the provision of 
information that ‘the value of records and the information they contain will be 
determined and archival practices defined’.136 At the end of the twentieth century 
archivist Mark A. Greene put forward what he termed a ‘utilitarian’ approach to 
archival appraisal, in which he argued that an evaluation of records based on their 
use-value was an effective appraisal criterion.137 Greene argued that use was ‘the 
only empirical measurement’ of the value that an institution or society may have of 
its archives.138 The importance of utility as a measurement of archival value has also 
formed the basis of a processing methodology proposed by Greene as a way to deal 
with the cataloguing backlog of many archival institutions.139 
 Terry Eastwood argued that use value should take precedence over both 
provenance and pertinence in the appraisal of archives primarily because both 
concepts are, in his view, ‘abstract’ and ‘devoid of any ready empirical means of 
evaluation’.140 Eastwood acknowledged that despite the difficulties of objectively 
measuring use, nonetheless, the ‘social facts of use are determinable expressions of 
need and therefore of value of benefit’.141 Eastwood also argued that attempts to 
classify value into different types such as ‘evidential’, ‘informational’, or ‘intrinsic’ 
end up in a tautology and achieve nothing. Instead he argued that it is the 
relationship between the public and the records that gives them value and needs to be 
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better understood.142 Parallels can be drawn between Eastwood’s identification of 
public use – past, present and future – with archival value and the ideas about the 
importance of public perception and partnership conceptualized by many public 
value theorists.  
4.5. The value of archives as information assets and evidence of good 
governance  
The idea that archives are valuable as evidence of administrative and 
executive decisions and business transactions was articulated by many archivists in 
the early twentieth century.143 Sir Hilary Jenkinson viewed the evidential value of 
archives as an implicit element of their nature and described archives as ‘Material 
Evidences surviving in the form of writing’.144 Central to this idea were concepts of 
authenticity and impartiality, as well as the view that archives were neutral records 
that could ‘tell the truth’ about what really happened in the past.145 As has been 
argued in previous chapters, such ideas were seriously challenged in the later 
twentieth century as new technologies and the proliferation of digital records 
challenged traditional concepts of authenticity and reliability whilst postmodernist 
theory challenged the predominant positivist discourse, which gave meaning to terms 
such as ‘truth’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘impartiality’. Yet, conversely, at the same time 
that some in the archival profession felt their evidential role to be under threat, others 
seized new opportunities to reinvigorate their mission by turning to new theories in 
the fields of information and records management.146 
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Records management arguably originated in the late 1940s, evolving from 
the US archival profession.147 The term ‘records management’ was formally defined 
by the Hoover Commission of 1947-49, established by US President Harry S. 
Truman to recommend administrative changes to the US Federal Government.148 
Also in 1949, archivist Philip C. Brooks published Public Records Management, 
which was a guide to good administration in terms of the filing of records.149 Brooks 
stated that ‘the basic purpose must be to preserve those […] [records] that represent 
vital interests of the government or the people, and those records that adequately 
document the operations of government agencies’.150  
Perhaps as a result of early American usage of the term records management, 
a clear distinction has long been made in the US between ‘records’ – which are in 
current or semi-current use by the administration – and ‘archives’ – which are non-
current records that are no longer needed by the administration and are transferred to 
the custody of an archivist.151 For example, the Society of American Archivists’ 
2005 A Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology stated that: ‘Records are not 
synonymous with archives. Whilst an archive collects records, not all records merit 
ongoing preservation’.152 Furthermore, the Glossary cited Richard J. Cox to 
articulate the separate definition of ‘archives’ as follows: ‘Archives are records with 
evidential value to the organization and society’.153 In contrast, both terms are often 
used interchangeably in the UK, and the national institution in which central UK 
government archives are kept was, until very recently, known as the Public Record 
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Office.154 Thinking on the subject appears to be divided along geographical lines 
within the international archival community. For example, an Australian archivist, 
attending an ICA conference in Paris in 1988, commented on the differences in 
viewpoint between archivists of different nationalities, stating that: 
The distinction between archive administration and records 
management which Australians and Americans seem to see as fairly 
clear cut was difficult for Europeans to come to grips with. […] The 
distinctions that a records manager will conduct his or her business to 
meet the daily priorities of the organisation for which he or she 
works, whereas the archivist will have prime concern for the 
preservation of records worthy of permanent preservation, appears not 
to deserve special attention.155 
More recently, Caroline Williams concurred that ‘in many European languages the 
word “archives” is taken to mean both records in use for current purposes and those 
maintained for their continuing long-term value’.156 Williams argued that 
‘increasingly the distinction in definition between records and archives is blurring, 
and the term “record-keeping” is increasingly being used to describe and encompass 
the complementary disciplines of records and archives management’.157 Nonetheless, 
she admitted that the roles of records manager and of archivist continue to be 
advertised as two distinct roles when it comes to employment advertisements and 
recruitment.158 
British archivist and academic Michael Cook explained that until the early 
1990s, in his view, there were two basic schools of thought with regards to what 
records management was: the first, particularly dominant in North America, viewed 
records management as a management technique, a means of increasing efficiency 
and reducing costs in day-to-day business; whilst the second, from an archival 
perspective characteristic of the UK, viewed records management as the 
management of current records from a standpoint of their ultimate disposal.159 Cook 
argued that a third school of thought began to be established in the 1990s which held 
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the view that ‘records management forms part of the broader discipline of 
information management and, like it, should use all the technical skills available to 
managers’.160 Cook gave as evidence of this new development in thinking: the 
formation of the Records Management Society of Great Britain in 1983, the 
publication of several new textbooks and journals on the subject, and the fact that at 
least one specialist consultancy firm had accepted records management as a major 
new programme area.161  
Other commentators also identified the impact of new technology as a 
significant factor in the rise of information and records management in the late 
twentieth century as a separate and increasingly influential discipline.162 Richard J. 
Cox, for example, argued that the advent of the information age had resulted in a 
shift in emphasis to: 
managing vast quantities of information created from many and 
diverse sources and used in new and interesting ways. As more 
memory becomes available, attention shifts from needing to 
distinguish records from everything else to the technological ability to 
save and access everything.163 
Technology changed the way organizations do business: handwritten or typed letters 
have been replaced by emails and word-processed records; online tools allow several 
individuals to edit, comment on and amend the same electronic document; electronic 
spreadsheets have become ever-changing entities as they link the most up-to-date 
information from multi-relational databases and other digital sources. Throughout 
the late twentieth century, information technology was increasingly viewed as a 
means to deliver more efficient and effective services by both the private and public 
sectors alike. In the 1990s, government strategies emphasized the importance of 
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capturing, managing and preserving digital records to support service delivery and 
accountability.164  
Ironically perhaps, the so-called ‘paperless office’ predicted in the 1970s is 
still yet to materialize; instead the increased use of electronic communication and 
ease of record production have led to a greater volume of paper being produced than 
ever before.165 The need to manage this volume of paper records was coupled with a 
recognition of the need to manage electronic records: the use of technology as a tool 
to deliver modernization initiatives led to a recognition of the need for electronic 
records management to enable the sharing and updating of information, and to 
ensure the authenticity and reliability of the information. Stephen Harries has argued 
that this recognition put records management functions at the forefront of business 
change.166 Several papers at an ICA Symposium on Current Records in Ottawa in 
May 1989, entitled Management of Recorded Information. Converging Disciplines 
shared this viewpoint.167 One speaker called for greater collaboration between the 
information science technology and industry and higher education;168 whilst another 
argued that archivists needed to redefine their role because ‘archivists are in the 
information networking business’.169 
 The sense of professional convergence within a general information 
management framework has been recognized by several writers.170 One writer who 
actively embraced the opportunities of information technology as a catalyst to 
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reinvigorate and re-cast the role of the archivist was David Bearman.171 Bearman 
argued that the electronic environment forced organizations to view archives in a 
new light and to change their recordkeeping behaviours, providing an opportunity for 
archivists to reaffirm their fundamental theoretical tenets and reassert their vital role 
as information managers.172 Bearman believed that ‘archives and records 
management share a simple goal: providing for organizational accountability’.173 
Using the language and techniques of risk management theory, Bearman proposed 
that ‘instead of asking what benefits would derive from retaining records, [archivists] 
should insist on an answer to the probability of incurring unacceptable risks as a 
consequence of disposing of records’.174 He argued that traditional approaches to 
archival appraisal were based on the ability of the archivist to reconstruct paper 
records’ structures and thus the use of the records. By contrast, Bearman argued that: 
the electronic record […] is stored randomly and the structures which 
support its use by the organization are documented only in software 
code not accessioned with systems, so appraisal of electronic records 
after accessioning is typically not reasonable. While the information 
the records contain can be discovered through external software 
functions such as full-text searches, the evidence they supply is based 
on their link to activity which will have been lost.175 
The format and nature of digital records meant that archivists could not wait to 
appraise records until the point of their transfer to the archives, by which point 
important information about the records’ provenance and context would be lost. The 
focus became how to manage an organization’s records as part of a compliance and 
risk agenda, in order to meet external demands for transparency and accountability, 
together with internal demands for flexible work processes and ever-increasing 
efficiency.176  
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Bearman drew explicitly on the ideas of US government advisors David 
Osborne and Ted Gaebler who published an influential book on how to transform the 
public sector from an inherited bureaucratic model into a flexible, creative and 
entrepreneurial one.177 Bearman drew analogies with Osborne and Gaebler’s ideas 
about service delivery and, employing their metaphor, suggested that archivists 
needed to shift the focus of their activity from ‘steering’ to ‘rowing’.178 For 
Bearman, this meant that archivists should be involved in providing policy direction 
for documentation, and in designing records systems that meet recordkeeping 
requirements and that conform to access, description, retrieval and preservation 
standards.179 In Bearman’s view archivists could no longer passively wait for records 
to be transferred to them when they were deemed no longer current by the business, 
instead he argued that archivists should become internal consultants, the ‘ally of 
information systems managers, auditors, freedom of information act administrators 
and information security personnel’ by focusing on ‘identifying the metadata that is 
required to create records, before they are created’.180 Archivists, in order to preserve 
future archives, needed to become proactive and manage records at the point of 
creation.  
As detailed in Chapter 2, Bearman’s approach to archival appraisal based on 
business processes and functions influenced other archivists to develop new 
approaches to the appraisal and preservation of electronic records. Bearman worked 
with Richard J. Cox on what became known as the Pittsburgh Project, run by the 
School of Information Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh, 1992-96.181 This 
project attempted to define the functional requirements for the preservation of 
electronic records as evidence: ‘[the] elements guaranteeing that the integrity or 
substance of an archival record can be maintained’.182 The Pittsburgh Project 
understood ‘archival records’ in terms of ‘evidence of transactions’.183 The Project 
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drafted recordkeeping functional requirements ‘that seek to preserve within an 
organizational environment […] the sense of a record as an organizational 
transaction that preserves evidence of that transaction’.184 Cox, in particular, argued 
that one of the aims of the project was to re-dress the balance, as he saw it, from an 
over-emphasis by American archivists on a solely ‘cultural mission’. In Cox’s view, 
the real archival mission ‘should be to ensure that the essential evidence of 
organizations will be maintained’.185 From this perspective, the value of archives is 
not primarily as cultural heritage but as evidence for good governance and 
accountability. 
Another research project which sought to identify and define the 
requirements for preserving reliable and authentic electronic records was what 
developed into the InterPARES Project, led by Luciana Duranti at the University of 
British Columbia, Canada, from 1994.186 Cox described the main difference between 
the two projects as being one of intended applicability, stating that whilst 
InterPARES ‘wishes to develop a method […] that is applicable across all juridical 
systems and cultures’, in comparison, the Pittsburgh Project proposed ‘a model that 
enables recordkeeping to be both universal and local at the same time’.187 Duranti, 
however, claimed that the differences between the two projects stemmed from their 
fundamentally different theoretical standpoints. She argued that although both 
projects had similar aims, ‘the Pittsburgh Project’s identification of functional 
requirements reflects the continuum perspective’, whilst the UBC Project ‘reflects a 
life cycle perspective’.188 Drawing heavily on the theory and techniques of 
diplomatics,189 and differentiating between the needs of active and non-active 
records, the UBC Project sought to establish how the record characteristics of 
reliability and authenticity can be verified and maintained in electronic 
recordkeeping systems. The emphasis was on the value of records as by-products of 
administrative actions, and the need to preserve their evidential qualities within the 
digital environment. Duranti argued that an alliance between records management 
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theory and archival theory was needed to achieve the aim of preserving ‘the 
authentic recorded memory of society’; and, moreover, that archival theory remained 
of prime importance in the face of the challenges of contemporary recordkeeping: ‘I 
believe that records managers and archivists need the same body of knowledge to 
carry out all functions affecting the records, that is, all archival functions’.190  
In a parallel development to the rise of records management theory, the late 
twentieth century witnessed the development of information management theory 
which recognized the value of information as a marketable commodity.191 
Information became regarded as a fourth resource, after people, money and physical 
resources: ‘Information produced and received by an organisation during the normal 
course of business is now recognised as a valuable, unique resource which needs to 
be managed and exploited as are other resources’.192 The approach towards 
managing information in this way is often referred to as information resource 
management, or information asset management, and can be defined as: ‘Principles 
and techniques to oversee and administer the creation, use, access, and preservation 
of information in an organization, founded on the belief that information is an asset 
comparable to financial, human, and physical resources’.193  
The notion of quantifying information in economic terms was seized upon by 
many archivists as an opportunity to explain and defend the value of their activities 
to society at large.194 US archivist, Richard Kesner, argued that ‘we now live in an 
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information economy where the producers of value are knowledge workers’.195 The 
need for accurate, timely and cost-effective, information could be used to reinforce 
the professional role of the archivist, but, Kesner argued, in order ‘to be relevant 
practitioners, […] archivists must move with the times and deliver valued 
information resource management (IRM) services’.196 Kesner outlined the various 
ways in which archivists could contribute to IRM, and explained that it is the 
archivist’s ‘unique perspective’, based on their knowledge of the organization and its 
information assets, that ‘can integrate process needs, tools and resources with the end 
user’s right to know’.197  
Access to information legislation, passed in various countries throughout the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, reinforced a perception held by wider 
society that information was valuable and could be used to hold those in authority 
accountable.198 This recognition created an opportunity for archivists to demonstrate 
their unique ability to decode information by identifying what the information is, 
where it originated and why, and who is using it. Yet the focus on governance and 
accountability also contributed to perceived divisions between the practices of 
records management and archives, as records managers were increasingly associated 
with the day-to-day organizational business processes: ‘[looking] forward at how to 
build on existing knowledge … and look[ing] inward on what the business needs’; 
whilst, in comparison, archivists were seen to focus instead ‘on past organizational 
practice, looking backwards into how information use shaped corporate identity 
[and] documented past actions’.199 
Other writers perceived a danger in ‘diluting’ concepts of archives and 
records into a sea of information.200 In the mid-1980s, Canadian archivist Gordon 
Dodds, in a review of George Orwell’s classic novel Nineteen Eighty-Four 
questioned whether ‘archives, reaching to be kaleidoscopic, [are] in danger of 
severing their roots and dissolving into an enormous cauldron of informational 
                                                 
195 Kesner, ‘Information Resource Management in the Electronic Workplace’, 84. 
196 Ibid., 72. 
197 Ibid., 85. 
198 See also Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
199 Convery, 207. 
200 Harries, 15. Examples include T. M. Campbell, ‘Archives and Information Management’, 
Archivaria, 28 (1989), 146-50; Glenda Acland, ‘Managing the Record Rather Than the Relic’, AM, 
20.1 (1992), 57-63; Peter B. Hirtle, ‘Archives or Assets?’ Presidential Address, AA, 66.2 (2003), 235-
47. 
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resources?’.201 A decade later, Australian archivist Glenda Acland argued that 
archival institutions should not be managed as ‘information outlets’; and that 
archivists are ‘in the understanding business, not the information business’.202 
Information, of course, is not knowledge, and the critical difference between 
information management and records management can be summarized as being that 
the former ‘focuses on information products used to support business activities, 
rather than the evidence of the activities themselves’.203 Increasingly the purview of 
information technology specialists and business analysts, information management 
approaches to recordkeeping focused on the information contained in the records 
rather than on the management of those records for their value as evidence. Yet, 
within this context, some argued that the role of archivist was increasingly vital:  
It is the very essence of the archival profession’s orientation towards 
the past and with it, its expertise in providing context that has an 
important role to play in bringing information and knowledge 
together into a collaborative environment in which information can be 
shared and re-used while at the same time maintaining its contextual 
linkages.204 
Sue McKemmish argued that the development of Australian records 
continuum theory arose in part as a reaction against the information management 
attitudes of the 1980s.205 The theory posits: 
a pluralist view of recorded information […] [and] characterises 
records as a special genre of documents in terms of their intent and 
functionality. It emphasises their evidentiary, transactional and 
contextual nature, rejecting approaches to the definition of records 
which focus on their subject and informational value.206 
Records Continuum theory was also seen as a conscious rejection of the life-cycle 
world view that had dominated records management and archival practices 
throughout much of the twentieth century.207 McKemmish argued that Australian 
practice had evolved from an understanding of the nature of records and archives as 
                                                 
201 Gordon Dodds, ‘Book Review of Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell (1949)’, Archivaria, 18 
(1984), 268-72, (272). 
202 Acland, ‘Managing the Record Rather Than the Relic, 58. Italics in original. 
203 Elizabeth Shepherd and Geoffrey Yeo, Managing Records. A Handbook of Principles and Practice 
(London: Facet Publishing, 2003), 18. 
204 Convery, 207. 
205 Sue McKemmish, ‘Placing Records Continuum Theory and Practice’, AS, 1.4 (2001) 333-59, 
(335).  
206 McKemmish, ‘Placing Records Continuum Theory and Practice’, 335. See also Chapter 1, section 
1.4. 
207 McKemmish, ‘Placing Records Continuum Theory and Practice’, 343. 
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evidence, with concepts of multiple provenance and an holistic, multi-dimensional 
approach to archive and recordkeeping that was ‘built on a unifying concept of 
records inclusive of archives, which are defined as records of continuing value’.208  
4.6. Concluding remarks 
 Archival theory in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is not 
isolated, but has been, and continues to be, influenced by ideas from other disciplines 
and by wider trends in society as a whole. This chapter has attempted to outline some 
of the dominant theories of influence on archival theory and to illustrate how these 
theories have brought underlying assumptions about value into the archival domain. 
Arguments about intrinsic and instrumental value have impacted on archival theory 
as archivists have promulgated different types of value as justification for the 
appraisal, description and long-term preservation of archives. Some archivists have 
sought measures of the social and economic impact as a demonstration of the 
instrumental value of archives whilst others have emphasized the intrinsic value of 
archives as evidence for accountability and good governance. There is little to 
suggest that a definitive calculation of the value of archives has been found yet. The 
launch of an AHRC-funded project entitled Cultural Value in April 2013, seeking ‘to 
establish a framework that will advance the way we talk about the value of cultural 
engagement and the methods by which we evaluate that value’ suggests that the 
debates around the public value of culture, which began in the late twentieth century, 
remain both unresolved and relevant.209 A report by Nesta, also published in April 
2013, commented that: 
after years of unproductive debates where cultural and economic 
values have been pitched against each other, it is time to accept that 
the arts do produce values that can be meaningfully assessed, and 
measured, by economists, but that they of course produce cultural 
value which cannot be expressed in monetary units.210 
Yet it still remains to be shown exactly how that cultural value is determined.  
                                                 
208 Ibid., 333-4, 341. 
209 www.ahrc.ac.uk/Funded-Research/Funded-themes-and-programmes/Cultural-Value-
Project/Pages/default.aspx [accessed 30 March 2013]. 
210 Hasan Bakhashi, Ian Hargreaves and Juan Mateos-Garcia, A Manifesto for the Creative Economy 
(London: Nesta, 2013), 77. Available online: www.nesta.org.uk [accessed 30 March 2013]. 
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 The promotion of the value of information – as a commodity and as a 
legislative compliance tool – has provided an opportunity for archivists to re-cast 
themselves as informational professionals at the centre of organizational 
management. But whilst this has led to innovations in the capture and management 
of electronic records, it has also arguably diluted the distinctiveness and importance 
of archive and recordkeeping principles as archivists and records managers struggle 
to retain their unique professional identity alongside administrators, information 
technology specialists and business analysts. 
The next chapter will explore the philosophical debate about value that has 
been taking place separately to that in the archival and cultural spheres, in which 
many of the same issues have been raised and debated, but from a completely 
different perspective. 
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Chapter 5. Value in axiology literature 
5.1. Chapter summary 
This chapter develops the second step of Theory Derivation methodology: 
reading widely in other fields for ideas; and lays the foundations for step three in the 
methodology: the selection of a parent theory for use in derivation.1 This chapter 
presents an overview of the philosophical discipline of axiology and outlines some of 
the main areas of debate within the discipline. Whilst it is impossible to describe all 
of the different theories and approaches that exist or have existed within axiology, 
this chapter summarizes those which have been particularly influential or long-
standing, and which have a particular relevance to discussions about archival value. 
A brief introduction to the historical development of axiology is followed by a more 
detailed exploration of several key themes within axiology, namely: objectivism and 
subjectivism; intrinsic, extrinsic and instrumental value; and the commensurability of 
value.  
5.2. Introduction to axiology 
 Axiology is a branch of philosophical Ethics that is ‘primarily concerned 
with classifying what things are good and how good they are’.2 Axiology was 
formally articulated at the end of the nineteenth century when philosophers began to 
study concepts such as justice, goodness and beauty as being specific in nature and 
members of a new genus called ‘value’.3 The discipline is also referred to as ‘value 
theory’, most notably in the North American philosophical literature.4 The terms 
axiology and value theory will be used synonymously in this thesis. Axiology seeks 
to explore questions about what is worth pursuing or promoting, what such questions 
mean, and whether or how there is any way of arriving at answers to them that 
constitutes knowledge.5  
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, section 1.5. 
2 Mark Schroeder, ‘Value Theory’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta (Summer 2012 edn.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/ [accessed 
13 August 2013]. 
3 Risieri Frondizi, What is Value?, transl.Solomon Lipp, 2nd edn., (Illinois: Open Court Publishing 
Co., 1971), 3. 
4 See, for example, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta (US: Stanford 
University) http://plato.stanford.edu  
5 Joel K. Kupperman, ‘Axiological Ethics’, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted 
Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71. 
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Like most philosophical disciplines, axiology consists of many differing 
approaches and theories. The historical development of axiology can be viewed as 
being based on three different schools of philosophical thought that were prominent 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: (i) the Austro-German school of 
value phenomenologists such as Franz Brentano and Nicolai Hartmann; (ii) the 
English school of realists and objectivists, which included G. E. Moore, Hastings 
Rashdall and W. D. Ross; and (iii) the American school of pragmatist and 
subjectivist theorists including John Dewey and Ralph Barton Perry.6  
5.2.1. The Austro-German school of value theory 
The Austro-German school of philosophical thought in the late nineteenth 
century took an approach towards axiology based on a ‘phenomenological’ 
methodology that involved an account of personal experience freed as far as possible 
from presuppositions and theoretical interpretations.7 Phenomenology – literally the 
study of ‘phenomena’ – seeks to discover knowledge by distinguishing between the 
objects of our consciousness, and our experience or consciousness of such objects. 
Proponents of phenomenology such as Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)8 studied 
various types of experiences ranging from perception, memory, imagination, 
emotion and desire, to embodied action and social activity, including linguistic 
activity. Husserl argued that the structure of these experiences typically involved 
what he called ‘intentionality’, that is, ‘the directedness of experience toward things 
in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about 
something’.9 Husserl argued that it is through our consciousness of a thing that we 
experience it and find meaning in it. Husserl’s ideas were both influenced by, and 
                                                 
6 Barry Smith and Alan Thomas, ‘Axiology’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. by 
Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 608. 
7 Smith and Thomas, 609. 
8 Born in Moravia (then part of the Austrian Empire), Edmund Husserl studied at Leipzig, the 
Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Vienna. He became Professor of Philosophy at 
the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg from 1887-1901, before teaching at Gottingen 
(1901-1916) and then Freiburg (1916-1929). As a Jew, Husserl was suspended from the University of 
Freiburg in 1933 and he resigned from the Deutsche Academie. Following Husserl’s death in 1938, 
his manuscripts and research library were smuggled to Belgium and deposited at the University of 
Leuven. www.husserlpage.com [accessed 14 August 2013]. 
9 David Woodruff Smith, ‘Phenomenology’, in Zalta (Fall 2011 edn.) 
http://plato.stanford/edu/arachives/fall2011/entries/phenomenology/ [accessed 15 August 2013]. 
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influenced, Austro-German moral philosophers of the period, particularly Franz 
Brentano (1838-1917).10  
Brentano published his work The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and 
Wrong in 1889, in which he argued that the origin of all ethical knowledge lies in our 
personal experience of love and hate.11 Brentano’s theory was also grounded in the 
concept of intentionality, which he defined as ‘the directedness of thought upon its 
objects’.12 Brentano divided consciousness into two classes – that of physical 
phenomena and that of mental phenomena. The latter class comprised thinking or 
having ideas, judging, and willing or feeling.13 He argued that such mental acts 
included three necessary elements: (i) the presentation of an object, (ii) a dimension 
of positive or negative belief in the object, and (iii) a ‘phenomenon of interest’ – a 
positive or negative preference of love or hate.14 Following a similar argument to 
that of Descartes some three hundred years earlier, Brentano believed that any act of 
thinking is an object of inner perception and as such it is evident to the thinker that 
he is thus thinking, judging or feeling.15 From this inner perception we attain the 
concept of correctness, and, in the view of Brentano, therefore, value judgements can 
be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. Brentano thus argued that ‘we need not appeal to a ‘realm 
of external values’ in order to safeguard the objectivity and absoluteness of our 
knowledge of value from subjectivism and relativism’.16  
Brentano also introduced the idea that values were commensurable – that 
they could be compared – and later proponents of this school, including Max Scheler 
(1874-1928) and Nicolai Hartmann (1883-1950), focused on the classification of 
                                                 
10 Franz Brentano was born in Germany and studied at Wurzburg, Munich, Berlin and Munster 
Universities. He was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1864 and became a Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Vienna in 1874. In 1880 Brentano left the Church and married, resigning his 
professorship; but he continued to teach at Vienna until 1894. Brentano moved to Florence and 
obtained Italian citizenship. At the outbreak of the First World War, Brentano, a committed pacifist, 
left Florence for Zurich where he died in March 1917. Mario Puglisi, ‘Franz Brentano: A 
Biographical Sketch’, The American Journal of Psychology, 35.3 (July 1924), 414-9. 
11 Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, transl. by R. M. Chisholm and 
Elizabeth H. Schneewind, ed. by Oskar Kraus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), first 
published as Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erhenntnis (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889).  
12 Smith and Thomas, 609. 
13 R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1. 
14 Smith and Thomas, 609. See also Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 13-
18. 
15 Chisholm, 2. The famous Cartesian formula is ‘cogito, ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I am’. 
16 Smith and Thomas, 609; Oskar Kraus ‘Introduction to the 1934 edition’ in Brentano, The Origin of 
Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, 164. 
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valuable objects into classes such as ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ using criteria such as 
permanence, fundamentality and universality.17 
 The Austro-German Phenomenological school declined in the early-mid 
twentieth century, but Anglo-American moral philosophers including J. N. Findlay 
(1903-1987) and R. M. Chisholm (1916-1999) revived interest in it. This, in turn, 
influenced work in the field of meta-ethics by contemporary philosophers such as 
David Wiggins (b.1933) and John McDowell (b.1942) to try to understand the nature 
of ethical properties, attitudes and judgements.18 Independently, other late twentieth 
century value theorists such as Robert Nozick (1938-2002)19 were inspired by 
Austro-German axiology. For example, in The Examined Life, Nozick detailed what 
he called the ‘valuable dimensions of reality’ and listed forty-eight categories, which 
included richness, amplitude and wholeness, echoing the earlier writings of Scheler 
and Hartmann.20  
5.2.2. The English school of value theory 
The British axiological tradition is based on the work of Cambridge 
philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958)21 and Oxford philosophers Hastings Rashdall 
(1858-1924)22 and W. D. Ross (1877-1971).23 Moore in particular greatly admired, 
and was influenced by, the work of Brentano.24 Both Moore and Rashdall gave 
                                                 
17 Smith and Thomas, 609. See also Franz Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, 
transl. by Elizabeth H. Schneewind, ed. by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1973). 
18 Smith and Thomas, 610. 
19 Robert Nozick was born in New York and studied at Princeton University. He was appointed one of 
the youngest full professors at Harvard University in 1969 – a position he held until his death in 2002. 
Initially drawn to socialism he later shifted his focus towards political philosophy and the defence of 
the libertarian ‘minimal state’. Encyclopaedia Britannica www.britannica.com [accessed 14 August 
2013]. 
20 Smith and Thomas, 610. See also Robert Nozick, The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 182-99. 
21 A biography of Moore can be found in Chapter 6. 
22 Hastings Rashdall studied at New College, Oxford and became an ordained priest, before taking up 
a fellowship in divinity and philosophy at Hertford College, Oxford in 1888. In 1895 he was elected 
to a fellowship in philosophy at New College, Oxford which he held for the next 22 years. He worked 
in the Admiralty intelligence department before being appointed Dean of Carlisle in 1917. Jane 
Garnett, ‘Rashdall, Hastings (1858-1924)’, ODNB. 
23 Sir William David Ross was educated in Edinburgh and Balliol College, Oxford. He taught at 
Oxford from 1900, at Oriel College then Merton College, before returning to Oriel College where he 
remained until 1947. Ross became Provost of Oriel in 1929 and was vice-chancellor of the University 
from 1941-44. Ross also served as chair of a royal commission on the press. G. J. Warnock, rev. 
David Wiggins, ‘Ross, Sir (William) David (1877-1971)’, ODNB. 
24 Smith and Thomas, 610. See also G E Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), first published in 1903. 
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accounts of value that rely on the concepts of moral intuition and rightness. As a 
result they are sometimes described as ‘consequentialists’, for whom rightness 
consists in the production of goodness; in other words, actions are viewed as being 
right in virtue of the amount of goodness of their consequences.25 In his seminal 
work, Principia Ethica, Moore argued that ‘good’ was indefinable and introduced 
the concept of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ as the basis for his argument that good was 
not a natural object, but was instead a non-natural quality that could be intuited.26 
Non-natural qualities are different from the objects of our ordinary sensory 
experience. Moore was arguing against the prevalent doctrine of ethical naturalism 
whose proponents argued that good was a complex natural object like ‘gold’. The 
ethical naturalists argued that just as gold can be defined by other natural qualities 
that are essentially related to it such as ‘yellow’, ‘heavy’ or ‘malleable’, the same 
was true of good. It was in this tradition that philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873)27 defined good as happiness, noting that it is happiness that men pursue and 
therefore the maximization of human happiness should be considered as the right 
goal of human endeavour.28 By contrast, Moore argued that there was a fundamental 
difference between good and happiness because there is never an end point to the 
question ‘but is that good?.’ Moore argued that no matter what definition of good is 
proposed the question always remains open and never trivial. As such, in Moore’s 
view, ‘when we say that a thing is good we are attributing a non-natural, simple, 
intuitable quality to it. And to identify this quality with any object in nature, such as 
happiness, would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy’.29  
Moore constructed a structure of value, arranged in order of relative intrinsic 
goodness. He also gave an account of ‘organic unities’ in value, in which he asserted 
the apparent paradox of the disproportion of the values of a whole to those of its 
                                                 
25 Smith and Thomas, 610. See also James P. Griffin, ‘Consequentialism’, in Honderich, 154-6. 
26 Ethics and the Search for Values, ed. by Luis E. Navia and Eugene Kelly (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1980), 394-5; Smith and Thomas, 610. See Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 6-13, 58-69. 
27 John Stuart Mill was the son of an eminent philosopher, James Mill, who was a great influence on 
his early years. His father refused to allow him to study at Cambridge, instead preparing him for a 
career in the law. J.S. eventually joined his father’s department at the India Office as a junior clerk, 
where he continued to work for the whole of his professional career. He suffered from bouts of 
illness, but this did not prevent him writing and publishing on a variety of subjects including law, 
politics, religion and economics. He was a recognized national legend in his lifetime. Jose Harris, 
‘Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873’, ODNB. 
28 Navia and Kelly, 394-5. See also John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. Reprint of the 7th edn. (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1879) available online: www.gutenberg.org [accessed 18 August 2013]. 
First published in 1863. See further discussion in section 5.3.3. 
29 Navia and Kelly, 395; see Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 8-13, 60-9. 
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parts.30 Rashdall offered a similar account to that of Moore, in which he emphasized 
states of consciousness as the ultimately valuable objects of our judgement.31 Ross 
also followed Moore’s argument regarding the indefinability of good, extending it to 
apply also to the concept of ‘right’; but by contrast, Ross ultimately concluded that 
values were incommensurable, that they could not be compared or measured in any 
meaningful way.32 
Value theory was eclipsed by analytical philosophy in Britain and many other 
English-speaking countries in the later twentieth century as the focus shifted to an 
interest in the role of logic and language in thought. Analytical philosophers such as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)33 and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)34 dominated 
British philosophy from the 1920s to 1960s as they argued that the aim of 
philosophy was the logical clarification of thought, which could only be achieved by 
the analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions.35 Russell defined the 
basic concepts of mathematics in purely logical terms and agreed with Wittgenstein 
that the true logical content of complex propositions is concealed by their ordinary 
language and can be made clear only by reductive analysis. Importantly for moral 
philosophy, both held the view that any propositions that could not be analysed into 
                                                 
30 Smith and Thomas, 610; Navia and Kelly, 396. Moore’s Principle of organic unities will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
31 Smith and Thomas, 610. See also Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil. A Treatise on 
Moral Philosophy, vol. II, 2nd edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), first published in 1912. 
32 Smith and Thomas, 610. See also W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1930). 
33 Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna and initially studied engineering in Berlin and then 
Manchester. Drawn towards philosophy, he studied under Bertrand Russell in Cambridge in 1912. He 
wrote his philosophical work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) whilst serving with the Austrian 
army during the First World War. Following the war he taught as a schoolteacher and became 
associated with the Vienna Circle of philosophers. In 1929 he returned to Cambridge where he spent 
the rest of his teaching life. Dr Peter Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann’ in Honderich, 912. 
34 Bertrand Russell was brought up by his devoutly religious grandmother. However, Russell 
increasingly questioned his religious belief and by the time he left to read mathematics at Trinity 
College, Cambridge in 1889, he had lost his faith completely. At Cambridge Russell formed a close 
circle of friends, many of whom including G. E. Moore, were members of the discussion group, the 
Apostles, of which Russell also became a prominent member. In 1910 Russell took up a teaching post 
at Cambridge where he taught and worked with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Russell protested against the 
outbreak of war in 1914. In 1916 Russell lost his post at Cambridge, and his increasingly radical 
political stance saw him imprisoned for 6 months. By the mid 1930s Russell had achieved financial 
security by inheriting the family earldom. He abandoned politics and returned to academic 
philosophy, lecturing at Oxford and Chicago Universities, before returning to Cambridge in 1944. In 
his final years, Russell re-embraced radical politics. Ray Monk, ‘Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, 
third Earl Russell (1872-1970)’, ODNB. 
35 Lord Quinton, ‘Analytic Philosophy’, in Honderich, 29. See also Bertrand Russell, Principles of 
Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractus 
Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, 2nd reprint (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972), first English edn. 1922. 
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elementary statements of fact were ‘metaphysical’ – into which category they placed 
morals and religion.36 The logical positivist school, including A. J. Ayer (1910-
1989)37, developed from Russell’s arguments the principle that empirical 
verifiability is the only criterion of meaningfulness, and that only scientific truths 
could be verified by experience as being true or false. As a result, Ayer and others 
argued that basic ethical statements are factually meaningless, expressing only 
emotional attitudes; whilst theological affirmations are at best ‘a kind of poetry’.38 
This was to remain the dominant philosophical discourse in Britain until a 
resurgence of interest in the work of Moore, in the last decades of the twentieth 
century and in the early twenty-first century, which was particularly focused on the 
centenary in 2003 of the publication of Principia Ethica.39 Moore’s work, once 
disregarded, is being reassessed by contemporary value theorists who have taken a 
renewed interest in ethical non-naturalism and intuitionism as they explore the 
connections between epistemology (the study of knowledge), meta-ethics and 
axiology.40 
5.2.3. The US school of value theory 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century American school of thought 
on value theory differed greatly from that of the British. Building on the work of US 
philosopher and psychologist William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-
1952)41 offered an account of the world as an articulated whole that has no existence 
                                                 
36 Lord Quinton, 29. 
37 Alfred Jules Ayer studied at Eton, then Oxford University. He spent the winter of 1932-3 in Austria 
where he was introduced to the ideas of the Vienna circle. During the Second World War Ayer served 
in the Special Operations Executive. From 1946 he was chair of philosophy of mind and logic at UCL 
where he transformed the philosophy department into a rival of Oxbridge. In 1959 Ayer returned to 
Oxford University, remaining there until 1983. Richard Wollheim, ‘Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules [Freddie] 
(1910-1989)’, ODNB. 
38 T. L. S. Sprigge, ‘Ayer, Alfred Jules’, in Honderich, 73. See also A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and 
Logic, 2nd edn., rev. and reset (London: Gollancz, 1951), first published in 1936. 
39 See, for example, Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Introduction to Centenary Symposium on G. E. 
Moore’s Principia Ethica’, Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 465-7; Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in 
Epistemology and Ethics, ed. by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
40 Nuccetelli and Seay, 3. See also Chapter 6. 
41 John Dewey studied philosophy and psychology at Johns Hopkins University. His early teaching 
career was at the Universities of Michigan and Minnesota, before becoming head of the department of 
philosophy at the University of Chicago in 1894. In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University 
where he was professor until his retirement in 1930. An avowed anti-Communist Dewey attempted to 
create a third ‘People’s’ political party in the US. In his later years Dewey continued to remain 
involved in public affairs, opposing teachers’ loyalty oaths and defending US action in Korea. ‘Dr. 
John Dewey Dead at 92: Philosopher a Noted Liberal’, The New York Times, 2 June 1952. 
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apart from human activities.42 Dewey argued that there was a vast realm of possible 
values, which were as broad as the subjective interests and desires that gave rise to 
them. He renounced the search for absolute ethical knowledge as futile, and argued 
that philosophers should instead seek to understand the nature of human desires.43 
Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957)44 similarly defended a subjectivist account of value 
in his 1926 publication General Theory of Value.45 Perry argued that value is defined 
in terms of ‘interest’, used in a sense synonymous with desire, will or purpose. He 
wrote: ‘that which is an object of interest is eo ipso invested with value. Any object, 
whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it’.46 
Perry presented a psychological account of why human beings value something and 
determined a hierarchy of values based on the criteria of intensity, preference and 
inclusiveness.47 
As a backlash to subjectivist accounts of value theory, the later twentieth 
century witnessed attempts to introduce a scientifically-based axiological 
methodology.48 Nonetheless, evolutionary psychology which, based on the work of 
Charles Darwin, offers an account of the evolution of human moral sense without 
any reference to objective values, together with moral scepticism about the place of 
values in the world, has tended to dominate recent US philosophy.49  
5.3. Main concerns of axiology 
The various schools of axiological thought have approached the subject of 
values in differing ways, yet all the theorists have attempted to answer the same 
series of inter-connected questions about value:  
                                                 
42 Navia and Kelly, 365. See also John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of 
Knowledge and Action (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930). 
43 Navia and Kelly, 367; Smith and Thomas, 609. 
44 Ralph Barton Perry was educated at the universities of Princeton and Harvard. He began teaching 
philosophy in 1899 first at Williams College, then at Smith College, both in Massachusetts. In 1902 
Perry went to Harvard University, becoming a professor of philosophy in 1913. He remained at 
Harvard until his retirement in 1946. Encyclopaedia Britannica www.britannica.com [accessed 15 
August 2013]. 
45 Frondizi, 50-58; See also Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value. Its Meaning and Basic 
Principles Construed in Terms of Interest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926). 
46 Perry, Ch. 5, Sect. 49, 115-6. 
47 Frondizi, 55-57. 
48 See, for example, Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology, 
2nd edn., (Illinois: Southern Illinois University, 1969). 
49 Smith and Thomas, 611. For example, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976) or J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977). 
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- what sort of property or characteristic of something means that it ‘has 
value’ or ‘is of value’?;  
- is having value an objective or a subjective matter – does the value reside 
in the object or is it about how we feel about it?; and 
- what things have value or are valuable?50  
The main points of contention in axiology are between: 
- subjective and objective values;  
- instrumental or extrinsic and intrinsic values; and  
- the notion of value commensurability.51  
Distinctions have also been drawn between different types of value such as moral 
and aesthetic. The next section of this chapter will explore in more detail the 
dominant theoretical discourses surrounding the main points of contention in 
axiology. 
5.3.1. Objectivism and subjectivism 
 There are two seemingly opposing traditions within axiology: subjectivism, 
which holds that values are subjective states of human beings; and objectivism, 
which holds that values exist independently of humans. As with most philosophical 
ideas, the picture is not as simple as it may appear and in fact there are a wide variety 
of interpretations within these two traditions; for example, some subjectivists claim 
that value is conferred upon an object by means of our pleasure or interest in the 
object; whilst other subjectivists claim that rather than asserting anything about the 
object to which we are attributing the particular quality of value instead we are 
merely expressing our own emotions.52 Similarly, within objectivism a moderate 
approach might argue that although value is an anthropocentric concept, the things 
that constitute a good life are valuable not because they are the components of a 
human life but because they are good; whilst a more extreme objectivist might argue 
                                                 
50 Nicholas Dent, ‘Value’, in Honderich, 895. 
51 Alan Thomas, ‘Values’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 9, ed. by Edward Craig 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 581. 
52 The first subjectivist approach is exemplified in the work of Perry, whilst the second can be found 
in the work of Ayer. 
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that values like good and beauty exist independently of all human interests.53 Like 
many philosophical ideas, the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ have different 
meanings depending on their particular use and context; and accounts of value often 
blend into each other.  
 Austrian philosopher, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920)54 is often cited as being 
the first to assert, in a systematic form, a subjectivist interpretation of value.55 In his 
1894 publication Psychological-ethical Inquiry into Value Theory, Meinong argued 
that the key to understanding values was to be found in psychology, rooted in our 
emotional experiences.56 Although he may have been the first to explicitly state this, 
Meinong’s argument has a long antecedence. The phrase commonly used in English 
is that ‘value is in the eye of the beholder’ – in other words, that value is not a 
property of the particular object, but is rather a projection onto the object by an 
individual or a community. Versions of this phrase, which regards value as an 
individual’s subjective opinion, can be traced back at least as far as Shakespeare 
whose eponymous hero in Hamlet boldly proclaimed: ‘Why, then, ‘tis none to you; 
for there is nothing either good nor bad, but thinking makes it so’.57 One of the most 
well-known expositions of what was later called a subjective theory of value was 
made in the eighteenth century by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).58 
                                                 
53 The moderate objectivist approach is exemplified in the work of Moore, whilst the work of Plato 
exemplifies a more extreme objectivist approach. 
54 Alexius Meinong was a pupil of Franz Brentano at the University of Vienna, before becoming 
professor of philosophy at the University of Graz in 1882. Meinong remained at Graz until his death, 
establishing the Graz School of experimental psychology. Johann Marek, ‘Alexius Meinong’, in Zalta 
(Summer 2013 edn.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/meinong/ [accessed 15 
August 2013]. 
55 Frondizi, 39. 
56 Originally published as Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie (Graz: 
Leuschner u. Lubensky, 1894). Meinong later shifted from his subjectivist position to the opposite, 
objectivist, position but for the purposes of this thesis, his work is relevant as an early example of 
subjectivist value theory. 
57 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, 2, 252-3 in William Shakespeare Complete Works, ed. by W. J. 
Craig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 882. The current form of the phrase ‘beauty is in the 
eye of the beholder’ is arguably thought to date from the end of the nineteenth century, with its first 
appearance in print in the novel Molly Bawn by ‘The Duchess’ (Margaret Wolfe Hungerford) 
published in 1878. Gary Martin, www.phrases.org.uk [accessed 14 August 2013]. 
58 David Hume was a child prodigy who joined his older brother to study at Edinburgh University at 
the age of eleven. Following an unsuccessful foray into business, Hume moved to France, returning to 
England to publish his Treatise in 1739. Despite being published anonymously, Hume’s reputation as 
an atheist and sceptic prevented him ever holding an academic post. Instead, he became secretary to 
his cousin, Lt-Gen. James St. Clair, joining him on diplomatic missions to Italy. In 1754 Hume 
became Librarian to the Edinburgh Faculty of Advocates but he resigned three years later. In 1763 
Hume moved to Paris as the private secretary to Lord Hertford, the British Ambassador to France. 
Hume returned to Edinburgh’s New Town in 1769. Aware he was dying, Hume arranged for the 
posthumous publication of his most controversial work Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 
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In his A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argued that ‘Vice and virtue […] may be 
compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern 
philosophers, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’.59 Hume 
argued that morality was ‘a matter of sentiment and taste’.60 He similarly viewed 
aesthetic value, stating that ‘beauty is no quality in things themselves; it exists 
merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different 
beauty’.61 In his essay Of the Standard of Taste, Hume sharply distinguished 
between judgement and sentiment, arguing that judgements can be right or wrong 
and true or false because they refer to something beyond human experience. In 
comparison, ‘a thousand different sentiments, excited by the same object, are all 
right’ because they are all perceptions of different human minds.62 In this way, 
Hume accounts for the differences of taste and opinion among individuals and 
cultures.  
Hume effectively made a distinction between facts and values when he 
argued that no ‘ought’ can be inferred from an ‘is’:  
In every system of morality […] I am surprised to find, that instead of 
the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is however of the last consequence. For 
as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; 
and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from the others, which are entirely different from it.63 
Hume argued that knowledge must be based on either logic or observation, and he 
identified a gap between ‘is’ statements, or statements of fact, that can be known in 
                                                                                                                                          
which appeared in print three years after his death. William Edward Morris ‘David Hume’, in Zalta 
(Spring 2013 edn.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/ [accessed 15 August 
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59 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method 
of reasoning into moral subjects (1739-40), Book III, Part 1, Sect. 1. Reprint of the 1777 edition, 
available online: www.gutenberg.org [accessed 14 August 2013] 
60 ‘The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. 
It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation; and vice the contrary’. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
(1751), Appendix 1 Concerning Moral Sentiment, Sect. 1. Reprint of the 1777 edition, available 
online: www.gutenberg.org [accessed 14 August 2013]. 
61 David Hume, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Essay IV, in Four Dissertations (1757). Reprint of the 
1777 edition, available online: www.davidhume.org [accessed 14 August 2013]. 
62 Hume, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. 
63 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part 1, Sect. 1. 
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this way, and ‘ought’ statements, or value judgements, that cannot. Although this 
appears to suggest that there is no such thing as moral knowledge, Hume was not a 
sceptic in matters of morals. Instead, he believed that there was a difference between 
good and evil, which was derived from a moral sense founded in human sentiment.64 
As has been outlined in section 5.2., subjectivist accounts of value gained 
favour in the early twentieth century with the dominance of philosophers such as 
Perry in the US and Russell in the UK who, despite taking very different approaches, 
both argued against concepts of objective value. For Perry, saying that ‘x is valuable’ 
was the same as saying that ‘interest is taken in x’;65 whilst Russell’s analytical 
approach meant that for him, ‘when we say something has value, we do not state a 
fact independent of our personal feelings; we are instead “giving expression to our 
own emotions”’.66 Russell’s doctrine led ultimately to the view that questions about 
value lie outside the legitimate sphere of philosophy, but despite the popularity of 
this view in many quarters, his was not the last word on the topic as other 
philosophers continued to search for an objective theory of value. In particular, some 
began to question the related ‘fact-value dichotomy’ that had been first established 
by Hume and was later promulgated by philosophers like Ayer, R. M. Hare (1919-
2002) and Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979).  
The fact-value dichotomy asserts that there is something different between 
‘objective’ or ‘factual’ statements such as ‘it is raining’, and ‘subjective’ or 
‘evaluative’ statements such as ‘it is good’. There are three main accounts of this 
difference: (i) it is a difference of subject matter (i.e. facts are regarded as ordinary 
and natural, compared to mysterious, non-natural values);67 (ii) it is a difference in 
the point of interest of the two types of claim (i.e. facts are statements, reports or 
assertions conveying information, compared to expressions or evocations of value); 
and (iii) it is a difference in the method of support for each type of claim (i.e. 
statements of fact are capable of being established by other statements of fact that 
                                                 
64 Justin Broakes, ‘Hume, David’, in Honderich, 380; Navia and Kelly, 189. 
65 Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value: A Critique of Human Civilization (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1954), 116, cited in Frondizi, 53. 
66 Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (New York: Hott, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1935), 230, 
cited in Frondizi, 78. 
67 This is a similar argument to Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ approach. 
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constitute evidence or reason, whereas value judgements cannot be conclusively 
established by statements of fact).68  
US philosopher Hilary Putnam (b.1926)69 argued that the fact-value 
dichotomy was a natural product of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
positivist framework of thought, and that it was necessary to think beyond these 
dogmas in order to genuinely embrace the postmodernism paradigm of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.70 Putnam argued that the distinction 
between fact and value was not as absolute as suggested by Hume, particularly as 
many of the arguments about the nature of ‘facts’ that were put forward by Hume 
have since been dismissed by developments in modern science.71 Putnam dismissed 
the argument upon which Ayer and others reinforced the fact-value dichotomy by 
arguing that the key philosophical terms used by the logical positivist school were 
ultimately self-refuting because ‘cognitively meaningful’ and ‘nonsense’ are neither 
terms of logic, observation nor theory.72 Putnam attempted to bridge the gap between 
fact and value by arguing from a pragmatist position that ‘knowledge of facts 
presupposes knowledge of values’.73 Or, as expressed another way by Nozick, 
‘values enter into the process of knowing a fact; without utilizing or presupposing 
certain values we cannot determine which is the realm of facts, we cannot know the 
real from the unreal’.74 More recently there has been a growing trend among 
philosophers to argue that such perceived dichotomies, like that of fact-value, are 
dubious in nature and warrant further investigation. For example, James Griffin 
(b.1933)75 has suggested that there is a rationality that can be found in morality by 
accepting the interdependence of facts and values.76  
                                                 
68 Kurt Baier, ‘The Concept of Value’, in Value Theory in Philosophy and Social Science, ed. by 
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5.3.2. Intrinsic and extrinsic and instrumental value 
 Another apparent dichotomy in axiological debate is between ‘intrinsic’ 
value and ‘extrinsic’ value. In their search for an account of moral knowledge, 
philosophers have concentrated on identifying and defining intrinsic value. 
Traditionally it has been defined as value in itself or as an end; or more technically, 
‘a value that depends solely on its internal properties (its qualities and inner 
relations) as contrasted with extrinsic value […] that depends, wholly or in part, on 
its external properties (its relations to other things)’.77 For example, one might argue 
that happiness has intrinsic value because being happy is something to be valued in 
itself; in contrast, possessing one million pounds is not intrinsically valuable because 
the money is only valuable to the extent that it can be used to obtain something else; 
for example, happiness. The term ‘instrumental’ value is often used instead of 
extrinsic value and underlines notions of the value being for, or as an instrument to, 
something else. All three terms are contested and their meanings can vary depending 
on their use and context. This section will outline some of the main philosophical 
issues surrounding intrinsic value and the author will use instrumental and extrinsic 
value synonymously to mean any value that is not intrinsic. 
 The perceived division between intrinsic and extrinsic value is one that has 
sustained axiological theory over the last one hundred years. This division can 
arguably be traced to the work of Moore. Prior to Moore, distinctions had been made 
between good as an end and good as a means, but many of these distinctions seemed 
to allow that good as an end could depend on other relational properties; for 
example, the suggestion that pleasure (a good as an end) had by a bad person was 
worse than the same pleasure had by a good person – in other words, the intrinsic 
value of pleasure could also depend on external factors, outside of the pleasure 
itself.78 Moore, however, presented a much more restrictive view of intrinsic value 
by arguing that it could only depend on its intrinsic properties. Moore explicitly 
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stated his definition of intrinsic value in an essay entitled ‘The Conception of 
Intrinsic Value’ in 1922.79 Moore believed that disputes about values, which 
appeared to be about whether the value was objective or subjective, were really 
about whether the value was intrinsic or extrinsic.80 Although Moore argued that 
intrinsic value is something easily recognizable and ‘simple and fundamental’, he 
admitted that ‘the task of defining it precisely is by no means easy and involves 
some difficulties which I must confess that I do not know how to solve’.81 Moore 
continued to give the following definition: ‘To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ 
means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it and in what degree it 
possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question’.82 Moore 
clarified that he meant two different things at the same time by this statement, firstly: 
that it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to 
possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, 
and not to possess it at another; and equally impossible for it to 
possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances, 
and to possess it in different degree at another, or in a different set.83 
And secondly, that: 
if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain 
degree, then not only must that same thing possess it, under all 
circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like it, 
must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree.84 
In this way, Moore established a strict definition of intrinsic value whereby it is 
irreducible, without parts, non-natural and unanalyzable.85 In Moore’s view the 
greatest intrinsic goods were ‘personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments’.86  
Moore’s narrow definition of intrinsic value is supported by other elements 
of his value theory such as organic unities and the isolation method, both of which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6. It remains one of the most contested areas of 
his value theory, and has thus helped to sustain a great deal of debate and theory 
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development within axiology ever since.87 Moore himself also later refined his ideas 
about whether beauty is intrinsically valuable. He argued in chapter three of 
Principia Ethica that the existence of beauty has intrinsic value, but allowed in 
chapter six, that it may have little or no intrinsic value by itself. In Ethics, published 
nine years later, Moore went further and explicitly denied that beauty by itself has 
intrinsic value.88  
The subject of the value of beauty, or aesthetic value, in particular, has been 
at the forefront of many philosophical debates about intrinsic value. In 1964, US 
philosopher Arthur Danto (b.1924)89 published an article in the Journal of 
Philosophy entitled ‘The Artworld’, which posited what became known as the 
‘institutional’ view of aesthetic value that remains influential to the present day.90 
Danto famously argued that ‘what in the end makes the difference between a Brillo 
box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art’.91 For 
Danto, there is no intrinsic value in the object itself – the Brillo box – because if 
there was, both Andy Warhol’s artwork and a brillo box on a storeroom shelf would 
be of aesthetic value and that clearly is not the case. In this sense, Danto follows 
Moore’s strict definition of intrinsic value by not allowing the value to vary 
depending on the context. Danto coined the term ‘artworld’ to describe the cultural 
context that somehow stands within, and yet apart from, normal reality, and which 
judges an artwork to be of aesthetic value.  
Many philosophers have followed Danto’s approach and argued that art is of 
instrumental value only, as the value is located externally to the art object in the 
judgements of individuals who respect the object as a product of the artist, time, 
talent, labour or expression.92 Other philosophers have attempted to restore an 
                                                 
87 Examples include: Austin Duncan-Jones, ‘Intinsic Value: Some Comments on the Work of G. E. 
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intrinsic value to art by suggesting that there is an intrinsic value in the experience 
the artwork offers. This is an approach followed by Malcolm Budd (b.1941)93 who 
argued that in order to understand what he calls ‘artistic value’ – value of a work of 
art as a work of art – it is necessary to understand both the context of the work’s 
creation and the spectator’s appreciation of it in equal measure.94 Budd argued that 
although individuals may experience different reactions to an artwork, an appropriate 
response (one that can be justified) will be an appreciation of the work based on the 
nature of the work itself. Through this process, Budd believed that artistic value, 
which is intrinsic, whilst also being inter-subjective and anthropocentric, can be 
found.95  
As with many other areas of philosophical debate, contemporary accounts of 
aesthetic value have shifted towards a postmodernist cultural framework, which has 
been described as being ‘not a unified axiology of a single discipline, but an 
emerging inter-textual discursive field in which the point of view of value orientation 
may disseminate’.96 Many of these accounts posit alternative concepts of aesthetic 
value that transcend the traditional intrinsic-extrinsic division.97 Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith (b.1932)98 argued that although literary and artistic works possess only 
instrumental value, judgements of value about them can nonetheless be validated.99 
Smith argued that when we make a value judgement we are saying that the thing 
being valued is good or bad for, or as, something; and that we do so within the 
conventions and assumptions of our community.100 As a result, she argued that 
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literary and artistic value is contingent, or ‘a changing function of multiple 
variables’101 but, although it is never absolutely fixed, neither is it completely non-
stable – these variables occur within ranges and exhibit patterns and constancies.102 
Another philosopher, Robin Attfield,103 subscribed to a similar idea, suggesting that 
there are ‘valuational frameworks’ that determine how value is ascribed.104 
Contemporary philosophers like Jonathan Dancy (b.1946)105 have developed 
Moore’s theory of intrinsic value to suggest that an object’s intrinsic value may not 
supervene, or depend, on its intrinsic properties alone, but that rather, it may be so 
open-ended as to resist generalization and may indeed vary from context to context, 
even changing polarity.106  
Attfield sought to re-establish the concept of intrinsic value against 
postmodernist challenges about the nature of objectivity, within an environmental 
ethics approach.107 Environmental ethics emerged as an academic discipline in the 
1970s out of concerns about the relationship between humans and nature fuelled by 
worries about over-population and commercial farming practices.108 It is in the 
discipline of environmental ethics that much contemporary value theory 
development has taken place.109 The key focus for environmental ethicists is the 
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value as they question the traditional 
Western ethical perspective that tends to take an anthropocentric approach towards 
intrinsic value. This approach ranges from the strong view that only human beings 
are intrinsically valuable, to the weaker view that the promotion or protection of 
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human interests is of most intrinsic value at the expense of non-human things.110 By 
contrast, environmental ethicists attempt to demonstrate that ‘non-human beings and 
states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value’.111 Some environmental 
ethicists set out to demonstrate this through a closer examination of the nature of 
intrinsic value; for example, by identifying multiple senses of the term, each with 
strong and weak interpretations and claims;112 whilst others, like Attfield, have 
attempted to defend an account of intrinsic value that is both objective and 
biocentric.113 
5.3.3. (In)commensurability of value  
 Moral philosophers have long-debated whether values are commensurable. 
The term commensurable comes from the Latin comensuralis: co: together and 
mensuralis: measurable.114 The idea that values can be classified and a hierarchy of 
value created whereby some values are more ‘valuable’ than others can be found in 
many traditional axiological theories, particularly those associated with monism or 
hedonism.115 One of the most influential moral thinkers, Aristotle (384BC-322BC), 
argued that there is a summum bonum, or ‘highest good’, which all humans should 
aim to attain.116 Aristotle believed that ethics was a practical discipline that could 
provide a solution to differences of opinion about what is best for human beings by 
identifying what is the highest good, that which is desirable for itself. Central to 
Aristotle’s theory is the idea that virtue is essential for a good human life. Aristotle 
identified the highest good as eudaemonia, or ‘well-being’: 
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in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some 
good, what is it that we say political science aims at and what is the 
highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very 
general agreement, for both the general run of men and people of 
superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well 
and doing well with being happy.117 
Aristotle further argued that all other goods, including health, wealth and justice, are 
subordinate because they are sought merely because they promote well-being.118 
Aristotle believed that although circumstances vary so much as to preclude a set of 
ethical rules that can be applied every time, nonetheless, a person can learn, through 
philosophical reflection, to live a virtuous life, and make good moral decisions based 
on practical reason.119 
 Another example of a monistic theory of value is utilitarianism. Utilitarian 
moral theories hold that the morally right action is that which produces the most 
good for the greatest number of people.120 Classic utilitarianism, as promoted by 
British philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)121 and John Stuart Mill, is based 
on the idea that values can be measured as being proportionate to each other. Mill 
wrote that: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the 
absence of pain.122 
Bentham tried to reconcile the view that humans are driven by pleasure or pain, with 
the principle of utility as a measure of virtue.123 He argued that although individuals 
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may not necessarily recognize the amount of good resulting from a particular action, 
the action is morally right, provided that the amount of good is greater than the 
results of any alternative course of action.124 The utilitarian theory of value holds 
that happiness and pleasure are synonymous and constitute the only intrinsic value. 
All other things have only extrinsic value to the extent that they bring about 
happiness. According to this theory it follows that the value of all actions ‘depends 
on the quantity of pleasure they produce – their quantity is a function of the number 
of pleasures, the intensity and duration’.125 It also follows that no action is 
intrinsically better than another, but can be instrumentally more valuable.  
Bentham’s theory of value was egalitarian in nature because according to it, 
everyone’s happiness – including that of non-humans – was equal in value; pleasure 
was identified by Bentham as the highest good, but he could not account for the 
intuitively-held belief that although hurting a puppy and hurting a human being are 
both bad actions, hurting a human is worse.126 This was a criticism of Bentham that 
his follower, Mill, attempted to resolve by introducing a qualitative difference 
between types of pleasure in addition to the idea of quantity. Mill famously wrote 
that it is ‘better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’.127 Mill claimed that 
certain pleasures were preferable to others, and moreover, that such preferences 
could be ‘competently’ judged: 
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasure, or 
what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a 
pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible 
answer. […] If one of the two is, by those who are competently 
acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, 
even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of 
discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other 
pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing 
to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing 
quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.128 
                                                                                                                                          
1. Reprint of the 1823 edition, available online: www.constitution.org/jb.pml.htm [accessed 18 
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Like Aristotle before them, both Bentham and Mill regarded their ethical 
theory as more than purely theoretical. They were social reformers who attempted to 
use utilitarianism to inform social policy and the law. Mill, in particular, was an 
advocate of women’s suffrage and free speech, arguing that such rights were 
determined by utility.129 However, because utilitarianism holds that there is no 
intrinsic value except pleasure, it affirms that things like law and justice are only of 
instrumental value. As a result, as the consequences of any given social policy may 
alter, so too can the moral quality of that policy.130 
 Thus far, the theories of value commensurability discussed all present a 
utilitarian or hedonistic approach to value. Moore argued against both these 
approaches, yet also argued in favour of the commensurability of value. Moore often 
used simple mathematical language and terminology in his writings, implying that 
comparisons of value could be expressed arithmetically.131 For example, in Principia 
Ethica, Moore referred to ‘the sum of the values’, ‘degrees’ and ‘proportion’.132 
Later, in Ethics, he used algebraic equations to illustrate his arguments about how 
quantities of intrinsic value can be calculated between a whole and its parts.133 
Moore’s contemporary, Rashdall, also posited that values could be quantitatively 
measured.134 Rashdall argued that ‘goods of all kinds can be compared, that we can 
place goods of all kinds on a single scale and assign to each its value relatively to the 
rest’.135 Rashdall explained this commensurability by asserting that there are two 
different senses in which the goods of different kinds could be measured: (i) a certain 
amount of one particular good is a sufficient substitute for another; and (ii) in a 
choice between a higher and a lower good, we can compare them and pronounce that 
one possesses more value than the other – therefore ‘for the purposes of choosing 
between them, they are commensurable’.136 Rashdall emphasized the importance of 
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being able to measure value, arguing that without value commensurability, a concept 
of morality has no meaning: 
If the morality of an act depends upon the value of all its 
consequences taken together, we must be able to say which of the two 
sets of consequences possesses more value; and, if different kinds of 
consequences are to have any weight assigned to them, we must be 
able to attribute more or less weight to each of them. To deny this 
seems to amount to the denial that there is any one fixed or consistent 
meaning in the word ‘value or ‘worth’ or ‘good’, and to make 
impossible any system of Ethics which is based upon this 
conception.137 
He further asserted that the fact we are able to make practical value judgements 
implies that we can measure goods against one another and decide which has more 
value. Rashdall argued that in evaluating goods we take into account quantity as well 
as quality and therefore this means value is commensurable.138 As has been 
mentioned, the view that values are commensurable was not limited to the writings 
of British philosophers during this period as it was a view also held by Brentano, 
who presented a hierarchical table of values, separated into two lists of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’.139 
 Within axiology there exists a counter-argument to commensurability, 
namely that values are incommensurable, that they cannot be measured in any 
meaningful way. Whilst influential proponents of this viewpoint can be found in the 
early twentieth century,140 it became a popularly-held view in the late 1980s and 
1990s through the works of Griffin, Wiggins, Bernard Williams (1929-2003) and 
Joseph Raz (b.1939) among others. It should be noted that many writers do not use 
the term ‘incommensurable’ consistently, and within the realm of 
incommensurability theories there are many subtle and complex variations.141 One 
significant variation is connected to the difference between cardinal numbers (1, 2, 3 
etc.) and ordinal numbers (1st, 2nd, 3rd etc.); as some writers use the term 
incommensurable to mean that comparisons cannot be cardinal or precise, whilst 
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others use it in a broader sense to indicate a lack of ordinal comparison or ranking.142 
Similarly, some writers use the term interchangeably with ‘incomparable’,143 whilst 
others insist that they are two distinct concepts.144 This thesis will not focus on the 
subtle and complex differences between incommensurability theories, but will 
instead present an overview of the main arguments in the field.  
The crux of incommensurability arguments is that values are like apples and 
oranges, or chalk and cheese – whilst they can both be good in different ways there 
is no common standard to allow them to be compared meaningfully.145 
Incommensurability proponents argue that because of the lack of a common standard 
or measure, it is impossible to say that one value is better than another, or that one 
value is equal in value to another. They often point to moral dilemmas to 
demonstrate the validity of their theories. They argue that complex moral situations 
involve two different aspects that both support incommensurability: (i) a sense of 
loss and (ii) intractability.146 Williams and Wiggins, for example, both argued that in 
a complex moral situation the choice that is made by an agent is often accompanied 
by feelings of regret or loss.147 They argued that if values were truly commensurable 
then there would be no reason to regret declining the apparently lesser value in 
favour of the higher value. US philosopher Stephen R. Grimm148 illustrated this 
argument by using the analogy of money; he gave the hypothetical example of 
listening to Mozart being worth $200 compared to going for a jog being worth $100 
and argued that if value could be expressed in monetary terms like this, there would 
be no difficulty in choosing between $100 and $200.149 In contrast to simple 
financial transactions, the choices faced in a moral situation are not straightforward 
and the gain in one value does not always cancel out the loss in the other.  
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The argument of intractability is also used to support a belief in 
incommensurability. This argument is made by value pluralists who believe that the 
plurality of good things cannot be reduced to a single value.150 The intractability 
argument entails that if all values were in fact elements of a single comprehensive 
value then it seems reasonable to think that in a conflicting moral situation we would 
be able to objectively weigh the values against one another; however, according to 
Grimm, reality shows us otherwise as each side in the conflict usually regards their 
values as ‘sacred and inviolable’.151 Grimm argued that ‘on this analysis moral 
conflicts are so deep-seated because in the absence of a common measure reason 
simply has no basis for preferring one value over another’.152 
Contemporary axiology has witnessed a backlash against incommensurability 
theories, with several writers arguing that the arguments for incommensurability 
simply don’t suffice, and that value comparison, whilst hard, is possible.153 This 
contemporary school of thought rests on the assumptions of value monism and the 
viability of decision theory, which holds that it is possible for an agent to rank her 
actions objectively based on the value of the expected outcome, and that it is rational 
to chose the action with the highest value.154 The debate about the commensurability 
of value is far from being categorically resolved, but it seems that the current trend in 
axiology holds a compromise position, with the view that ‘the absence of exact 
mathematical measurement with reference to value does not doom one to fumbling 
subjectivity and relativity, in dealing with the amount of value possessed by an 
entity, and in comparing amounts of value’.155  
5.4. Concluding remarks 
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 This chapter has shown that several competing theories exist about the nature 
of value, what it is and how it can be defined. In particular, there are differing 
theories about intrinsic value, whether value is objective or subjective, and whether 
values can be compared or measured. The second half of the twentieth century 
witnessed a trend in axiological thinking to favour theories of value that were simple 
and fundamentally all-encompassing. The twenty-first century, however, has 
witnessed a shift towards the view that there exists an enormous variety of plausible 
intrinsic values and multiple ways of combining them, resulting in a realm of values 
that ‘is rich in possibilities and in subjects for debate’.156 
 This chapter has introduced the reader to general concepts, language and 
terminology of axiology. The next chapter will take a closer examination of intrinsic 
value and value commensurability by detailing Moore’s specific theory about the 
compounding of values within wholes and parts, namely his Principle of organic 
unities. 
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Chapter 6. Moore’s Principle of organic unities 
6.1. Chapter summary 
Chapter 6 represents step three in Theory Derivation methodology, namely 
the selection of a parent theory for use in derivation.1 The chosen parent theory is the 
Principle of organic unities, defined by G. E. Moore as holding that ‘the intrinsic 
value of a whole is neither identical with nor proportional to the sum of the values of 
its parts’.2 The author was first attracted to the Principle because the similar 
language of ‘organic’, ‘parts’, and ‘whole’ suggested a possible correlation between 
Moore’s work and the ideas she had found in the archival literature. The author 
believed that there might be a similarity in the conceptual ideas underlying the 
Principle of organic unities and was therefore interested in exploring it further. 
This chapter outlines the Principle of organic unities in detail, including the 
context in which Moore wrote and the influences on his work. Moore’s aims and 
objectives in devising the Principle are discussed as well as its implications for value 
theory. An analysis is made of how successful Moore was in his aims by exploring 
critiques of the Principle by other contemporary and later philosophers.  
6.2. Introduction 
 The previous chapter introduced the reader to some of the key themes and 
ideas in the philosophical study of value. In 1903, English philosopher G. E. Moore 
(1873-1958) posited a theory of value, which holds that there exists objective, 
commensurable intrinsic value that can be known.3 Underpinning his theory is an 
argument about the nature of wholes and parts and their relations that Moore called 
the ‘Principle of organic unities’. Simply put, the Principle holds that ‘the value of a 
whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts’.4 By 
this Moore highlighted the unique nature and complexity of practical moral 
situations – a moral actor cannot survey the ‘good’ inherent in the various parts of a 
situation, assign a value to each of them, and then simply generate a sum in order to 
get an idea of its total value. Instead, a moral scenario is a complex assembly of 
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parts, and its total value can be created by the relations between those parts, rather 
than by their individual values added together.  
Moore was not the first philosopher to consider the nature of parts and 
wholes in relation to value as Franz Brentano appeared to have anticipated the 
Principle in a lecture given in 1889 in which he spoke about ‘pleasure in the bad’, or 
Schadenfreude.5 Arguably, this an example of an organic unity in the sense implied 
by Moore; namely a whole that is not a mere sum of its parts.6 Nonetheless, despite 
the earlier example, Moore’s exposition of the asymmetrical relationship between a 
whole and its parts in regard of their respective values became the basis for much of 
contemporary axiological thinking about wholes and parts.7 
The philosophical consideration of wholes and parts has a long antecedence; 
the notion of the absolute perfection of the whole being derived from the relative 
measure and proportion of its parts can be found in Plato’s Parmenides, and Aristotle 
discusses the relationship between a city and its citizens in terms of a whole-part 
relationship in his Politics.8 The relation of parts and wholes also had a prominent 
role in the writings of Medieval scholastic philosophers including Peter Abelard 
(1079-1142) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and in the late nineteenth century a 
formal theory was outlined by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).9 However, it is 
important to note that axiological interpretations of wholes and parts are distinct 
from ‘part-whole theory’ per se, which developed in the field of mathematics and 
logic at the turn of the twentieth century, and which led to the discovery of ‘set 
                                                 
5 This is an argument put forward by R. M. Chisholm, who argued that although some of Brentano’s 
ideas, including his ‘principle of summation’ appear to be inconsistent with Moore’s principle of 
organic unity, Brentano later repudiated his position, and moreover, some of his other statements, 
particularly in unpublished writings, support a concept of organic unity. R. M. Chisholm, Brentano 
and Intrinsic Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 70-7.  
6 Chisholm, 73. 
7 Examples include: Erik Carlson, ‘Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic 
Value’, The Journal of Ethics, 5 (2001), 335-60; Jonathan Dancy, ‘Are There Organic Unities?’, 
Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 629-50; Julie Allen, ‘G. E. Moore and the Principle of Organic Unity’, Journal 
of Value Inquiry, 37 (2003), 329-39; Michael Clark, ‘Retribution and Organic Unities’, Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, 3.3 (2006), 351-8.  
8 E. L. Hussey, ‘Parmenides’, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 645-6; David Charles, ‘Aristotle’, in Honderich, 53-7. 
9 Achille Varzi, ‘Mereology’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta 
(Winter 2012 edn.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/mereology/ [accessed 19 
August 2013]; Andrew Arlig, ‘Medieval Mereology’, in Zalta (Fall 2011 edn.) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/mereology-medieval/ [accessed 19 August 2013]. 
178 
 
theory’.10 In the later twentieth century part-whole theory broadened into 
‘mereology’ – a term first coined in 1927 by Polish logician Stanislaw Leśmiewski 
(1886-1939), and which is used in contemporary philosophy to refer to any 
theoretical study of parts, wholes and the relations between them.11  
Neither the terms ‘part-whole theory’ nor ‘mereology’ are used by axiologists 
and it would be incorrect to use either in reference to the discussions of parts and 
wholes in relation to value. Similarly, it should not be assumed that the language or 
terminology used by axiologists, which may be common to part-whole theory and 
mereology, is being used in a manner consistent with either of those disciplines. 
Nonetheless, the author believes it might be useful to outline some main definitions 
of the terms ‘whole’ and ‘part’ as generally debated in part-whole theory. The term 
‘whole’ can be defined in one of three main ways: (i) x is a whole, in the sense that x 
is complete or not lacking in anything; (ii) whole x is y, in the sense that all of the 
parts of x taken together equal y; and (iii) a whole is a thing that is composed of 
some things or divisible into some things.12 Similarly, although a ‘part’ is, generally 
speaking, any item that composes a whole, there exist a myriad of different 
understandings of this term as exemplified by the following statements: ‘the handle 
is part of the mug’, ‘the left half is your part of the cake’, and ‘the conclusion is part 
of the argument’.13 The author suggests that Moore defined the term ‘whole’ in the 
most general third sense detailed above – as a thing that is composed of, or divisible 
into, parts; and defined ‘part’ as any item that composes a whole. This will also be 
the sense meant by the author in employing these terms throughout the thesis, unless 
it is indicated otherwise that they are being used in a different sense by a particular 
writer. 
6.3. Biography of G. E. Moore and Principia Ethica 
G. E. Moore was an eminent British moral philosopher during the early part 
of the twentieth century. He grew up in the south-east London suburb of South 
Norwood in a large middle-class family of ten; his father having been a general 
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medical practitioner in Hastings prior to retirement in London.14 Moore attended 
Dulwich College as a day-pupil, showing ‘some aptitude for Greek and Latin, and no 
particular preference for anything else’.15 In 1892 he went up to Trinity College, 
Cambridge, where, in Moore’s own words, ‘for the first time, I did form intimate 
friendships with extremely clever people’.16  He won a Fellowship in 1898 for his 
dissertation on Immanuel Kant and the metaphysics of ethics. In that same year, 
Moore also delivered a series of lectures on the elements of ethics at the short-lived 
London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, in the Passmore Edwards 
Settlement building at 9 Tavistock Place.17 Both the dissertation and the lectures laid 
the groundwork for Moore’s articulation of his theory of value, which was published 
in 1903 under the title Principia Ethica.18 In this, perhaps the best known of his 
works, Moore argued against previous ethical theories (including Utilitarianism), 
which he believed were guilty of what he called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.19 Moore’s 
own theory aimed to avoid this fallacy and included a discussion of the nature of 
intrinsic value, what things possessed this value and what sort of actions we ought to 
perform. It should be noted that in Principia Ethica when Moore used the term 
‘good’ or ‘goodness’ he always did so in the intrinsic sense, also using other terms 
including ‘good in itself’, ‘good as end’, ‘intrinsic good’ and ‘intrinsic value’ 
interchangeably. When Moore talked of non-intrinsic good, he specified this as 
‘good as means’, ‘extrinsic good’ or ‘value as means’.20  
The first chapter of Principia Ethica outlined what Moore believed the 
philosophy of ethics should concern itself with – namely the study of goodness and 
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how it should be defined. The chapter introduced a discussion of the naturalist 
fallacy, the differences between good ‘as an end’ and good ‘as a means’, and the idea 
that there exist complex states of affairs wherein the value of the whole is not 
necessarily equivalent to the sum of the values of its parts, which Moore termed his 
‘Principle of organic unities’. Chapters two and three were concerned with 
disproving naturalistic theories of ethics, including Herbert Spencer’s ‘Evolutionist 
Ethics’, and Hedonism and Utilitarianism, as exemplified in the works of John Stuart 
Mill and Henry Sidgwick. Chapter four continued the discussion of the metaphysics 
of value, critiquing Immanuel Kant (1724-1804); here Moore also introduced his 
‘method of isolation’ as the process by which intrinsic value can be identified. The 
emphasis of the final two chapters of Principia Ethica shifted to a substantive ethical 
theory, giving in chapter five, an account of moral conduct; and in chapter six, 
examples of things that have intrinsic value. In the final chapter, Moore discussed 
aesthetic pleasure and personal affection (both of which he regarded as being of 
great intrinsic value). Moore also reiterated his Principle of organic unities, going 
into more detail about the nature of what he called ‘mixed goods’ – wholes that 
contain both good and evil.21 
 The rhetoric of Moore’s book suggested that it was a fresh start in ethical 
thinking and this was a view held by many of his contemporaries, most notably by 
fellow members of the Bloomsbury Group including Maynard Keynes, Lytton 
Strachey, and Leonard and Virginia Woolf. Strachey wrote enthusiastically to 
Moore:  
I have read your book, and want to say how much I am excited and 
impressed. [...] I think your book has not only wrecked and shattered 
all writers on Ethics from Aristotle and Christ to Herbert Spencer and 
Mr Bradley, it has not only laid the true foundations of Ethics, it has 
not only left all modern philosophy bafouée – these seem to me small 
achievements compared to the establishment of that Method which 
shines like a sword between the lines. It is the scientific method 
deliberately applied, for the first time, to Reasoning […] I date from 
Oct. 1903 the beginning of the Age of Reason.22 
                                                 
21 Moore, ‘Table of Contents to the First Edition’, Principia Ethica, 39-52. 
22 Lytton Strachey to G. E. Moore, 11 October 1903, CUL, The papers of George Edward Moore 
(1873-1958), Add. MSS 8330, 8S/44/1. See also Paul Levy, Moore. G. E. Moore and the Cambridge 
Apostles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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Moore’s defence of art, beauty and friendship, in particular, appealed to the aesthetic 
ideals of his friends.23 Fellow philosophers were impressed by his clarity. Cambridge 
contemporary Bertrand Russell praised Principia Ethica for being ‘a triumph of 
lucidity’ and ‘a model of exposition’.24  
Moore is cited in many reference works as having a huge, even revolutionary, 
influence on twentieth century ethical philosophy;25 however, as has been argued by 
Jennifer Welchman and Thomas Hurka, many of the ideas in Moore’s book were not 
entirely new, but rather built upon existing ethical theories by Henry Sidgwick, 
Franz Brentano and J. M. E. McTaggart (1866-1925).26 Moore studied under both 
Sidgwick and McTaggart at Cambridge and cited both men as great influences on his 
work in his ‘Autobiography’.27 Although perhaps not quite a revolutionary, Moore 
was nonetheless an important figure in the development of modern value theory and 
was innovative in his style of writing and his method of questioning commonly-held 
beliefs and ideas.28 He was also an honest reviewer of his own work, often pointing 
out errors and correcting earlier statements in later publications. For example, Moore 
believed his second major publication, Ethics, in 1912, to be ‘much clearer and far 
less full of confusions and invalid arguments’ compared to Principia Ethica.29 The 
preface to the second edition of Principia Ethica noted: 
I now see that the book, as it stands, is full of mistakes and confusions 
[…] My excuse for re-printing it at all is that the propositions, which, 
so far as I can gather, it chiefly emphasises and which constitute the 
chief part of what most readers carry away from it, are propositions 
which I still think to be true, in the main, and to be well worth 
emphasising; although, in most cases, these propositions are not 
expressed with sufficient precision nor distinguished sufficiently 
clearly from others which I now hold to be false or comparatively 
doubtful.30 
                                                 
23 Baldwin, ‘Introduction’, in Moore, Principia Ethica, xxxii-xxxvi. 
24 Bertrand Russell to G. E. Moore, 10 October 1903, CUL, Add. MSS 8330, 8R/33/24.  
25 For example, Honderich. 
26 For example, Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874), Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889, first English translation 1902), J. M. E. McTaggart, Studies in 
Hegelian Cosmology (1901). Jennifer Welchman, ‘G. E. Moore and the Revolution in Ethics: A 
Reappraisal’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 6.3 (1989), 317-329; Thomas Hurka, ‘Moore in the 
Middle’, Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 599-628. See also Chapter 5. 
27 Moore, ‘Autobiography’, 16-18. 
28 Welchman; Hurka, ‘Moore in the Middle’; Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Introduction to Centenary 
Symposium on G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica’, Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 465-7 
29 Moore, ‘Autobiography’, 26. 
30 G. E. Moore, ‘Preface to the Second Edition’, Principia Ethica, CUL, Add. MSS 8875, 15/1/1. The 
Preface was first published in 1993 in G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. edn., ed. by Thomas 
Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprinted 2000). 
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Moore’s simple and direct style made his work immediately accessible, yet 
he was to be overshadowed for much of the later twentieth century by more 
flamboyant contemporaries like Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein.31 
Additionally, as has been previously shown in Chapter 5, Moore’s central theory – 
that moral truths are self-evident and intuitive – fell out of favour with what was to 
become the predominant philosophical discourse, logical positivism. Proponents of 
logical positivism, including A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, regarded value 
judgements as mere expressions of feelings and emotions.32 For much of the later 
twentieth century if Moore’s theories were mentioned by other philosophers, they 
were primarily to be contradicted, with the majority rejecting his views outright.33 
However, over fifty years after Moore’s death, a revisionist consensus has begun to 
emerge as twenty-first century philosophers have returned to Moore’s texts to re-
examine the relevance of his theories for contemporary ethics and epistemology.34 
 Moore left Cambridge in 1904 having failed to obtain a Research Fellowship. 
A substantial family inheritance meant that he did not need paid employment and 
could instead concentrate on his philosophy. In 1911, Moore returned to Cambridge 
University as a lecturer in Moral Science, succeeding James Ward as Professor of 
Philosophy in 1925. He remained at Cambridge until forced to retire aged sixty-five 
in 1939. Moore and his wife35 travelled to the US where he held several visiting 
professorships in the early 1940s. In addition to his successful academic career, 
Moore was editor of Mind, the pre-eminent British philosophy journal, from 1921 to 
1947.36 Philosophy student Constantine Cavarnos met with Moore on three 
occasions in the late 1940s, when Moore was in poor health, but nonetheless 
                                                 
31 Consuelo Preti, ‘Book Review of Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and 
Ethics, ed. by Susanna Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford University Press, 2007)’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 59.236 (2009), 563-6. 
32 Richard Norman, ‘Moral philosophy, history of’, in Honderich, 590; Ethics and the Search for 
Values, ed. by Luis E. Navia and Eugene Kelly (New York: Prometheus Books, 1980); Brian 
Hutchinson, G. E. Moore’s Ethical Theory. Resistance and Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). See also Chapter 5, section 5.2.2. 
33 Welchman, 318; Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, ed. by 
Susanna Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-4. 
34 For example, Donald H. Regan, ‘How to Be a Moorean’, Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 651-77; Nick 
Zangwill, ‘Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, Epistemology’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 42.2 (2005), 125-30; Nuccetelli and Seay, 3.  
35 In 1916 Moore married one of his students, Dorothy Ely. 
36 Moore, ‘Autobiography’; Bibliography written by C. D. Broad, from The Manchester Guardian, 25 
Oct 1958, in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959). 
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engaged in keen debate with the young student. Cavarnos wrote later that Moore 
was: 
very humane, having a warmth that is rare among philosophers. When 
the conversation is non-philosophical, he is relaxed and genial. But he 
becomes transformed when the discussion is philosophical. He 
becomes tense, his features, particularly his extraordinarily bright and 
penetrating eyes, assume the expression of a nervous critic.37 
During his lifetime Moore published only two monographs, but over twenty articles 
and papers.38 Posthumously, compilations of published and previously unpublished 
articles, notes and lectures appeared during the course of the later twentieth century.  
6.4. Outline of the Principle 
Before detailing the Principle of organic unities, it is first necessary to make 
clear the sense in which Moore understood the terms ‘whole’ and ‘part’. Moore 
believed that a complex object can be defined by its parts: 
which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it. 
We might think just as clearly and correctly about a horse, if we 
thought of all its parts and their arrangement instead of thinking of the 
whole.39  
In contrast, Moore held that ‘good’ is indefinable in this sense because ‘there is 
nothing whatsoever which we could so substitute for good’.40 Any attempt to define 
good by reference to anything else simply ends up in a circular argument. Moore 
believed that ‘good’ was incapable of any definition because he understood the term 
‘definition’ to mean a statement of the parts that compose a whole. In this sense, 
therefore, ‘good’ has no definition because ‘it is simple and has no parts’.41 Despite 
his contention that ‘good’ is indefinable, Moore nonetheless held that ‘the good’ – 
that which is good – is definable.42 Moore believed that the error of many other 
ethical philosophers had been the confusion of these two different concepts. In his 
view, ethics aims to discover what are the properties of things that are good, but too 
                                                 
37 Constantine Cavarnos, A Dialogue on G. E. Moore’s Ethical Philosophy (Belmont, US: Institute for 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1979), 44.  
38 Bibliography of the Writings of G. E. Moore in Schilpp, 689-91. 
39 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 8, 60. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. 10, 61. 
42 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. 9, 60. Emphasis in original. 
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often when identifying those properties, philosophers thought they were defining 
good itself. This, Moore said, is the basis of the naturalistic fallacy.43 
In chapter one, ‘The Subject-Matter of Ethics’, of Principia Ethica, Moore 
explained that the investigation of intrinsic value is complicated by the fact that ‘the 
value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its 
parts’.44 Moore continued to detail how a given whole (which may be either 
intrinsically good, intrinsically bad or indifferent) can be made up of several parts, 
which independently may be intrinsically good, intrinsically bad, or indifferent 
respectively. Whilst it might be assumed that the value of the whole must equal the 
sum of its parts, Moore denied this, instead asserting the apparent paradox that ‘the 
value of such a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its 
parts’.45 Moore illustrated his point by using the example of ‘consciousness of a 
beautiful thing’. Moore argued that whilst the whole is of great intrinsic value, 
neither of its individual parts, namely, consciousness, and a beautiful object, are of 
great intrinsic value in themselves.46 Moore asserted that: 
There are, then, wholes which possess the property that their value is 
different from the sum of the values of their parts; and the relations 
which subsist between such parts and the whole of which they form a 
part have not hitherto been distinctly recognised or received a 
separate name.47 
Moore proposed to call these relations ‘organic’ and to call the complex state of 
affairs in which they exist an ‘organic whole’. But he cautioned that he was using the 
terms in a very specific sense. Moore stated that he was not using the term ‘organic’ 
to imply ‘any causal relation between parts of the whole or that the parts are 
inconceivable except as parts of that whole’.48 Moore was especially keen to avoid 
any confusion with usage of the term ‘organic’ influenced by Georg Hegel (1770-
1831), which held that the whole was itself a part of the relation, that ‘the whole is 
                                                 
43 It was this aspect of Moore’s philosophy – his sense of definition and the resulting naturalistic 
fallacy - which caused most criticism and debate by contemporary reviewers of his work. See reviews 
by Bernard Bosanquet, Mind, 13.1 (1904), 254-61 and J. S. MacKenzie, International Journal of 
Ethics, 14.3 (1904), 377-82. 
44 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 18, 79. Italics in original. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. 18, 79-80.  
47 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. 19, 80. 
48 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. (D)22, 85. 
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always a part of its part’.49 Moore wrote at greater length on the issue in an article in 
Mind also published in 1903, in which he emphatically dismissed Hegel’s notion that 
‘two distinct things both are and are not distinct’.50 Moore concluded rather archly:  
In this, as in other matters, Hegel’s main service to philosophy has 
consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a principle, a type of 
fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers, along with the 
rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder he has followers and 
admirers.51 
In the series of lectures originally delivered at the London School of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy in 1898, Moore discussed Kant’s earlier use of the term 
‘organism’ or ‘organic whole’, (Moore uses both terms interchangeably).52 Moore 
argued that the sense employed by Kant rested upon ‘the confusion of “end” as good 
and “end” as effects, mediated by that third meaning of “end” as purpose’; adding 
that ‘later writers have not done anything to clear up the confusion’.53 Moore made it 
clear that his use of ‘organic whole’ was not synonymous with a scientific sense of 
the term, having no meaning in application to the human or social organism. Instead, 
Moore specified that his definition of an organic whole applied only ‘to what is good 
– a work of art for instance’.54 In Principia Ethica, Moore emphasized again that he 
used the term organic whole solely to denote the fact that ‘a whole has an intrinsic 
value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts’.55  
 The Principle of organic unities can be expressed thus: 
(OU1) A whole is an organic whole if and only if it has an intrinsic 
value different from the sum of the values of its parts.56 
                                                 
49 Ibid., Ch. I, Sect. (D)22, 85. See also Bernard Bosanquet, ‘Hegel’s Theory of the Political 
Organism’, Mind, 7.25 (1898), 1-14, in which he discussed Hegel’s use of the term ‘organic’, 
meaning ‘a whole in itself’. 
50 G. E. Moore, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1922), 1-30, (15), originally published in Mind, 12 (1903). 
51 Moore, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, 16. 
52 G. E. Moore, ‘Lecture X – General Conclusions’, in The Elements of Ethics, ed. by Tom Regan 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 178-94.  
53 Moore, ‘Lecture X – General Conclusions’, 186-7.  
54 Ibid., 187. 
55 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 22, 87.  
56 This is a style of expressing philosophical principles as a declarative sentence in formal language. 
The idea is that ‘since a declarative sentence can represent the world as being a certain way, the 
meaning of a sentence can be given by stating the conditions the world has to meet for things to be as 
the sentence says they are’, Barry C. Smith, ‘Formal semantics’, in Honderich, 287-8, (287). The 
abbreviation indicates the particular principle, in this case OU standing for organic unities, and the 
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However, through his denial of a Hegelian sense of ‘organic’, which held that the 
relation between the parts and the whole is such that neither would be what they 
were but for the existence of the other, Moore introduced a further element to his 
Principle. Moore denied that a part can have a different value outside the whole from 
that which it has inside the whole;57 in other words, he insisted that the value of a 
part remains constant regardless of the particular complex state of affairs it might be 
part of. The implications of this constancy, or universality, will be discussed later in 
the chapter, particularly with regard to the work of twenty-first century philosophers 
Jonathan Dancy and Thomas Hurka. The Principle must therefore be reformulated to 
include this additional condition: 
(OU2) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an intrinsic 
value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) the 
value of each part is the same as the value it would have apart from 
the whole. 
Moore believed that the greatest errors in ethics had been made because of a failure 
to recognize both aspects of the Principle of organic unities.58 
 In the final chapter of Principia Ethica, Moore returned to the Principle of 
organic unities. The chapter discussed the concept of ‘The Ideal’ – by which Moore 
primarily meant something that is of a great good in itself.59 Earlier, in chapter four 
of Principia Ethica, Moore had proposed a specific method – the method of isolation 
– as the means by which one might determine what things have intrinsic value.60 The 
method is reaffirmed in chapter six, where Moore explained that by considering 
things as ‘if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge 
their existence to be good’.61 Moore asserted that this method would enable an 
observer not only to discover what things have intrinsic value but also to what 
                                                                                                                                          
number indicates the first formulation of the principle. This allows for subsequent reformulation as 
the philosophical theory develops. 
57 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I, Sect. 22, 87. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 110, 233. Moore admitted that there were two other senses of ‘The Ideal’ – 
firstly, the best state of things conceivable or Absolute Good; and secondly, the best possible state of 
things in this world or a utopia. Moore believed that finding the answer to the third sense of the Ideal 
– what was of great good in itself - would provide the answers for identifying the Ideal in the other 
two senses. 
60 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. IV, Sect. 55, 144-5. 
61 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 112, 236. Italics in original. 
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degree, as absolute isolation allowed consideration of ‘the comparative value 
attached to the isolated existence of each [intrinsic good]’.62 Moore believed that this 
method would guard against two errors; the first being that of mistaking ‘good as a 
means’ for ‘good as an end’ by ‘supposing that what seems necessary here and now 
for the existence of good is therefore good in itself’.63 The second error is to neglect 
the Principle of organic unities by ‘supposing that if one part of a whole has no 
intrinsic value, the value of the whole must reside in the other parts’.64 Moore argued 
that it is only by considering the part in isolation and then comparing it with the 
whole, of which it forms a part, that the true extent of intrinsic value of the part 
existing by itself becomes clear. And of course, according to Moore’s Principle of 
organic unities, this value of the part by itself may be less (or more) than the value of 
the whole.65  
Moore again gave an example to illustrate his theory by comparing the value 
of pleasure existing by itself with the value of certain enjoyments that contain the 
same amount of pleasure. Moore commented that in some cases the enjoyment could 
be better than the pleasure, whilst in others it might be worse. Moore explained that 
this was because: 
the ‘enjoyment’ does not owe its value solely to the pleasure it 
contains, although it might easily have appeared to do so, when we 
only considered the other constituents of the enjoyment, and seemed 
to see that, without the pleasure, they would have had no value. It is 
now apparent, on the contrary, that the whole ‘enjoyment’ owes its 
value quite equally to the presence of the other constituents, even 
though it may be true that the pleasure is the only constituent having 
any value by itself.66 
 In Principia Ethica Moore asserted that things having great intrinsic value 
included aesthetic appreciation and personal affection. He defended this assertion by 
appealing to the Principle of organic unities. Moore believed that the organic whole 
which is aesthetic appreciation consists of two parts – the consciousness of beauty, 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. Other philosophers have questioned whether Moore’s method of isolation is truly viable. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is merely shown to provide support for the principle of organic unities as 
the method by which organic unity is itself established. 
66 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. VI, Sect. 112, 237. Italics in original. 
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together with the emotion appropriate to it.67 If the emotion is judged in isolation, 
one might consider that the emotion by itself has little, if any, intrinsic value (or 
indeed might be intrinsically bad if directed towards a different object). So whilst the 
presence of emotion is necessary for the intrinsic value of a state of aesthetic 
appreciation, the emotion, in itself, may have little or no value; in other words, the 
emotion gives to the whole of which it forms a part a value far greater than that 
which it itself possesses.68  
 Moore also used the Principle to explain what he called ‘mixed evils’ (‘those 
evil wholes which nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something positively 
good’); and ‘mixed goods’ (‘those wholes, which, though intrinsically good as 
wholes, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something positively evil’).69 
Moore divided ‘mixed evils’ into three classes: (i) those which include the 
enjoyment of or admiration for things which are themselves evil, i.e., cruelty; (ii) 
those which include a cognition of what is good but are accompanied by an 
inappropriate emotion, i.e., a love of what is evil or a hatred of what is good; and (iii) 
the class of pains. Moore held this final class to be an exception to the rule that 
applies to all other great evils and great goods – namely, ‘that they are all organic 
unities to which both a cognition of an object and an emotion directed towards that 
object are essential’.70 Moore argued that pain differs from pleasure in that the mere 
consciousness of pain, by itself, may be regarded as a great evil. In this way the 
relation of pain to intrinsic evil is not analogous to that of pleasure to intrinsic 
good.71  
 In chapter six of Principia Ethica, Moore introduced the notions of value ‘as 
a whole’ and value ‘on the whole’.72 He explained the differences between them with 
reference to the mixed evil whole of retributive punishment (in which an individual 
commits a crime and is then punished for it). The whole involves two ostensibly bad 
things – the original crime, and the punishment (causing pain), and is therefore 
intrinsically bad. However, many might argue that this scenario is better than one in 
which the criminal had not been punished. So although it comprises two bad things, 
                                                 
67 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 114, 238.  
68 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 114-5, 239. 
69 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 124, 256. Italics in original. 
70 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 127, 261. Italics in original. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 127-8, 261-2. Italics in original. 
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overall the whole might comprise more good than either one of those bad things by 
themselves. The whole is not merely a sum of the parts, and the parts themselves are 
not valued in proportion to the whole. Whilst the scenario ‘as a whole’ may be evil 
(because it comprises two bad parts), ‘on the whole’ it might be better (despite 
comprising two bad parts) than a scenario that only comprised one bad part – the 
crime.73 Moore formally defined value on the whole as that which is ‘equivalent to 
the sum of the value which [the whole] possesses as a whole, together with the 
intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts’.74 Moore thus believed that it 
was possible for organic wholes that contained some bad parts to be nonetheless 
intrinsically good ‘on the whole’, and cited as examples: compassion, courage and 
virtue, which each involve the cognition of something which is intrinsically evil.75 
 Moore concluded the final chapter of Principia Ethica by justifying the lack 
of neat symmetry in his theory of intrinsic value, commenting that ‘to search for 
‘unity’ and ‘system’, at the expense of truth, is not, I take it, the proper business of 
philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers’.76 
He held that there were ‘many and various things’ that were intrinsically good or 
intrinsically bad and that judging the value of such things was a complicated matter. 
Moore ended the chapter by criticizing existing value theory and the approach taken 
by other ethical philosophers: 
the practice of asking what ought to be here and now without 
distinguishing whether as a means or end […] the search for one 
single criterion of right or wrong, without the recognition that in 
order to discover a criterion we must first know what things are right 
or wrong; and the neglect of the principle of ‘organic unities’ – these 
sources of error have hitherto been almost universally prevalent in 
Ethics.77 
Moore believed that his method eliminated such errors and enabled one to truly 
judge what is of intrinsic value. 
6.5. Critiques of the Principle 
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74 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 129, 263. Italics in original. 
75 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 131, 265; Sect. 132, 267. 
76 Ibid., Ch. VI, Sect. 134, 270. 
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 Moore’s work made an impact at the time of its publication and was 
reviewed in several prominent philosophical journals. The following section will 
explore some of the critiques of his work, focusing on the Principle of organic 
unities, both contemporary and subsequent to its first publication. 
6.5.1. By Moore himself 
As previously discussed, Moore often revised his own theories. It has already 
been noted that Moore refined his ideas about whether beauty has intrinsic value.78 
Similarly, Moore did not make any distinction in Principia Ethica between ‘intrinsic 
good’ and ‘ultimate good’, or ‘good for its own sake’. In his later publication, Ethics, 
he suggested that good things can be divided into two classes, ‘intrinsic goods’ and 
‘ultimate goods’, both of which ‘apply to things whose existence would be good, 
even if they existed quite alone’.79 But he included a revision to his theory to hold 
that whereas a whole that is intrinsically good may have parts that are not 
intrinsically good, a whole that is ultimately good contains no such parts.80  
Moore made no such alterations or amendments to his Principle of organic 
unities which is simply restated in Ethics.81 Furthermore, in Ethics, he expounded a 
theory of moral action which is ultimately reliant upon the Principle: 
It seems to me quite self-evident that it must always be our duty to do 
what will produce the best effects upon the whole, no matter how bad 
the effects upon ourselves may be and no matter how much good we 
ourselves may lose by it.82 
In ‘A Reply to My Critics’, written in 1942, Moore again affirmed his 
commitment to the Principle of organic unities. In a response to a critique of ‘the 
alleged independence of goodness’, Moore re-iterated the difference between value 
‘on the whole’ and value ‘as a whole’ and emphasized the constancy of the intrinsic 
values of the parts of a whole, stating that ‘it is from this whole combination of facts, 
which we admire and think good; and this whole combination is something which 
                                                 
78 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2. 
79 G. E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 42. 
80 Moore, Ethics, Ch. 2, cited in Alan R White, G. E. Moore. A Critical Exposition (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1969), 121; and in William H. Shaw, Moore on Right and Wrong. The Normative Ethics of 
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81 Moore, Ethics, 7. 
82 Ibid., 143. 
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would have been equally good under whatever circumstances it occurred’.83 The 
Principle of organic unities, central to Moore’s theory of value, remained similarly 
constant in his subsequent work. 
6.5.2. By Moore’s contemporaries 
 In 1989, Jennifer Welchman conducted a survey of responses to Principia 
Ethica published during the first half of the twentieth century.84 Welchman noted 
that the publication was reviewed in most of the professional philosophical 
periodicals of the day, including Mind, International Journal of Ethics, and 
Philosophical Review; and was additionally discussed or noted in several articles 
between 1903 and 1906.85 The reviews were decidedly mixed. In 1904, one 
reviewer, Evander McGilvary, commented that many of the points made by Moore 
‘seem to be extremely questionable and the arguments employed to support them are 
often more ingenious and subtle than convincing’,86 whilst J. S. MacKenzie agreed 
that ‘Mr. Moore’s book is not free from blots’.87 In the same year, another reviewer, 
Bernard Bosanquet, concluded that whilst ‘there is undoubtedly something attractive 
and stimulating in the novelty of Mr. Moore’s attack; there is also something 
genuinely high-minded in his devotion to his subject, in the tendency of his ethical 
estimates, and in his carelessness of orthodoxy’.88 
Unfortunately for the purposes of this thesis, Moore’s contemporary 
reviewers did not concentrate their critiques on his Principle of organic unities. 
Bosanquet’s only specific mention of the Principle was to comment that although he 
agreed that ‘the doctrine of organic membership is always the better for being 
overhauled […] Mr. Moore’s criticisms do not seem to me to make any impression 
on it, resting as they do on the non-modifiability of subjects by relations’.89 
 The reviews of Principia Ethica were not wholly negative, however. In 
addition to praising Moore’s lucid style and clear exposition, MacKenzie also wrote 
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that Moore’s conception of organic unity was treated ‘in a striking and original way’ 
and demonstrated one of the strengths of his argument, by successfully moving 
beyond the theory of Sidgwick.90 
 In 1942, Paul Arthur Schilpp edited a compilation of expository and critical 
articles on Moore written by leading exponents and opponents of the philosopher’s 
thoughts.91 The volume included a reply to the commentators by Moore, an 
autobiography and a bibliography of Moore’s works. One of the articles was written 
by Herbert James Paton (1887-1969), an Oxford scholar and Professor of Logic at 
Glasgow University.92 In his article Paton questioned whether Moore’s Principle of 
organic unities ‘is right in what it denies’ and argued that it is not self-evident and 
involves several difficulties.93 Contrary to what Moore had argued about the sense in 
which he was using the term ‘organic’, Paton agreed with the Hegelian notion that 
the goodness of a whole cannot be separated from the goodness of the parts, stating 
that: ‘a whole is a whole of parts and cannot be separated from the parts’.94 As a 
result, Paton suggested that the goodness of a thing might depend partly ‘on the 
relation of the whole to its parts, or at least on the relation of its parts of one 
another’.95 Paton further suggested that it is the circumstances of a particular whole, 
which can determine its value and, implicitly, allow for the altering of the values of 
the parts depending on the particular circumstances. Moore gave a forthright 
response to Paton’s criticisms, even arguing that the examples used by Paton showed 
the very opposite of what Paton intended.96 
6.5.3. By later philosophers 
 As has been previously shown in the preceding chapter, there is little 
consensus on most philosophical topics or areas of debate, and Moore’s Principle of 
organic unities is no exception. Recent scholarship on Moore’s value theory has 
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93 Paton, 125. 
94 Ibid., 125. 
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included a focus on some aspects of Moore that were previously ignored, including 
his Principle of organic unities.97 Only a sample of the many different arguments for 
and against Moore can be included here in the interests of brevity, and the author has 
chosen those critiques that seem to best exemplify the range of opinion.  
Writing in 1990, philosopher Thomas Baldwin (b. 1947)98 feared that the 
Principle of organic unities ‘engenders a form of moral scepticism’.99 Baldwin 
argued that all actions are part of the total history of the universe, and as such, may 
have value as parts of this history regardless of the intrinsic or instrumental value in 
themselves. Baldwin suggested that this causes a problem because we cannot know 
the value as a part of the history of every possible universe of each course of action, 
and we are therefore unable to know which course of action is the best overall.100 
Similarly, he contended that by this same argument, that it might be the case that a 
particular course of action, which is very evil, is ‘nonetheless an essential constituent 
of the best possible universe and therefore the best course of action, all things 
considered’.101 The problem is that we can never know for sure. Baldwin believed 
that the Principle of organic unities could not therefore be sustained without a 
commitment to Absolute Idealism.102 Baldwin suggested that ‘the intrinsic value of a 
whole as a whole seems to be a deus ex machina which is liable to interfere with the 
evaluation of situations in a random fashion’.103 Baldwin argued that the Principle’s 
defence of retributive punishment reinforces this conclusion by insisting that 
something which is intrinsically evil – the infliction of pain – can produce an 
outcome that is intrinsically better than an outcome without it. Baldwin admitted that 
the Principle worked better in certain situations than others, for example in the 
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103 Baldwin, G. E. Moore. The Arguments of the Philosophers, 127. Italics in original. 
194 
 
consideration of aesthetic value; but nonetheless concluded that it was still a bad fit 
even to this type of complex whole.104  
In the 2000s Jonathan Dancy105 wrote several articles in which he critiqued 
Moore’s Principle of organic unities.106 In these, Dancy argued that there are two 
ways of understanding organic unities: Moore’s approach, which he termed 
‘intrinsicalism’ and the approach favoured by Dancy, termed ‘variabilism’.107 
According to Dancy, ‘intrinsicalism’ holds that individual parts retain their intrinsic 
value as they move from whole to whole; they do not increase or decrease in value 
when they enter a whole, yet their presence can increase or decrease the intrinsic 
value of the whole. Dancy illustrated this with an example of a recipe which is much 
improved by the addition of a pinch of salt, whereby the salt adds more value to the 
recipe than it itself has.108 Dancy held that such consistency of value is unreasonable. 
He argued that the ‘most natural way of understanding intrinsic value is as that part 
of the value of an object which is grounded in the intrinsic properties of that 
object’.109 Since the intrinsic properties include an object’s shape and size, it follows 
that just as these properties are, in Dancy’s view, capable of change, so too is 
intrinsic value.110 As a counter proposal to Moore’s intrinsicalism, Dancy thus 
advanced a theory of variabilism which holds that parts can change in value when 
they move from whole to whole.111 To support this theory, Dancy argued that 
Moore’s division of value into two sorts – intrinsic and instrumental – is 
oversimplified. In addition to suggesting that there is a difference between 
‘instrumental’ and ‘extrinsic’ value, with the first actually being a type of the second, 
Dancy also proposed that there exist things like ‘symbolic value’ and ‘sentimental 
value’ which are other types of extrinsic value. Therefore, he surmised that there 
might also exist an extrinsic value type defined as ‘value-as-a-part’.112 Dancy argued 
that ‘value-as-a-part’ can ‘change as the bearer moves from whole to whole. It gives 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 129. 
105 See Chapter 5 for a brief biography. 
106 Jonathan Dancy, ‘Are There Organic Unities?’, Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 629-50; Jonathan Dancy, 
‘What Do Reasons Do?’ in Metaethics After Moore, ed. by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons 
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107 Dancy, ‘Moore’s Account of Vindictive Punishment’, 326. 
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us constant intrinsic value, supposedly, and variable extrinsic value’.113 Dancy 
believed that his theory avoids the seemingly irrational suggestion that parts can 
contribute value which they themselves do not have: 
Any differences between the value contributed to one whole and to 
another will be explained by appeal to differences in the extrinsic 
values enjoyed by that part in those two wholes – that is, by appeal to 
the differences between its value as a part of one whole and its value 
as a part of the other.114 
Dancy supported his variabilist theory with what he held to be ‘the essential 
link between values and reasons’.115 Briefly, this view holds that value entails 
reasons – if something has value there are reasons to preserve, protect or admire it, 
and if there are such reasons, it must follow that the object in question has value. 
Dancy contended that having reasons to value an object necessarily includes the 
‘features’ (parts) of the object and that it would therefore be incoherent to value 
features which have no intrinsic value in themselves.  
Dancy examined specifically the case of retributive punishment, (although he 
preferred to use the term ‘vindictive’), which Moore argued can be justified by the 
Principle of organic unities. Dancy outlined Moore’s justification, and admitted that 
his approach is ‘rather clever’ as Moore based his argument on the appropriateness 
of the punishment to the crime rather than ‘in terms of hope for social or other 
consequences of inflicting punishment’.116 Dancy contended that although it is 
difficult to explain vindictive punishment within the variabilist approach, it is not 
impossible. He continued to argue that by recasting the argument in terms of reasons 
a variabilist can successfully claim that in the context of a particular crime, a 
particular punishment is less bad.117 
Thomas Hurka118 disagreed with Dancy, arguing that no such account of 
retributive punishment is available to the variabilist.119 Like Dancy, Hurka argued 
                                                 
113 Ibid., 327. 
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115 Ibid., 330. Italics in original. 
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118 Thomas Hurka is a Canadian philosopher who has been professor of philosophy at the University 
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that there are two interpretations of Moore’s Principle of organic unities but rather 
than regarding them as incompatible, he argued that both are equally valid and each 
is appropriate to different situations.120 Hurka defined his two interpretations as (i) 
‘holistic’ interpretation: parts retain their value on entering a whole and can 
contribute to the intrinsic value of the whole a value which they themselves do not 
have (in other words, Moore’s classic Principle); and (ii) ‘conditionality’ 
interpretation: parts change their values when they enter wholes. According to 
Hurka, in the holistic interpretation an additional value results from the combination 
of the parts and the whole. Returning to Moore’s example of the consciousness of a 
beautiful thing, Hurka stated that the ‘additional value is an intrinsic property of the 
contemplation-plus-beauty-plus-causal-relation that it involves those elements in that 
way’.121 In comparison, the conditionality thesis holds that the additional value is not 
located in the relation but in the beauty itself, whose value has changed when it 
became part of the whole, which included the consciousness or contemplation of the 
beautiful thing.122  
Hurka admitted that there is a possible objection to the conditionality 
interpretation, namely that it results in a value that is not strictly intrinsic value – 
because it is not necessarily determined by intrinsic properties but can depend on 
relations to other states, or its place in larger wholes.123 In response to this Hurka 
contended that things like knowledge and beauty actually possess what he called 
‘mixed value’ by which their intrinsic properties mean that ‘when they stand in 
certain relations they are good’.124 Furthermore, he argued that this mixed value 
plays the same role as strict intrinsic value in that it contributes to the overall value 
of the world and as such is something that should be pursued in and for its own 
sake.125 
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Importantly, Hurka argued that despite the apparently fundamental 
differences between the holistic and the conditionality interpretations of the Principle 
of organic unities, there is actually no practical significance as both interpretations 
can agree on the overall intrinsic value in a given whole.126 Additionally, he argued 
that the differences make one interpretation more appropriate than the other in a 
particular situation. For example, in aesthetic appreciation it can be argued that the 
conditionality interpretation is more apt because the holistic thesis would hold the 
irrational idea that the admirer’s attitude (in the contemplation of beauty) is directed 
not at a good thing but only at something ‘that though part of a good, is itself 
intrinsically neutral’.127 Because the conditionality thesis locates the value in the 
beautiful object itself rather than in the whole, it allows that the admirer’s attitude is 
directed towards something intrinsically good.128 In comparison, the holistic 
interpretation is more appropriate in a situation such as retributive punishment. 
According to the holistic thesis this situation comprises three intrinsic values: (i) the 
initial evil of the crime, (ii) the evil of punishment (pain), and (iii) the good of 
retribution in the whole composed of these two evils as a whole.129 If the punishment 
is to be on balance worth inflicting, the goodness of (iii) must be greater than (ii), but 
must not be so great that the combination of (i) plus (ii) plus (iii) is better than if 
there had been no (i) at all.130 Hurka contended that this situation involves a ‘mixed 
attitude’, as an observer would experience pleasure at the (just) retributive outcome, 
but pain at the pain. The holistic interpretation thus provides an explanation as to 
why retribution involves a ‘subdued tone’ and is ‘suffused with regret’.131 This 
mixed attitude cannot be explained by the conditionality interpretation. However, 
Hurka claimed that the same does not hold true for the mirror-opposite situation: that 
of undeserved pleasure. He argued that many people would deny that there is any 
good in a situation where an evil person derives pleasure. Accordingly, the 
conditionality interpretation, rather than the holistic one, would allow that pleasure 
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loses its value when combined with a moral vice and therefore explains the lack of a 
mixed attitude in this situation.132 
Hurka republished his 1998 article in a 2011 compendium of essays.133 In the 
later version, he added a section on the ‘asymmetry of value’, which is reminiscent 
of Moore’s own concluding remarks in Principia Ethica about the lack of symmetry 
in his own philosophical theories. Hurka concluded that there is ‘no single pattern 
amongst pairs of intrinsic values. The truth is more complicated than symmetry or 
any one type of asymmetry alone’.134 
In contrast with both Dancy and Hurka, Noah Lemos135 defended both 
Moore’s Principle of organic unities, and specifically what he termed the 
‘universality’ interpretation of the Principle.136 Lemos quoted directly from Moore to 
reiterate the universality thesis: 
The part of a valuable whole retains exactly the same value when it is, 
as when it is not, a part of that whole. If it had value under other 
circumstances, its value is not any greater, when it is part of a far 
more valuable whole; and if it had no value by itself, it has none still, 
however great be that of the whole of which it now forms a part.137 
In his defence of Moore’s Principle, Lemos outlined five possible states of affairs, 
(his preferred term for ‘wholes’), that contain intrinsic value as follows: 
  (i) A is pleased that someone is happy 
  (ii) A is pleased that someone is suffering 
  (iii) A is pleased and A is wicked 
  (iv) A is pleased and A is virtuous 
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  (v) A is pleased138 
Lemos held that (v) is a part of wholes (i)-(iv), but that if the Principle of organic 
unities is correct, all five states are not of equal intrinsic value; for example, it is 
reasonable to believe that (i) is better than either (ii) or (iii). However, the thesis of 
universality holds that (v) has the same value as (i)-(iv) – in other words, the intrinsic 
value of ‘A being pleased’ is the same regardless of whether A is wicked or virtuous. 
Lemos argued that the Principle of organic unities holds that (v) is an intrinsically 
good part of each of the other states of affairs; and (ii) and (iii) are examples of 
organic unities because they are intrinsically bad wholes, which contain a good part 
(namely (v)) and a bad part. Therefore (v) has the same intrinsic value that it is 
intrinsically good, even when it is part of a whole that is intrinsically bad.139 
 Lemos continued to defend the thesis of universality by considering the 
arguments of W. D. Ross140 who, despite concurring on many issues with his friend 
Moore, had nonetheless rejected the universality thesis. In the 1930s, Ross argued 
that pleasure was ‘conditionally or prima facie good’ and that pain was 
‘conditionally or prima facie bad’.141 In Ross’s view, therefore, (iii) is a ‘total’ fact 
which includes the simpler fact of (v); and moreover, the total fact overrides the 
prima facie goodness of the simpler fact so that ‘the goodness of (v) is mere 
conditional goodness in so far as (v) is good provided that certain other conditions 
do not obtain’.142 In other words, according to Ross’s position, the value of (v) can 
alter depending on whether or not it is a part of (iii). Lemos contended that ‘the chief 
difficulty of Ross’s view is that it misses what apparently makes so offensive the 
prosperity of the wicked and states of affairs such as (iii)’.143 In a similar vein to the 
argument put forward by Hurka, Lemos argued that what makes (iii) so offensive is 
that a wicked man apparently has a good that he does not deserve.144 
Moore’s Principle of organic unities has been expressed as follows: 
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(OU2) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an intrinsic 
value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) the 
value of the part is the same as the value it would have apart from the 
whole. 
The work of philosophers, Dancy, Hurka and Lemos indicates that there may be two 
different interpretations of Moore’s Principle: a strong interpretation, which has 
variously been called ‘intrinsicalism’, ‘holistic’ and ‘universality’; and a weaker 
interpretation called ‘variabilism’ or ‘conditionality’. These different interpretations 
focus on whether parts of a whole can change their intrinsic value or not as they 
move from whole to whole. According to these strong and weak interpretations of 
Moore’s Principle, we arrive at two different formulations of the Principle. The 
strong interpretation can be expressed as follows: 
(OU2-S) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part is the same as the value it would have apart from 
the whole. 
The weak interpretation can be expressed as follows: 
(OU2-W) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
Both interpretations will be considered in analogy with concepts of archival value in 
Chapter 7. 
6.6. Concluding remarks 
 This chapter has described Moore’s Principle of organic unities, together 
with his related theories on the indefinability of good and the method of isolation, by 
which intrinsic value can be determined. The presentation of several critiques of 
Moore’s Principle has highlighted the lack of consensus within the field of 
philosophy regarding the validity of his ideas. It has also suggested that twenty-first 
century philosophers regard Moore’s work as relevant and applicable to modern 
value theory. Two possible interpretations of Moore’s Principle of organic unities 
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have been proposed that focus on the nature of the parts and their ability to change in 
value upon entering a whole. 
The next chapter takes an analytical approach as the author explores through 
analogy the possible application of Moore’s Principle (in both interpretive senses) to 
theories of archival value. 
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Chapter 7. Archival value: a re-interpretation 
7.1. Chapter summary 
 This chapter consists of the two final steps in Theory Derivation 
methodology, namely: identifying what content and/or structure from the parent 
theory is to be used, and developing or redefining new statements from the content 
and/or structure of the parent theory in terms of the phenomenon of interest to the 
theorist.1 The axiological Principle of organic unities will be considered in 
application to various concepts of archival value – in both its strong and weak 
interpretations. The application of both interpretations of the Principle allows the 
author to explore the ways in which different writers have defined ‘parts’ and 
‘wholes’ in relation to archives; and the ways in which they have ascribed values to 
parts and/or wholes.  
7.2. Introduction 
 Chapter 6 identified the parent theory for use in derivation, namely G. E. 
Moore’s Principle of organic unities, and offered two possible interpretations of the 
Principle; a strong interpretation and a weak interpretation as follows:  
(OU2-S) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part is the same as the value it would have apart from 
the whole. 
(OU2-W) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
The final two steps in Theory Derivation methodology comprise ‘identifying what 
content and/or structure from the parent theory is to be used, and developing or 
redefining new statements from the content and/or structure of the parent theory in 
terms of the phenomenon of interest to the theorist’.2 Nursing theorists, Lorraine 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, section 1.5. 
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Walker and Kay Avant noted that these final steps involve more than simply 
‘borrowing’ the parent theory: ‘Theories cannot be moved unchanged from one field 
to another […] True Theory Derivation requires that at least some modifications […] 
be made’.3 They insisted that creativity and imagination were required by the 
theorist in order to redefine the concepts of the parent theory and transpose them into 
a new field: ‘more is required than simply applying an existing concept to a 
phenomenon. The meaning of the concept must be developed and changed to fit a 
new phenomenon’.4 Archival theorist Pekka Henttonen also emphasized the need to 
modify a theory’s concepts or structure as part of the derivation process: 
When a new theory is derived the whole parent theory may not be 
needed. Only those elements that are analogous and therefore relevant 
have to be used. In theory derivation one also may – and often needs 
to – modify the concepts or structure borrowed in such a way that it 
becomes meaningful in the theorist’s field.5 
This chapter develops and modifies the axiological Principle of organic unities in 
order for it to become meaningful in an archival context. Both interpretative senses 
of the Principle will be developed. In doing so, the author aims to create a 
framework of ideas that ‘may serve as a basis for developing hypotheses for 
examination of different archival phenomena’.6 The framework will enable a 
consideration of the various ideas about value in archival theory that have been 
detailed in earlier chapters of the thesis, as the author re-interprets these ideas 
through the lens of the derived theory. This process involves the translation of the 
language, terminology and ideas of the archival theorists into the author’s language 
and terminology as used in the derived theory. The level of interpretation will vary 
according to the theorist, and it should be noted that the archival theories ‘fit’ into 
the derived theory in varying degrees of success, with some not fitting at all. This 
variance will enable a discussion of why some of the archival theories work better in 
analogy than others. The author will also discuss the extent to which the aptness of a 
particular archival theory is contingent on the particular frame of reference in which 
it is situated; whether it is framed within a positivist or postmodernist paradigm. 
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Consideration will be given to those which don’t necessarily fit but how, by not 
doing so, they nonetheless contribute something of interest to the discussion. 
The application of both strong and weak interpretations of the Principle will 
allow the author to explore the ways in which different theorists have defined ‘parts’ 
and ‘wholes’ in relation to archives; and the ways in which they have ascribed values 
to parts and/or wholes. As has been discussed previously in Chapter 3, a variety of 
possible aggregations of archives are presented in the archival literature, including, 
for example, ‘fonds’, ‘series’, ‘subfonds’, and ‘record group’. It is not the aim of the 
author to establish any firm differentials between these options, but rather to explore 
how each might be conceived as an organic whole applicable to the derived theory. 
The author is not concerned with where things might sit within a multi-level 
hierarchy but rather in how things can be conceived in relation to each other within a 
part-whole dynamic. The author acknowledges revisionist approaches to the fonds7 
but will focus on the conventional acceptance of archival aggregations for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
7.3. Transposition of the strong interpretation of the Principle of organic unities 
to the archival context  
The strong interpretation of Moore’s Principle of organic unities has been 
expressed as follows: 
(OU2-S) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part is the same as the value it would have apart from 
the whole. 
In summary, this interpretation emphasizes the disproportion of the value of the 
whole and the values of the parts, together with what Noah Lemos termed ‘a 
universality thesis’ of value;8 or, as Moore himself wrote: ‘The part of a valuable 
whole retains exactly the same value when it is, as when it is not, a part of that 
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whole’.9 As has been discussed, some philosophers have wrestled with this 
interpretation, which demands a constancy in the value of the parts of the organic 
whole.10 The strong interpretation of the Principle of organic unities entails that the 
intrinsic value of the organic whole depends on some additional value that results 
from the combination of the unchanging value of the parts and the value of the whole 
as an organic whole. This approach is underlined by Moore’s distinction between 
value ‘as a whole’ and value ‘on the whole’, which asserts that value ‘on the whole’ 
is ‘equivalent to the sum of the value which [the whole] possesses as a whole, 
together with the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts’.11 In other 
words, there is something valuable about the arrangement of the organic whole and 
its parts that contributes a separate value to the parts and the whole and thus results 
in the intrinsic value of the organic whole ‘on the whole’. 
 The concept of the intrinsic value of an organic whole needs to be transposed 
into the archival context to create a framework in which ideas about archival value 
can be examined. Taking the two key components of the concept and modifying 
them to be meaningful within the archival context, a formulation might be expressed 
as follows: 
(AV-S) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the values of the parts are constant.12 
This formulation of the Principle of archival value in its strong interpretation thus 
contains two components: (i) a disproportion between the value of the archives ‘on 
the whole’ and the values of the parts as they compose the archives as a whole; and 
(ii) a universality of the values of the parts whereby such values are unchanging in 
value irrespective of whether or not they are part of the archives.  
7.3.1. Analogy with the archival theory of Hilary Jenkinson 
                                                 
9 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. edn., ed. by Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), Ch. I, Sect. 19, 81. 
10 See Hurka, ‘Two Kinds of Organic Unity’, 302-3; Jonathan Dancy, ‘Are There Organic Unities?’, 
Ethics, 113.3 (2003), 629-650. 
11Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. VI, Sect. 129, 263. Italics in original. 
12 As previously explained the Principle is expressed as a declarative statement in formal language; 
See Chapter 6 for details. In this case, AV stands for Principle of archival value and S for the strong 
interpretation.  
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 This section will explore the analogies between the Principle of archival 
value (AV-S) and the archival theory of Hilary Jenkinson, and will demonstrate 
considerable alignment between the two. The section will first examine the second of 
the Principle’s components – the universality of the values of the parts – because this 
unchanging intrinsic value determines to a great extent the characteristics of the first 
component, the disproportion between the value of the whole ‘on the whole’ and the 
sum of the value of its parts as a whole.  
 In the early twentieth century, Jenkinson argued that archives were made up 
of certain types of records that had particular characteristics, which distinguished 
them from other records: ‘Archives are documents which formed part of an official 
transaction and were preserved for official reference’.13 He detailed the 
characteristics as impartiality and authenticity, and argued that these characteristics 
were derived from the nature of the records as evidence of business transactions and 
from their preservation in official custody.14 Jenkinson was explicit in stating that 
the part-whole relationship between records and archives was dependent on these 
characteristics, arguing that ‘while all Archives are Documents, not all Documents 
are Archives’.15 The necessary characteristics of the parts of archives thus defined by 
Jenkinson are arguably analogous to the values of the parts in an organic whole as 
interpreted by Moore, in that they are intrinsic (i.e. according to Jenkinson, they arise 
from the nature of the records themselves and not from any external source) and 
constant (i.e. according to Jenkinson, they are fixed characteristics of the record). 
Jenkinson argued that the characteristics of impartiality and authenticity residing in 
the ‘archival document’ were the result of a specific process of creation and custody, 
and he described the primary role of the archivist as one which safeguards these 
characteristics.16 By definition, therefore, such characteristics are fixed, identifiable 
qualities that are capable of being defended or attacked. Terry Eastwood similarly 
expressed this idea as follows: 
                                                 
13 Hilary Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration (London: Lund Humphries, 1937), 4. Italics 
in original. See also Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.  
14 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 4-11. 
15 Hilary Jenkinson, The English Archivist: A New Profession (London: H K Lewis & Co. Ltd., 1948), 
4. 
16 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 15. The term ‘archival document’, as used by 
Jenkinson, is interpreted by the author to mean those records (or documents) that are archives. 
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The purpose of the archivist […] is to preserve the integrity of the 
archival documents as faithful and trustworthy evidence of the actions 
from which they originated. It is precisely the value of the documents 
[…] which the archivist is entrusted to protect.17 
Through this approach, the value of the records satisfies the second component of the 
Principle (AV-S): ‘the values of the parts are constant’. The characteristics of 
records as evidence, engendered by their nature as the by-product of business 
transactions, remain fixed in the records, regardless of any subsequent 
administrative, historical or research uses to which they might be put.18  
 Although Jenkinson’s theory as above-outlined appears to support a part-
whole relationship between records and archives, the author believes that there is 
evidence to suggest that he was not altogether consistent in this approach. In his 
Manual of Archive Administration, Jenkinson began by defining the parts of which 
archives are comprised; in other words, the ‘documents which are material survivals 
of certain administrative or executive transactions in the past, preserved for their 
own reference’, and indicated that an extensive range of records might be so 
identified: ‘all manuscript in whatever materials made, all script produced by 
writing machines, and all script mechanically reproduced […] all other material 
evidences, whether or no they include alphabetical or numerical signs’.19 Yet he also 
referred to an instance-class relationship between records and archives within the 
same text, stating that: 
A document which may be said to belong to the class of Archives is 
one which was drawn up or used in the course of an administrative or 
executive transaction (whether public or private) of which itself 
formed a part; and subsequently preserved in their own custody for 
their own information by the person or persons responsible for that 
transaction and their legitimate successor.20 
By employing two different logical relations – part-whole and instance-class – , it 
seems that Jenkinson used the term ‘archives’ simultaneously to mean an 
                                                 
17 Terry Eastwood, ‘Nailing a Little Jelly to the Wall of Archival Studies’, Archivaria, 35 (1993), 
232-252, (237). It is the contention of the author that Eastwood uses the phrase ‘archival documents’ 
in the same sense as Jenkinson, simply meaning those documents that are archives.  
18 This is also an approach supported by Margaret Cross Norton. See Margaret Cross Norton, 
‘Comparison of Archival and Library Techniques’, in Norton on Archives: The Writings of Margaret 
Cross Norton on Archival and Records Management, ed. by Thornton Mitchell (Carbondale & 
Edwardsville, US: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975), 86-105. 
19 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 4, 6. Italics in original. 
20 Ibid., 11. Italics in original. 
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aggregation (of records) as well as to mean any or all records with certain 
characteristics. It is unclear whether Jenkinson realized he was confusing two 
different logical relations. It is the contention of the author that Jenkinson meant to 
define archives in terms of an aggregation as this correlates with his emphasis on the 
natural accumulation of archives and the importance of retaining original order and 
arrangement.21 In addition, in his later writings, the term ‘class’ is not applied to 
‘archives’ but rather to the ‘structural subdivisions’ within archives.22 Nonetheless, 
the lack of clarity or explanation on this point in Jenkinson’s writings mean that an 
alternative interpretation is possible. 
 Thus far, it has been argued that Jenkinson’s archival theory supports the 
second component of the Principle (AV-S), namely that ‘the values of the parts are 
constant’. A further analogy can be made with Jenkinson’s archival theory, which 
satisfies the first component of the Principle, concerning the disproportion of the 
value of the organic whole to the sum of the values of its parts. This has been 
expressed as follows: ‘(i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an intrinsic value different 
from the sum of the values of its parts’. In order to safeguard the evidential 
characteristics of records, Jenkinson insisted on the maintenance of the ‘natural form 
and relationship’ of the records.23 Jenkinson argued that ‘[archives] have […] a 
structure, an articulation and a natural relationship between parts which are essential 
to their significance’.24 Jenkinson’s classic definition of archival provenance entailed 
the existence of an archival fonds – what he called ‘an organic whole’, whose 
boundaries were determined in relation to the context of its creator; and original 
order, which held that the ‘original’ arrangement of the records (normally that of the 
creator) should be retained.25 According to Jenkinson, in order to preserve the value 
of the archives, provenance must be respected by maintaining and protecting the 
boundaries of the fonds and the order of its components. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 97. See also Chapter 3. 
22 Jenkinson, The English Archivist, 5. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Ibid., 4. As has previously been discussed in Chapter 3, the author contends that Jenkinson’s use of 
the term ‘significance’ is synonymous with her use of the term ‘value’ – see Chapter 3, section 3.4.1. 
especially. 
25 See Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration. For an earlier rendition of this definition of 
provenance see also S. Muller, J. A. Feith and R. Fruin, Handleiding voor het ordenen en beschrifven 
van archieven (Groningen: Erven B. Van der Kamp, 1899). English translation: Manual for the 
Arrangement and Description of Archives, transl. by Arthur H. Leavitt (New York: H. W. Wilson & 
Co., 1940), 2nd edn., with new introduction by Peter Horsman, Eric Ketelaar, Theo Thomassen and 
Majorie Rabe Barritt (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2003). 
209 
 
It should be noted that Jenkinson and Moore would not have understood the 
term ‘organic whole’ in the same way despite the identical terminology employed by 
both. Jenkinson used the term to imply a natural accumulation in the sense of a living 
organism as contrasted with an artificial grouping; Moore used the term in a unique 
sense to distinguish a particular type of whole that ‘has an intrinsic value different in 
amount from the sum of the values of its parts’.26 However, it is the contention of the 
author that irrespective of the different origins, nonetheless both approaches lead to 
the same premise that there is a separate value, which results from the arrangement 
or combination of the (unchanging) value of the parts and the value of the whole in 
that specific way.  
According to Jenkinson, the separation of records originating from one 
creator from those originating from another, and the retention of the original order of 
the records, constituted ‘the moral defence of archives’.27 Using the framework of 
the derived theory, Jenkinson’s approach can be understood to place the value of the 
records as determined and fixed within the administrative context in which the 
records were created; and, furthermore, it is the combination of the relationship 
between the records and the activities of which they are a product, and the 
relationship between an individual record and the fonds to which it belongs, that 
together constitute archival value. These essential relationships add value to the 
archives ‘on the whole’. The archival principle of provenance, as interpreted in this 
way to include both respect des fonds and original order, thus supports a theory of 
archival value whereby such value is ‘equivalent to the sum of the value which [the 
whole] possesses as a whole, together with the intrinsic values which may belong to 
any of its parts’.28 Jenkinson’s archival theory can therefore be interpreted to support 
a theory of archival value developed from the strong interpretation of the Principle of 
organic unities: 
(AV-S) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the values of the parts are constant.  
7.3.2. Analogy with the archival theory of Luciana Duranti 
                                                 
26 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 105; Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch.1, Sect. 22, 87.  
27 Jenkinson, A Manual of Archive Administration, 97-102, 83. 
28 Moore, Principia Ethica, Ch. VI, Sect. 129, 263. Italics in original. 
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The work of Italian archival theorist Luciana Duranti can also be interpreted 
to support the strong interpretation of the Principle of archival value. Using 
Jenkinson as a framework, Duranti argued that there are essential and determined 
characteristics in ‘archival documents’.29 Duranti defined these characteristics as 
‘reliability’ and ‘authenticity’ and argued that ‘the authority and trustworthiness of 
the records as evidence […] is provided to a record by its form and procedure of 
creation’.30 In her writings Duranti employed multiple terms to describe the 
constituent parts of archives, including ‘document’, ‘archival document’ and 
‘record’. It is the contention of the author that Duranti used these terms 
interchangeably to define those individual items that constitute the aggregation of 
‘archives’.31 More confusingly, Duranti also often referred to ‘archives’ as a whole 
as possessing the same characteristics as its constituent parts; for example, a sub-
section of one of her articles is titled: ‘The Characteristics of Archival Documents 
and the Attribution of Value’ but the proceeding text detailed what she termed ‘the 
characteristics of archives’.32 Duranti had previously identified a lack of clarity in 
the archival literature:  
Modern archivists use terms such as “medium”, “form”, “logical 
relations” [etc.] […] in a very inconsistent way, and keep creating 
arbitrary terms every time they encounter an entity which appears 
slightly different from those with which they are familiar. Failure to 
recognize the substance of things leads to the false impression that the 
reality is changing fundamentally.33 
Arguably Duranti is guilty of the same lack of clarity which she hoped her work 
would elucidate. 
                                                 
29 Luciana Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, AA, 57.2 (1994), 328-44, (334); 
Luciana Duranti, ‘Reliability and Authenticity: The Concepts and Their Implications’, Archivaria, 39 
(1995), 5-10.  
30 Duranti, ‘Reliability and Authenticity’, 6. 
31 The InterPARES Glossary distinguished between the term ‘document’ which is defined as 
‘recorded information’ and the term ‘record’ which is defined as ‘a document made or received and 
set aside in the course of a practical activity’; but for the purposes of this study this difference in the 
nature of the parts is irrelevant. There is no separate definition provided for ‘archival document’, 
despite the term being used elsewhere in the Glossary. The InterPARES Taskforce, The InterPARES 
Glossary (December 2001), available online: www.interpares.org [accessed 6 April 2014]. 
32 Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, 334, capitals in original; 335-6. The 
InterPARES Glossary offered three definitions of ‘archives’: an aggregation of records; the physical 
place where such records are preserved; and the institution responsible for their preservation. 
33 Luciana Duranti, ‘Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science, Part VI’, Archivaria, 33 (1991/2), 6-
24, (8). 
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 Duranti described how ‘archival documents […] accumulate naturally, 
progressively and continuously’.34 Her focus on the ‘natural’ character of records 
stemmed from her perspective as a diplomatist. She believed that the application of 
diplomatics theory,35 with its formal method of analysis and definitional role in 
identifying and naming the elements of records, helped to prevent the ‘corrupting’ of 
the records by attributing values to them in archival appraisal judgements.36 In an 
attempt to counter the probable biases by archivists introduced during the appraisal 
process, Duranti argued that the archivist should instead seek to identify the 
‘inherently truthful’ characteristics of the records.37 These characteristics are by their 
very definition, fixed within the records and are constant and enduring. Duranti 
disliked the term ‘value’, and argued that ‘if what qualifies documents as archival is 
their nature […] the idea of attributing values to them is in profound conflict with 
archival theory’.38 Yet, Duranti’s description of the characteristics of records is what 
defines them as archival, as being parts of the whole of archives. The author 
interprets this through the framework of the derived theory as being analogous to 
saying that these characteristics contribute to the records’ value as parts of archives. 
Therefore, following this approach, it can be argued that the parts (records) have 
values (characteristics) and the values of the parts are constant, thus satisfying the 
second component of the Principle (AV-S). 
Duranti’s approach can also be interpreted to satisfy the first component of 
the Principle (AV-S) through her description of what, (following Italian archival 
tradition), she termed ‘the archival bond’, defined as ‘the network of relationships 
that each record has with the records belonging in the aggregation’.39 Duranti 
emphasized the importance of these relationships, arguing that ‘the characteristic of 
unique-in-context of each document makes its meaning unique and its existence 
                                                 
34 Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, 335. 
35 The InterPARES Glossary defined ‘diplomatics’ as ‘the study of the genesis, inner constitution, and 
transmission of archival documents, and of their relationship with the facts represented in them and 
with their creator’. 
36 See Duranti, ‘Diplomatics: New Uses for an Old Science, Part VI’. See also Duranti, ‘The Concept 
of Appraisal and Archival Theory’. 
37 Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, 334. 
38 Ibid., 339. 
39 Luciana Duranti, ‘The Archival Bond’, Archives and Museum Informatics, 11 (1997), 213-18, 
(216). 
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necessary to the meaning of the archives in which it belongs’.40 Duranti identified 
the concept of ‘the archival bond’ in her work in order to apply traditional archival 
theories of diplomatics and provenance to electronic records. She defined the ‘bond’ 
as being ‘originary’, ‘necessary’ and ‘determined’.41 Duranti believed that the 
‘bond’ is more than just external context, being an essential part of the record itself 
that can be revealed through the physical order or classification of records.42 The 
author argues that Duranti’s theory of ‘the archival bond’ implicitly expresses the 
idea that the particular arrangement of the parts in the whole – the relationship that 
links the records of a similar activity together in a specific way – necessarily 
contributes to an archival value ‘on the whole’ (i.e. of the aggregation) that is 
separate from, and additional to, the values of its individual records.43 In this way, 
therefore, Duranti’s approach fully supports the strong interpretation of the Principle 
of archival value (AV-S). 
7.3.3. Analogy with the archival theory of Theodore R. Schellenberg 
The theories of mid-twentieth century US archivist, Theodore R. 
Schellenberg have often been contrasted with those of Jenkinson. In Chapter 2 of this 
thesis the author outlined the distinct approaches taken by Jenkinson and 
Schellenberg and the resultant divergence in thinking about archival appraisal that 
took place during the second half of the twentieth century.44 However, the author 
also identified similarities between their work, most notably in their understanding of 
archives comprising an ‘organic whole’.45 The framework of the author’s derived 
theory also presents an opportunity to re-interpret Schellenberg and to find 
commonalities with Jenkinson which, whilst initially appearing to support the strong 
interpretation of the Principle of archival value (AV-S), ultimately oppose it.46 One 
                                                 
40 Duranti, ‘The Concept of Appraisal and Archival Theory’, 336. The author contends that the term 
‘meaning’ is employed here as a synonymous alternative to the term ‘value’.  
41 Duranti, ‘The Archival Bond’, 216. Italics in original. 
42 Ibid., 216. 
43 See also Luciana Duranti, ‘The Impact of Digital Technology on Archival Science’, AS, 1.1 (2001), 
39-55, (48). 
44 See Chapter 2.  
45 See Jenkinson, The English Archivist, 4-5; Theodore R. Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of 
Arrangement’, AA, 24.1 (1961), 11-24. See also Chapter 3, section 3.5.1. 
46 Richard Stapleton argued that despite the strong criticism each made of the other’s theories, the 
differences between Jenkinson and Schellenberg were often merely ‘ones of emphasis’; see Richard 
Stapleton, ‘Jenkinson and Schellenberg: A comparison’, Archivaria, 17 (1983/84), 75-85, (80-1). 
Conversely, Reto Tschan argued that the two men ‘held strikingly different opinions’ which have 
sustained much of the ongoing debate about the appraisal of archives within the archival profession; 
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of the challenges in analysing Schellenberg’s theory is the inconsistencies often 
found in his use of terminology and sometimes in his clarity of meaning. In Chapter 
3 the author outlined the contradictions that appear in Schellenberg’s writing 
regarding the importance of original order. This chapter will also show that a lack of 
clarity in his writing when exploring ideas about parts, wholes and archival value can 
significantly obscure the theory he sought to put forward.  
Schellenberg defined archives as having two intangible qualities: reasons for 
creation and values for preservation.47 Although Schellenberg spoke about ‘reasons’, 
he chose to term these ‘primary values’ and ‘secondary values’ respectively.48 
Schellenberg argued that archives were composed of records that had been created as 
part of a transaction, describing them as ‘the organic material product of activity, of 
purposeful action’.49 He also argued that what made the records ‘archival’ was the 
fact that they had been set aside for permanent preservation for reasons different 
from those of their creation, namely for the purposes of reference and historical 
research.50 Schellenberg’s definition of archives asserted that archives are composed 
of not just any records but of the records of purposeful transactions; and moreover, 
not all such records are archives, but only those which additionally have historical or 
research values that mean they should be permanently preserved. Implicit in this 
definition is a process of selection and transfer – the records’ value is identified and, 
in Schellenberg’s own words, these are records that ‘have been deposited or have 
been selected for deposit in an archive institution’.51 Arguably, Schellenberg has 
introduced an element of confusion into his writings as he seemed to shift 
chameleon-like between a definition of ‘archives’ meaning records that have been 
judged archival, and ‘archives’ meaning an institution holding such records.52 
Schellenberg offered no explanation for this variance, but the author contends that 
Schellenberg meant the former – archives as an aggregation – an interpretation that 
is reinforced by the direct comparison Schellenberg drew with library theory. He 
                                                                                                                                          
see Reto Tschan, ‘A Comparison of Jenkinson and Schellenberg on Appraisal’, AA, 65.2 (2002), 176-
95, (176). 
47 Theodore R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques (Melbourne: F. W. 
Cheshire, 1956), 13. 
48 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 17, 133, 140-59. 
49 Theodore R. Schellenberg, The Management of Archives (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1965), 66. 
50 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 16. 
51 Ibid., 16. 
52 See also Chapter 1 on the different meanings of the term ‘archives’ in the English language. 
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argued that archives ‘grow out of some regular functional activity […] in a 
systematic manner’, compared to the ‘haphazard’ or ‘spontaneous expression of 
thought or feeling’ that normally creates library collections.53 Furthermore, he 
argued that it is because of their nature as coming into being in a specific way, that 
archivists treat records as part of a whole rather than as an individual items such as 
the librarian might do.54  
Schellenberg argued that the archivist should respect the ‘organic whole’ of 
the archives, but in contrast with Jenkinson, he placed the ‘organic whole’ at the 
level of a ‘series’ rather than at fonds level.55 Schellenberg did not identify the 
aggregation at the level of an archival fonds, but he did identify a series as a whole 
with parts: ‘for the series as a whole has a meaning greater than its parts, that is, than 
the individual record items’.56 Once again, Schellenberg’s use of terminology is 
problematic as he appeared to introduce a new concept of ‘record items’. However, 
the author suggests that when referring to ‘record items’, Schellenberg simply meant 
‘records’ in the sense he had previously used it to mean components of archives, and 
his employment of the additional term ‘items’ was probably intended to emphasize 
their character as parts. Schellenberg’s use of the term ‘series’ can be regarded as 
analogous to the author’s use of the term ‘archives’, by identifying an organic whole 
composed of parts, and whose value is greater than the sum of its individual parts.  
Schellenberg’s definition of archives can be regarded as satisfying the first 
component of the Principle (AV-S), namely: ‘that archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts’. Through the 
framework of the derived theory, we can interpret Schellenberg’s approach as 
follows: the values of the individual records comprise primary values for which the 
records were created, and secondary values for which the records are retained in an 
archival institution, yet the value of the archives does not merely equal the sum of 
these two types of value but depends on an additional evaluation: the appraisal and 
selection of the records that establishes their status as part of the archives. This 
activity appraises the records in relation to the totality of the records produced by a 
                                                 
53 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 18. 
54 Ibid., 21. 
55 See also Chapter 3. Schellenberg’s use of the phrase ‘organic whole’ is consistent with that of 
Jenkinson, used in the sense of a natural accumulation like a living organism, rather than an artificial 
grouping. 
56 Schellenberg, ‘Archival Principles of Arrangement’, 16. 
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particular creator and identifies a value in the relationship: ‘All records arising from 
a particular activity have a cohesive character and are part of one another. They have 
a meaning as a group rather than as single items’.57 It is this value of the archives ‘on 
the whole’ which is separate from the values of the parts of the archives ‘as a whole’, 
and thus constitutes an archival value that is different from the mere sum of the 
primary and secondary values of the records. 
Schellenberg’s theories can thus be shown to satisfy the first component of 
the strong interpretation of the Principle of archival value, but determining whether 
they are capable of satisfying the second, namely that ‘the values of the parts are 
constant’ is a more difficult exercise. Schellenberg identified two different types of 
values in records; the first, the primary values or reasons for record creation, can be 
defined as constant as they are established in the record during creation and can be 
identified by understanding the creator and the functions and activities of which the 
record is a product.58 In comparison, the secondary values are attributed to the record 
later, for reference or research use.59 Although Schellenberg argued that some of 
these secondary values are easily identifiable; for example, the evidential value of 
the records of the creator and its functions and activities which, he claimed, could be 
tested practically in an objective and definitive way; he admitted that other values, 
termed ‘informational’, were much harder to identify.60 Moreover, Schellenberg 
argued that the judgement of informational value was not based on absolute 
standards, but was ‘relative to time and place’; stating that: ‘archivists should use 
different criteria in evaluating records of different periods, for what is valuable in a 
past age may be valueless for the present’.61 However, although Schellenberg 
appeared to have introduced an element of conditionality to the notion of 
informational value, he immediately countered this with the statement that archivists 
were competent to identify such values, and he produced appraisal guidance that 
comprised basic criteria under which informational values could be identified; for 
                                                 
57 Schellenberg, The Management of Archives, 67. 
58 Schellenberg, Modern Archives, 16, 142. 
59 Ibid., 17, 133, 140-59.  
60 Ibid., 140-2, 148-9. 
61 Ibid., 149.  
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example: ‘all records have value when they relate to important historical personages, 
episodes or events’.62  
These contradictory or inconsistent statements published by Schellenberg 
make interpretation of this aspect of his theory especially problematic. However, 
having examined the entirety of his published works, the author’s overwhelming 
sense is that Schellenberg believed that it was possible to identify all values in 
archives through the application of specific appraisal criteria by archivists with a 
‘specialized knowledge of the subject-matter fields pertinent to the records’ and ‘a 
general knowledge of the resources and products of research’.63 Moreover, the 
assumption that a taxonomic approach can identify archival value has continued to 
form the basis of much archival appraisal activity in the US; for example, 
Schellenberg’s 1956 article The Appraisal of Modern Records continues to be 
available on the NARA website;64 and, arguably, Schellenberg’s ideas provided the 
grounding principles on which the US National Archives developed its theory of 
‘intrinsic value in archival material’.65 These taxonomic approaches all suggest that 
there are values that records possess and which are capable of being identified and 
judged by a competent archivist. In so far as Schellenberg believed that the act of 
selection for preservation of the records by an archival institution is based on the 
judgement of these values, it can be argued that he thought such values are constant 
within that judgement of archival value.  
Nonetheless, whilst Schellenberg’s approach supports the assertion that 
value(s) in records exist and can be identified, it also seems to allow that secondary 
value(s) may not be constant, but may only endure in terms of the assessment of 
value by an archivist at a given point in time, and that they may be subject to a 
different assessment by a different archivist at a different time. One might make an 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 150. See also Theodore R. Schellenberg, Disposition of Federal Records: How to Develop an 
Effective Program for the Preservation and the Disposal of Federal Records, National Archives 
Publication No. 50-3 (Washington DC: General Services Administration, The National Archives, 
1949). 
63 Theodore R. Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Records, Bulletin of the National Archives, 
No. 8 (Washington DC: NARA, 1956), 23. 
64 Schellenberg, The Appraisal of Modern Records, published online at: 
www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/archives-resources-appraisal-of-records.html [accessed 18 
November 2012]. 
65 National Archives and Records Service, Intrinsic Value in Archival Material, Staff Information 
Paper No. 21(Washington DC: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). See also Shauna 
McRanor, ‘A Critical Analysis of Intrinsic Value’, AA, 59.4 (1996), 400-11. 
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argument to the effect that it could be the case that the record possesses constant 
values, but that they have not (or not yet) been perceived; or to express it differently, 
that evidential and informational values constantly exist in the record but may be 
identifiable at different times in the record’s life. Such an argument would involve a 
commitment to the philosophical theory of perceptual realism and the claim that such 
values can exist unperceived – a claim that is by no means uncontested.66  
In view of these uncertainties, the author therefore must admit that 
Schellenberg’s theories ultimately do not satisfy both components of the strong 
interpretation of the Principle of archival value formulated as:  
(AV-S) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the values of the parts are constant. 
The possibility that Schellenberg’s theories might instead support a weak 
interpretation of the Principle will be considered in section 7.4. 
7.3.4. Analogy with the archival theory of Hans Booms 
Thus far this chapter has considered the strong interpretation of the Principle 
of archival value, (AV-S), in relation to the archival theories of Jenkinson and 
Duranti who both identified a whole-part relationship in terms of archives as an 
aggregation of records whose value remains constant regardless of whether they are 
a part of the whole or not. The discussion of Schellenberg’s theories, whilst 
supporting a whole-part relationship, also raised questions about the constancy of the 
values found in individual records. The next section will consider alternative archival 
approaches, which satisfy both components of the Principle, but that understand the 
organic whole of the archives to include other parts that have (unchanging) value(s) 
that contribute to its intrinsic value ‘on the whole’. These approaches are based on 
greater flexibility regarding what parts contribute value to the organic whole of 
archives. The approaches do not assert that records are not parts of the archives, but 
rather that they are parts without value. The Principle is still satisfied provided that 
this non-value remains constant, and therefore does not contribute to the archival 
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value of the organic whole. From this perspective, archival value is constituted in 
part by (unchanging) values found elsewhere in the organic whole of the archives. 
As previously detailed in Chapter 6, this approach is consistent with a definition of a 
‘whole’ as a thing that is composed of or divisible into parts, where ‘part’ is defined 
as any item that composes a whole.67  
One archival theorist whose work can be interpreted as supporting such an 
approach is the German archivist Hans Booms. Booms argued that archives should 
be appraised for their value as a chronicle of society because they constitute 
‘documentary heritage in material form and […] documentary heritage is the 
material source of a society’s historical consciousness’.68 Booms insisted that 
appraisal decisions should be based on ‘measuring the societal significance of past 
events’ through an analysis of the value that the records’ contemporaries had 
attached to them.69 Booms was explicit in his view that archivists could not find 
intrinsic value by seeking it in the records, arguing that ‘documentary sources do not 
possess an inherent value discernible within the documents themselves’, but rather 
that archivists assign value during the process of appraisal.70 Nonetheless, Booms 
believed that this assigned value could be ‘objective’, ‘universal’, and ‘concrete’.71 
He argued that this value was to be found in the value systems of those who created 
the records.72 Booms believed that it was possible to identify these value systems, 
stating that: ‘[society] always develops its own recognizable system of coordinating 
norms and values, of special control and behavioural models, which influence the 
life and thought patterns of its members’.73 As a result, Booms argued, it was 
possible to ‘arrange groups of records within a hierarchy of value that parallels a 
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gradient of historical events scaled according to societal significance’.74 In other 
words, archivists could identify ‘legitimate value standards’ against which archives 
could be measured.75 
 Booms’ theory places value not in the records themselves, but in the value 
systems of the records’ creators, those in society who created the records for a 
specific purpose and as part of a specific activity. Such value is regarded by Booms 
as constant because it is not subject to any subsequent trends of historical research 
but is grounded in the context in which the records originated. Booms’ theory 
necessarily attached a great importance to the archival principle of provenance, in 
arguing that the structure and context of the creation of the records was an essential 
component of the attribution of value.76 Booms’ theory can thus be interpreted to 
define archives ‘on the whole’ as comprising parts that are the values of the creators 
of the archives, which include both the original creators of the records and the 
archivists who subsequently identify value and designate the records as archives. In 
Booms’ view, these parts are identifiable and measurable and, as such, they 
constitute value that is unchanging. Booms’ theory does not, of course, exclude 
records as also being parts of the organic whole of the archives, but it does not allow 
that they are parts which in themselves have any value: Booms posited that at no 
time is there value intrinsic to the records.77 The second component of the Principle 
of archival value (AV-S) is satisfied because the non-value of the records remains 
constant and, as a result, such parts are irrelevant to the Principle.  
Thus far, Booms’ theory has been analysed in relation to the second 
component of the Principle of archival value (AV-S), concerning the constancy of 
the values of the parts of the archival whole. It is now time to consider the 
applicability of his theory in terms of the first component, namely the intrinsic value 
of archives ‘on the whole’, which is different from the sum of the values of its parts. 
It might seem natural to consider the application of the archival principle of 
provenance in relation to this component as has been previously discussed in the 
work of Jenkinson and Schellenberg; however, Booms’ position on provenance is a 
little confusing. In the two articles on archival theory that he published in the English 
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language, Booms presented two different views on provenance. In the first, he 
outlined the implementation of ‘provenienz [provenance]’ in the German archival 
endeavour, commenting that it was an arrangement principle that became used as a 
selection principle because of its advantages over ‘pertinenz [subject 
classification]’.78 Booms was critical of this approach, arguing that it ‘obscured the 
need for concrete value concepts in the appraisal process’.79 He concluded the article 
with an argument in favour of ‘Pertinenzprincip [principle of subject classification]’ 
which ‘requires archivists to appraise the content of individual, subject-defined 
groups of information regardless of provenance’.80 But in the second article, 
published in English four years later, Booms stated that ‘Archival appraisal […] can 
only be completed according to and in the context of the provenance of records’.81 
At first glance, Booms appears to have contradicted himself, or changed his 
opinion.82 However, the author believes that this is not the case; that it was never the 
principle of archival provenance that was in question, but rather the application of it. 
The context of Booms’ first article is the former East Germany, where appraisal 
became an ideological tool to ensure the preservation of the records of the State. In 
these circumstances, appraisal based on the principle of provenance meant keeping 
all the records originating from certain records’ creators because they were judged to 
possess inherent value regardless of their content, and understandably Booms was 
critical of this simplistic approach.83  
Booms believed that provenance was important, and he detailed the analysis 
of the administrative structures and functions of records’ creators as a necessary 
element of his appraisal documentation plan.84 But he also argued that provenance 
was not to be considered in isolation, but alongside a consideration of how 
documentary heritage was formed as a derivative of society itself; through an 
analysis of the patterns of societal relationships that would reveal the societal values 
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inherent in the documentation.85 The author therefore believes that Booms’ view of 
provenance is consistent with an interpretation that it adds value to the archives ‘on 
the whole’. The value of the archives ‘on the whole’ involves an analysis of the 
context of the records’ provenance, through which societal relationship values are 
added to the value systems of the records’ creators, contributing to an archival value 
that is greater than a mere sum of the parts. In this way, therefore, Booms’ theory 
can be interpreted as fully supporting the (AV-S) formulation of the Principle of 
archival value:  
(AV-S) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the values of the parts are constant. 
7.3.5. Analogy with the archival theories of David Bearman, Terry Cook and 
Helen Samuels 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the US theorist David Bearman posited an archival 
theory of value, which also shifted the emphasis away from the records themselves, 
in this case to the functions and structures of the records’ creators. Bearman argued 
that traditional approaches to archival appraisal that attempted to create a 
‘representative’ chronicle of society were doomed to failure because of the inherent 
bias in the process.86 He instead contended that archivists should focus on ‘selecting 
what should be documented rather than what documentation should be kept’.87 He 
argued that instead of focusing on the appraisal of individual records or series of 
records, archivists should make appraisal judgements before the records are created, 
by working with the records’ creators to ensure that they document certain activities 
and functions.88 Bearman argued that value lies not in the records, but in the extent 
to which the records are evidence of such activities and functions; and that all 
archival endeavour should be focused on the creation, maintenance, preservation and 
accessibility of this evidence.89 He argued that because functions ‘exist 
independently’, archival appraisal ‘based on business function and […] guided by 
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the principles of organizational risk management’ would ensure the preservation of 
this evidence.90  
Central to Bearman’s theory is his re-working of the archival principle of 
provenance: ‘content, structure and context must be joined for a record to be 
evidence’.91 Bearman was particularly concerned that traditional archival methods 
were insufficient to deal with the complexities of electronic records and electronic 
recordkeeping.92 He argued that only through an extended application of the 
principle of provenance, which emphasized the relationship between the creating 
activity and the records created, could electronic records be successfully managed 
and preserved.93 Bearman’s theory can thus be interpreted in a similar manner to that 
of Booms, substituting the value-holding parts of the organic whole of archives from 
the creators’ value system (as identified by Booms) by the creators’ functions (as 
identified by Bearman). Bearman argued that the functions of the records’ creators 
are identifiable and assessable and, as such, it can be argued that they constitute parts 
whose values are constant.94 This approach towards the Principle of archival value 
again interprets the organic whole of archives in its widest sense, to include 
components other than records that have intrinsic value, and which contribute to the 
value of the archives ‘on the whole’. The value of the archives ‘on the whole’ also 
involves the provenance of the records, through which value is added, thus 
contributing to an archival value that is greater than the sum of the parts.  
Bearman’s theory influenced several other writers whose own work can also 
be interpreted to support the strong interpretation of the Principle of archival value 
(AV-S). For example, in the early 1990s, Canadian archivist Terry Cook developed 
Bearman’s ideas about the business functions of records and applied them more 
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broadly to include wider societal-cultural functions of records and recordkeeping.95 
What Cook called his ‘macro-appraisal’ approach was a top-down approach that 
looked for values not in the records themselves but in the functions and structures 
that created the records. Also influenced by Booms, underpinning Cook’s theory was 
a belief that these structures were ‘a manifestation of societal functions’.96  
In 1992, US archivist Helen Willa Samuels developed the ideas of Bearman 
and Cook into an appraisal approach, which became known as ‘functional analysis’. 
This approach incorporated some of Cook’s macro-appraisal ideas within the 
function-based approach of Bearman.97 Samuels suggested that archivists should 
focus on the activities and functions of an organization rather than on its structures 
and hierarchies, arguing that there is a constancy in the former, which make them a 
better basis for appraisal decisions.98  
All these approaches to archival appraisal locate value in parts of the organic 
whole of archives that are other than records: the value of such parts can be regarded 
as constant; and, whilst the value of the parts contributes to the value of the archives 
as a whole, the value of the archives ‘on the whole’ also includes a separate, 
additional, value that stems from the nexus of relationships between records, 
activities, functions, structures, creators and society.99 In this way, the approaches of 
Bearman, Cook and Samuels can be interpreted to support the strong interpretation 
of the Principle of archival value: 
(AV-S) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the values of the parts are constant. 
However, although as interpreted thus far the theories of Cook can be viewed 
as supporting the strong interpretation of the Principle, his work also raises some 
difficulties regarding the constancy or universality of the value of the parts. Cook 
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recognized the importance of postmodernist thought in leading archivists to 
acknowledge their role in shaping the archives. In 1997, he wrote: 
Archivists have […] changed over the past century from being 
passive keepers of an entire documentary residue left by creators to 
becoming active shapers of the archival heritage. They have evolved 
from being, allegedly, impartial custodians of inherited records to 
becoming intervening agents who set record-keeping standards and, 
most pointedly, who select for archival preservation only a tiny 
proportion of the entire universe of recorded information. Archivists 
have become in this way very active builders of their own “houses of 
memory”.100 
Cook asserted that archivists are subject to societal and cultural influences just as the 
records’ creators are; and in his later work he affirmed that archivists therefore ‘are 
literally co-creating archives as records as we create archives as institutions’.101 Or, 
to put it another way, as he stated in the provocative title of an article in 2011: ‘we 
are what we keep; we keep what we are’. Although Cook was keen to affirm that this 
postmodern perspective on appraisal does not undermine ‘the very desirable 
character of archives as evidence’,102 nonetheless it raises doubts about the extent to 
which judgements of value made by archivists can be objective, standardized or 
measured. It calls into question the concept of a universality of value as it follows 
that if an archivist’s appraisal judgement is influenced by the society in which she 
lives, so will another’s in a different time and place, potentially, even likely, 
resulting in a different judgement. In the ever-changing social and cultural context 
affirmed by Cook, it seems difficult to assert that values can remain constant.  
 The strong interpretation of the Principle of archival value is therefore found 
to be both supported and challenged by several different archival theories of value. 
The next section will explore whether a weak interpretation of the Principle of 
archival value can provide an alternative option. 
7.4. Transposition of the weak interpretation of the Principle of organic unities 
to the archival context 
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The weak interpretation of Moore’s Principle of organic unities has been 
expressed as follows: 
(OU2-W) A whole is an organic whole if and only if (i) it has an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and (ii) 
the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
In summary, this interpretation emphasizes the disproportion of the value of the 
whole and the sum of the values of the parts, together with what Jonathan Dancy 
termed a ‘variability’ of value of the parts.103 Rather than regarding the value of the 
part as intrinsic, Dancy proposed that it is another type of extrinsic value termed 
‘value-as-a-part’ whose value can change as the part moves from whole to whole.104 
Thomas Hurka similarly interpreted Moore’s Principle, by suggesting that the value 
of parts is conditional and therefore parts change their values when they enter 
wholes.105 Any additional value is not to be found in the relation of the part to the 
whole in the whole, but rather in the part itself, whose value changed when it became 
part of the whole.106 It should be noted that it is possible to detect a subtle distinction 
between the interpretations of Dancy and Hurka as regards whether the nature of 
change in value of the part when it enters the whole is potential or essential. This 
distinction need not trouble the reader at present, but will become relevant later in 
the chapter when discussing possible analogies between the Principle (AV-W) and 
the theories of Terry Eastwood and Theodore R. Schellenberg. 
 As before, this concept of the intrinsic value of an organic whole needs to be 
transposed into the archival context in order to create a framework in which ideas 
about archival value can be examined. Taking the two key components of the 
concept and modifying them to be meaningful within the archival context, the 
formulation can be expressed as follows: 
(AV-W) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have 
an intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and 
(ii) the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
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The Principle of archival value in its weak interpretation thus formulated contains 
two components: (i) a disproportion between the value of the archives ‘on the whole’ 
and the values of the parts as they compose the archives as a whole; and (ii) a 
variability of the values of any parts whereby such values can change in value 
depending on whether or not they are part of the organic whole of the archives. The 
author’s analyses of possible interpretations of archival theories of value using the 
derived theory framework in the preceding sections have indicated that the Principle 
(AV-W) might be best supported by archival theories strongly influenced by 
postmodernist thinking, due to a shared emphasis on conditionality and variation.107  
7.4.1. Analogy with the archival theories of Tom Nesmith and Brien Brothman 
In 2002, Canadian archivist Tom Nesmith referenced the work of French 
postmodern theorist Jacques Derrida in arguing that although some of a record’s 
value is ‘inscribed in it by those who literally made it’, most of its value lies in ‘its 
context of interpretation’.108 Nesmith argued that records and their values evolve 
over time through every single activity in which they are involved; through the 
process Derrida called ‘archivization’.109 In Nesmith’s view, ‘records survive 
because they evolve and take on ever-changing new value’.110 Furthermore, Nesmith 
argued that the act of placing a record in an archival institution adds value by giving 
the record ‘a special status’.111 Although not explicitly identified as such by 
Nesmith, his viewpoint is grounded in a theory of linguistic reality, which holds that 
our conception of reality is affected by the structure of our language; or, as Nesmith 
put it: ‘what we take for granted as clear reflections of reality is never separable from 
our means of communicating it’.112 Central to his argument is the role of the 
archivist as a communicator, and thereby a constructor, of archives. Nesmith argued 
that as a result of the act of appraisal, of selecting the record for preservation in the 
archives, the record ‘is circled, framed or privileged for a particular type of 
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viewing’.113 He contended that through the ‘transformation’ into archives, not only 
does the context for understanding the records change, but also that the records 
‘changed what they are’.114  
We appear to be presented with the same confusion regarding the definition 
of ‘archives’ that was previously introduced by Schellenberg, because Nesmith 
seems to move without explicitly acknowledging so from the idea of archives as an 
aggregation of records to that of the archives as an institution. Nesmith’s argument 
appears to suggest that records are archives simply because they have been placed in 
an archival institution. Jenkinson might have argued the reverse of course, namely 
that they have been placed in an archival institution because they are archives. It is 
the view of the author that Nesmith did not intend to define archives in terms of an 
archival institution, but instead that he used this argument, which is reminiscent of 
the philosopher Arthur Danto’s ‘artworld’ theory of aesthetic value, in an effort to 
highlight the contingent nature of archival value.115 Nesmith did not, for example, 
question the importance of the principle of provenance, but instead he emphasized its 
role in the archival endeavour by suggesting that it should be widened to allow for 
the many ‘societal and intellectual contexts shaping the actions of the people and 
institutions who made and maintained the records […] and the custodial history of 
the records’.116 What is clear is that Nesmith believed that acts of appraisal, 
transmission, preservation and interpretation of records by archivists change their 
values.117 The author argues that this notion of a transformation affecting the value 
of the records can be viewed as analogous to saying that their values as parts change 
as they enter the organic whole of the archives.  
Thus interpreted through the framework of the derived theory, Nesmith’s 
arguments about the values in archives support a theory of archival value as 
formulated in Principle (AV-W). His approach satisfies both components of the 
weak interpretation of the Principle by asserting that records, have no intrinsic value 
but instead their values are variable, changing with every action of the archivist; and 
that it is through the multiple contexts of ‘archivization’ that value is added to the 
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records, contributing to an archival value of the archives ‘on the whole’. In the words 
of Nesmith, ascribing archival value ‘often raises records which were once thought 
quite ordinary to this new special status as “archives”, or […] even […] as archival 
“treasures”’.118 The value of the archives ‘on the whole’, necessarily including the 
value of the records as archives, thus constitutes an archival value that is different 
from the sum of the values of the parts as mere records.  
In 1991, Brien Brothman posited a similar approach to archival appraisal by 
drawing on the work of postmodern theorist Michel Foucault.119 Brothman identified 
the influence that wider society asserted on archival work, and aimed to encourage 
‘broader reflection about the cultural meanings of contemporary archival practice 
and the context within which these take shape and place’.120 Brothman drew 
specifically on Foucault’s ideas about the grouping and ordering of things and 
asserted that: 
archival appraisal […] is not merely a process of value identification 
but of value creation or destruction. It entails more than simply 
identifying archival or historical value that already exists in a 
document before archivists encounter it. As they make decisions 
about […] value, archivists in effect create, initiate or perpetuate an 
axiological commitment which is manifested in the permanence of the 
order that emerges. […] In principle, […] once having been judged to 
have permanent value, the document’s right to a place in the archives 
and society is irrevocable.121 
Again, using the framework of the derived theory we can interpret Brothman’s 
approach to support a conception of archival value as an organic whole consisting (in 
part) of the variable values of its parts, which Brothman identified as the values of 
the records as they evolve with each activity of creation, processing and use. The 
organic whole also comprises the value of the archives ‘on the whole’ which, 
according to Brothman, is established in the varying cultural and social values of the 
‘bounded spaces’ of archival institutions.122 Brothman argued that ‘archival 
institutions, then, embody a social vocation to create a special space in which a 
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certain order of values prevails’.123 Brothman’s reference to the archival institution 
rather than to a concept of an archival aggregation again introduces an element of 
confusion. But he, at least, is clearer on his intended meaning, in stating that such 
institutions ‘embody’ and ‘reflect’ our social and cultural values; as well as 
physically containing the records that constitute archives.124  
The author does not believe that Brothman called into question the idea of 
archival aggregation, namely that archives are constituted by parts such as records, 
but rather, that he identified other components which together constitute the organic 
whole of archives. Archives do not exist in a vacuum and Brothman argued that all 
archival activity is contingent – both influenced by, and influencing, wider society. 
He disputed traditional notions of the archivist as a ‘neutral catalyst’, ‘servant’ or 
‘mere instrument’ and instead asserted the active role taken by the archivist in ‘a 
dynamic of negotiated social and cultural relations’.125 Similarly, archives 
themselves are not ‘culturally transparent’ but are ‘constituents […] within a larger 
historically characterizable structure which both determines and is determined by 
archival practice’.126 The value of the archives ‘on the whole’ comprises the 
changing values of the parts as archives together with the wider social and cultural 
values that are embodied within the activities (for example, selection, cataloguing, 
exhibition) of archival institutions. 
The archival appraisal theories of both Brothman and Nesmith can thus be 
interpreted to support the weak interpretation of the Principle of archival value: 
(AV-W) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have 
an intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and 
(ii) the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
It is perhaps also worth noting that both Nesmith and Brothman would likely argue 
that not only is the value of the part variable, but so too is the value of the whole. 
From the postmodernist perspective which they both adopt, the parts would be 
regarded as subject to constant change irrespective of any membership of the organic 
whole of the archives and the whole itself would not be viewed as having an intrinsic 
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value, but would instead be subject to the same variability of value. Archival value, 
as constituted by each activity of archival creation, processing and use; and the wider 
cultural values reflected by the activities of archival institutions, is ever-evolving and 
variable. 
7.4.2. Analogy with the archival theories of Lawrence Dowler, Theodore R. 
Schellenberg and Terry Eastwood 
 A significant strand of archival appraisal theory has focused on the use of 
archives as a possible measurement of their value. Chapter 2 detailed the long history 
of utilitarian approaches to appraisal that have been particularly prevalent in the US, 
notably through the writings of Philip G. Bauer, Maynard Brichford, Theodore R. 
Schellenberg, Lawrence Dowler and Mark A. Greene.127 For example, Bauer argued 
that ‘Public value in records […] is purely utilitarian. Future utility must appear to be 
probable if continued preservation is to be justified’;128 whilst some forty years later, 
Dowler embraced the idea that the value of archives could be articulated through an 
examination of the use of archives.129 More recently, Greene argued that use was 
‘the only empirical measurement’ of value in archives and as such was a legitimate 
appraisal criterion.130 Canadian archivist Terry Eastwood also highlighted the 
importance of use in appraisal, arguing that rather than possessing a ‘so-called 
intrinsic value’, instead, ‘the document is an enduring entity, its faces to the world as 
many as the uses conceived for it’.131  
This thesis has already discussed how Schellenberg’s archival theory 
identified two different types of use-value: the primary values for which the records 
were created and maintained by the creator, and the secondary values for which the 
records are selected and retained in an archival institution.132 The earlier discussion 
of Schellenberg’s theory in this Chapter raised questions about the difficulty of 
identifying some of these values and also challenged the notion of a constancy of 
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value in records. This led the author to acknowledge that the work of Schellenberg 
cannot be interpreted to fully support the strong interpretation of the Principle of 
archival value (AV-S). Similar limitations can be applied to utilitarian-led 
approaches because, implicitly or explicitly, they each identify the records’ value to 
be instrumental rather than intrinsic in nature: it is value for a purpose, and that 
purpose may change throughout the life of a record. Use-value is potentially subject 
to the vagaries of administrative processes or historical research trends. The value is 
not constant but changes as the record is used variously as a reference tool by its 
creators, or to protect the legal rights of individuals, or for historical research and so 
forth. As such, an utilitarian approach cannot support the strong interpretation of the 
Principle of archival value; but it does appear capable of satisfying the second 
component of the weaker interpretation of the Principle of archival value, namely: 
‘(ii) the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole’.  
 But can utilitarian approaches to archival appraisal satisfy the first 
component of the Principle (AV-W), namely: ‘archives ‘on the whole’ have an 
intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts’? The author believes 
it can, although support for the component is evidenced implicitly rather than 
explicitly in some of the theories discussed. For example, Dowler argued that there is 
a specific relationship between the use of information and the provision of 
information, which determines the value of records and therefore defines archival 
practices.133 Dowler also referred to the ‘value-added processes’ of archival activity 
and the means by which archivists gain physical and intellectual control over the 
archives (i.e. through appraisal, arrangement and description activity).134 The author 
argues that this implies that there is additional value generated from the archival 
activities, similar to Derrida’s notion of ‘archivization’. Archival value can therefore 
be seen as being constituted by a combination of this value and the variable values of 
the parts (the use-values(s) ascribed to the records) of the archives as a whole. 
However, in the case of many of the other utilitarian-based appraisal theories it is 
difficult to draw such analogies. The author suggests that one reason for this is the 
pragmatic emphasis of these approaches which, largely grounded in the US 
manuscript tradition, tended to follow a taxonomic approach to appraising the value 
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of archives.135 This approach necessarily focuses on individual records rather than 
aggregations and generally has a weak conceptual understanding of concepts such as 
fonds or series.136  
The utilitarian-based archival appraisal theory which appears most applicable 
in analogy with the Principle of archival value (AV-W) is that of Eastwood. 
However, Eastwood’s theory of appraisal is not, strictly-speaking, based solely on 
utility but instead combines several quite diverse theoretical aspects. In contrast to 
some of his US counterparts, Eastwood clearly articulated a concept of archives as ‘a 
complex whole, the parts of which are interdependent’.137 He understood archives in 
terms of an aggregation comprising records, where each record has a unique place in 
the structure of the whole, in ‘its position in relation to other documents’.138 
Eastwood also emphasized the importance of the context of a record’s creation in 
understanding the value of the record as part of the archives.139 Yet despite this 
apparent stress on the importance of provenance, Eastwood argued elsewhere that 
provenance cannot form the sole basis of appraisal as it is ‘abstract’ and ‘devoid of 
any ready empirical means of evaluation’.140 In contrast, he argued that the ‘social 
facts of use are determinable expressions of need and therefore of value or 
benefit’.141  
Eastwood’s theory of appraisal also combined other elements; for example, 
in addition to use-value, he placed an emphasis on the importance of records as 
evidence.142 According to Eastwood, the context of the record’s creation is part of 
the value of archives because of the unique character to ‘capture a moment in time, 
fix and freeze it’ which enables archives to serve as ‘an evidential window on the 
action-orientated past’.143 Greene critiqued this aspect of Eastwood’s theory, arguing 
that it suggests an objective definition of ‘archivalness’ that has nothing to do with 
the record’s potential or actual utility, and the author would agree with this 
                                                 
135 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
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critique.144 Eastwood also emphasized the role archives play in memory formation, 
arguing that it is through the selection and preservation of archives that public or 
social memory is made; that the evidence of past actions informs the present in an 
ongoing dialogue.145 So, although Eastwood appeared to support a utility-based 
approach to appraisal, his writings also suggest that use is not the only criteria for 
retaining archives and that considerations as to the evidential character of records 
and their role in forming social memory must also be made. He seemed to assert that 
all of these different elements are what makes records (parts of) archives.  
Eastwood’s multi-faceted approach requires considerable ‘unpicking’ as his 
writing shifts between different theoretical concepts and ideas with little or no 
analysis of how these might relate to each other in a wider conceptual framework. 
The author believes that this stems from Eastwood’s attempt to reconcile the 
positivist idea that archives are ‘objective’ and ‘exist as objects in reality 
independent of thought’146 with postmodern notions about the socially- and 
culturally-dependent nature of records creation. Although the author questions the 
extent to which this attempt is ultimately successful, nonetheless, Eastwood’s 
theories can be interpreted to support the weak interpretation of the Principle of 
archival value:  
(AV-W) Archival value entails that (i) archives ‘on the whole’ have 
an intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts and 
(ii) the value of the part can vary when it enters the whole. 
The first component of the Principle is satisfied because Eastwood’s approach 
identifies a relationship between the records and the activities that led to their 
creation, and a relationship between individual records and the aggregation to which 
they belong, that together contribute to the value of the archives, thus constituting an 
archival value of the archives ‘on the whole’ that is different from the sum of the 
values of the parts. But in order to determine whether his approach can satisfy the 
second component of the Principle, it is necessary to reflect on the two different 
senses by which the second component of the Principle (AV-W) can be understood. 
This is a subtle distinction which stems from the different axiological interpretations 
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of Moore’s Principle of organic unities as exemplified in the work of Dancy and 
Hurka. Dancy’s variabilist interpretation allows for the possibility of change to the 
value of a part upon entering a whole, whereas Hurka’s conditionality interpretation 
can be understood to imply the necessity of change.147  
Using the framework of the derived theory, Eastwood’s approach can be 
understood to identify the parts that contribute value to the organic whole of archives 
to include both a constant value (the evidential character of records which is 
intrinsic; it is determined and fixed within the context of the record’s creation), and a 
variable value (the instrumental value of the records based on their use). Whether 
this approach satisfies the second component of (AV-W) depends on whether the 
expression ‘the value of the part can vary’ entails the possibility of variability as 
argued by Dancy, or whether it entails that the value of the part must vary when it 
enters the whole, as implied by Hurka. If it is understood in a narrow sense to entail 
the necessity of change, then Eastwood’s theory does not satisfy the Principle since it 
includes a non-changing part-value that contributes to the value of the organic whole 
of archives. If, however, the expression ‘the value of the part can vary’ is understood 
in a looser sense, with the term ‘can’ entailing only the possibility of variability, then 
it can be argued that Eastwood’s theory does satisfy the Principle because there is no 
compulsion for a part-value to change when it enters the whole. Therefore the value 
of archives ‘on the whole’ can be constituted by mixed parts: some parts whose 
value is variable and others whose value is constant. 
 As a final point to this section, the admittance of two possible senses of this 
expression can be similarly applied to the archival theories of Schellenberg and 
therefore also makes it possible to demonstrate his support for the weak 
interpretation of the Principle of archival value (AV-W). Earlier in the chapter the 
author detailed how Schellenberg’s definition of archives can be interpreted as 
satisfying the first component of the Principle, namely ‘that archives ‘on the whole’ 
have an intrinsic value different from the sum of the values of its parts’.148 
Schellenberg identified the parts, which contribute value to the organic whole of 
archives, as comprising the primary values of records (reasons for creation) that are 
constant, and the evidential and informational values of records (reasons for 
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preservation) that are variable. Therefore, using the same arguments as above, if the 
second component of the Principle, namely that ‘the value of the part can vary when 
it enters the whole’, is understood to entail the possibility of variability rather than 
the necessity of it, Schellenberg’s theory also satisfies the second component and 
thus can arguably be interpreted to fully support the weak interpretation of the 
Principle of archival value (AV-W). 
7.5. Concluding remarks 
 This chapter has developed and modified the axiological Principle of organic 
unities to the archival context. The application of strong and weak interpretations of 
the Principle has provided a wide framework in which to consider diverse archival 
theories of value. Generally speaking, theories of archival value based on Moore’s 
Principle of organic unities are found to be supported within the archival literature, 
but the means by which they are supported differs greatly depending on the 
particular archival theory. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their shared origins within 
the positivist tradition at the beginning of the twentieth century, Jenkinson’s archival 
theory can be seen as straightforwardly analogous to the axiological theory of 
Moore. Less predictable, perhaps, are the analogies that can be drawn with archival 
theories which are based within the postmodernist paradigm, for example, those of 
Nesmith or Cook, to support the Principle of archival value, albeit in its weaker 
interpretation. Arguably, the framework of the derived theory has enabled a 
consideration of archival theories which, whilst acknowledging the differing 
paradigms in which they are based, can also partially transcend them through re-
interpretation and translation into the author’s language, terminology and ideas as 
used in the derived theory.149 Additionally, the author argues that her exploration of 
the archival theories in this new way has presented a better understanding of some of 
the traditional theorists like Jenkinson, and has suggested that some elements of 
these theories have a continuing resonance today. 
The discussion has reflected on the different types of archival aggregations 
and the varied terminology used to describe them by archival theorists. The chapter 
has demonstrated that part-whole relationships underpin most archival theories of 
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value, even if they are often implied rather than explicitly stated or defined. It has 
also demonstrated that within the part-whole dynamic is a range of possible schemas; 
from physical (and intellectual) bounded structures such as fonds or series which are 
made up of individual records, to more abstract concepts of archival wholes that 
include the activities of creators, archivists and users. In particular, the Principle has 
facilitated an understanding of the organic whole of archives as one which may 
comprise many different sorts of parts that have value(s) that contribute to its 
intrinsic value ‘on the whole’.  
The discussion has also demonstrated support for a theory of archival value 
in which there is something valuable about the make-up of the organic whole and its 
parts that contributes a separate value to the parts and the whole, and thus results in 
the intrinsic value of the organic whole ‘on the whole’; in other words, the value of 
the whole entails more than the value of the sum of its individual parts. This allows a 
more tangible grasp of a concept of value ‘on the whole’, which is often expressed in 
the archival context in purely emotional or instinctual terms; usually along the lines 
that there is something about archives that makes them valuable and worthy of 
preservation, based on elements besides their content or their context, which is yet 
nonetheless seemingly incapable of definition. This concept of archival value also 
indicates the relevance of archival practice and the role played by archivists as 
professional practitioners as contributors to the value of archives. The importance of 
the role of the archivist is explicitly promoted in archival theories that follow in the 
tradition of Jenkinson.150 Arguably, it is also supported in other theories which 
emphasize the evolution of the role of archivist from passive records custodian to 
active records keeper.151 Alan R. Bell presented an articulation of the role of the 
archivist in the face of changing technology and postmodernist theory, arguing that it 
is a role which has been refined, and which: 
acknowledges the centrality and importance of the record to the 
profession, to societies and to communities, and the enduring nature 
of the record as a conceptual construct, whilst recognizing the 
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multiple claims upon records and the need for equal and innovative 
access to them.152 
Arguably, the whole range of professional activities undertaken by the archivist, 
whilst not being the only component, is nonetheless an essential component of 
archival value. In acknowledging the role of wider society in value formation, the 
author believes that there is a danger of negating, or underplaying, the professional 
role of archivists in the process; of proclaiming that ‘archives are valuable’ rather 
than ‘these archives are valuable because of archival recordkeeping’.153 A 
comprehensive view of archival value must include the archivist and archival 
activities (including, for example, appraisal, cataloguing, description and exhibition). 
Archivists, of course, are as influenced by wider socio-cultural factors as are record 
creators and users. In recognizing this, the profession needs be open and transparent 
in understanding and communicating the value of archives.  
The author has identified a lack of rigour in many archival theories, even in 
the work of some archival theorists who are generally perceived as having a 
reputation for precision and thoroughness. In large part, the author believes this is 
due to the difficulty of the subject area and highlights the simplistic approaches 
taken by many in the archival field who have thought it straightforward to identify 
and judge archival value. This thesis has evidenced that the concept of value in 
archives is complicated, demanding and interesting; the author has discovered at first 
hand many of the complex theoretical issues involved and therefore applauds all 
those who have similarly tried to address them. However, a more rigorous approach 
towards the definition and explication of theoretical concepts in this area, and more 
generally in archival theory as a whole, would greatly benefit the archival profession. 
This thesis has shown that archival theory is a legitimate field of study, and the 
development of robust theory in the discipline would support future research.  
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 The next chapter will conclude the thesis by reflecting on the research 
methodology, presenting a summary of the main findings of this study, and 
suggesting areas for further research. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
8.1. Chapter summary 
 This chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting on the research methodology 
and considering the advantages and limitations of the approach. A summary of the 
thesis and its main findings is presented, together with recommendations for further 
research. 
8.2. Reflections on research methodology 
 This thesis employs the research methodology of Theory Derivation, which 
aims to give new insight and explanations for ideas and concepts in one discipline, 
through the application of analogous ideas and concepts in another discipline.1 It is a 
methodology that draws its primary data from the literature of the chosen disciplines. 
This approach has advantages over methodologies that rely on alternative data 
sources, such as surveys or interviews, in that the literature is readily accessible (via 
published books and articles); and it can encompass ideas from several different 
countries and different historical periods. Use of this methodology has allowed the 
researcher to trace the development and evolution of archival theory and axiological 
theory; as well as the links between theories in different times and places.  
 There are, however, disadvantages to this approach: with potentially a huge 
volume of material available to read in the field of interest it was a challenge for the 
researcher to limit the boundaries of her research; a challenge that was even harder in 
the external discipline with which she was less familiar. Her initial expectation that 
identifying relevant literature dealing with value within the archival sphere would be 
straightforward was soon replaced with the realization that she would have to look 
beyond the literature on appraisal and also consider writings about archival 
arrangement and description. Approaching the philosophical literature was a greater 
challenge still as the author had to gain a full understanding of the context of the 
theories of G. E. Moore and the place of his work within the axiological canon. 
 Nursing theorists Walker and Avant identified a danger that researchers using 
Theory Derivation methodology might fail ‘to take into account any dissimilarities 
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or dis-analogies present in the parent theory’.2 This danger became clear to the 
author during her transposition of the axiological Principle of organic unities to the 
archival context and subsequent development of the Principle of archival value and 
consideration of it in an analogy with various theories of value found in the archival 
literature. It became apparent to the author that whilst some archival theories fitted 
well with the Principle, others were less analogous. Rather than dismiss this second 
group of theories as irrelevant, the author instead acknowledged their importance in 
providing other information of use in the development of her ideas; for example in 
thinking about different types of archival aggregation and the concept of an archival 
whole that is comprised of parts other than records. 
 The use of literature as the sole data source raises a question regarding the 
extent to which the ideas and concepts found in published literature are widely 
accepted by practitioners or reflect the realities of practice; and therefore the extent 
to which any findings based on the literature alone can be comprehensively 
applicable. The numbers of individual archivists who are published authors are small 
compared to the total number of practising archivists, thus allowing the potential for 
many different perspectives to exist that never appear in the professional literature. 
The author believes that this is a particular issue within the archival profession where 
beliefs about a disconnect between theory and practice are widespread, and there is a 
tendency for a small group of ‘usual suspects’ to be the dominant proponents of the 
published literature; although this situation is not unique to the archival profession. 
As a practitioner herself the author firmly believes in the co-dependency of theory 
and practice; and argues that the elucidation of the one advances the other. The 
content and direction of this thesis rests on this premise. The author has worked in 
archives and records management for over sixteen years and has gained practice-
based knowledge of the field through attending conferences, reading grey literature, 
undertaking training, attending seminars and professional networking. She has 
brought this wealth of experience to bear on her exploration of the theoretical 
dimensions of archive and recordkeeping. Whilst the main consideration of this 
study has been archival theory, its relationship with archival practice has remained a 
central theme as the author has investigated debates about the relevance and 
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interaction of theory in archival practice.3 The author is in agreement with 
Henttonen’s view that Theory Derivation has provided an interdisciplinary 
framework that has opened up concepts in archival theory, given new insights into 
what records and archives are, and has provided new ideas for discussing them.4 In 
doing so, the author has reflected on the ideas and presuppositions that underpin and 
sustain archival practice. 
8.3. Summary of thesis  
 Chapter 1 set out the primary research questions which this thesis aimed to 
explore, as follows: 
- is there something intrinsically valuable about archives? Does such a thing as 
‘archival value’ exist?; 
- if so, can we define what this value is?; and 
- can we measure it? 
 The author began her exploration of these questions by looking at concepts of 
value articulated within the archival appraisal literature (Chapter 2). She has given a 
chronological account of the development of appraisal theories, focusing on the 
intellectual concepts that support the theories rather than on their practical 
applications, and showing the overlapping developments and links between different 
theories. The account indicated a broadening of appraisal theory from early 
domination by British archivist Sir Hilary Jenkinson, and later US archivist 
Theodore R. Schellenberg, to the admittance of a wide spectrum of different theories 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The impact of developments in 
wider society upon appraisal theory has been noted, particularly through advances in 
technology and the proliferation of digital records; and, at a more theoretical level, 
through the postmodernist shift in critical thinking. For some archivists these 
influential changes necessitated new approaches to appraisal, whilst for others they 
provided an opportunity to re-interpret traditional approaches to fit the new 
paradigms. The author has explored how further impact from new ideas about 
memory, accountability, power, and other phenomena, has continued to shape 
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appraisal theory; and has argued that divisions emerged within the archival 
community as archivists sought solutions to deal with the challenges of twenty-first 
century recordkeeping. These divisions have resulted in a multiplicity of 
perspectives as archivists attempt to reconcile the traditional emphasis on authority 
and control with a newer focus on inclusivity and transparency. 
 The author continued her exploration of archival theories by examining 
theories about arrangement and description and the evaluative judgements they 
entail; from ideas about the implicit role of such activities in revealing value, to the 
notion that such activities explicitly create value (Chapter 3). Again focusing on the 
intellectual basis of the theories, the author examined the principle of provenance 
and considered different interpretations of the principle relating to respect des fonds 
and original order. The chapter introduced the conceptualization of an archival 
aggregation as a fonds and discussed its perceived nature as an organic whole with 
component parts, as well as more recent ideas about the notion of a ‘conceptual 
fonds’. Similar themes emerged as the author traced the impact of modern 
recordkeeping and postmodernist theory on the development of archival arrangement 
and description, with a concomitant shift from the notion of an archival aggregation 
whose boundaries are clearly delineated in relation to the context of its creator, to the 
view that archives are characterized within wider contextual groupings that include 
multiple relationships and perspectives. 
 The author proceeded from the specifics of archival theory to a general 
discussion of some of the dominant discourses that have impacted upon the archival 
profession from the late twentieth century (Chapter 4). The author explored the 
underlying value assumptions of the cultural and heritage sectors and the information 
and records management sectors; and how ideas in these sectors have influenced 
archival thinking about value. The author argued that divergent approaches towards 
recordkeeping have been reinforced by theories in other related disciplines that 
variously emphasize the role of archives as material culture, collective memory, 
catalysts for economic regeneration, legal evidence or information assets. The 
chapter introduced the philosophical concepts of intrinsic value and instrumental 
value as they have been employed by other sectors and transferred into the archival 
discourse. 
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 The broadening of the exploration of value continued as the author moved 
from her primary consideration of archival theory to focus on discussions about 
value in the discipline of philosophy (Chapter 5). The author presented an overview 
of the historical development of axiology (a sub-branch of ethics dealing with the 
question of value) and detailed its key themes. The author posited that although the 
philosophical debate about value has taken place independently of archival theory, 
parallel developments are visible, notably in the growing influence of 
postmodernism and a shift from all-encompassing theories of value to a complex 
web of varied concepts of value that can be combined in multiple ways. The chapter 
presented the predominant philosophical debates about value, centred on several 
inter-connected questions: is value subjective or objective?; is value instrumental or 
intrinsic?; and is value commensurable?. Through an exploration of the dominant 
discourses in axiology, the reader was introduced to the general concepts, language 
and terminology of the philosophy of value. 
 The study identified a parent theory from axiology for use in derivation and 
the next chapter of the thesis discussed this theory in detail (Chapter 6). The author 
outlined her chosen theory, namely Moore’s Principle of organic unities, and 
explained the context of Moore’s work, particularly in connection with definitions of 
parts and wholes, and the concept of an organic whole. The author’s understanding 
of the Principle identified a disproportion between the value of the whole and the 
value of the parts and suggested a compounded value of the organic whole. The 
author detailed critiques of the Principle that were contemporary to the publication of 
Moore’s theory in 1903 and explored how his work was ignored for much of the 
later twentieth century, before being re-considered by twenty-first century 
philosophers. The author explained how the lack of consensus within philosophical 
debate about value has led to two different interpretations of Moore’s Principle: a 
strong interpretation, which emphasized the unchanging nature of the value of the 
parts in combination with the value of the whole; and a weak interpretation, which 
allowed the value of the parts to change when they enter the whole. 
 The author completed the final steps in the Theory Derivation methodology 
by transposing the axiological Principle of organic unities into the archival context, 
with the subsequent development of a Principle of archival value and consideration 
of it in an analogy with various theories of value found in the archival literature 
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(Chapter 7). An exploration of both weak and strong interpretations of the Principle 
of archival value enabled the author to consider the ways in which different archival 
theorists have defined parts and wholes, and the ways in which they have ascribed 
values to them. The author found that the Principle of archival value provided a 
unifying framework in which archival theories that are different in terms of their 
underlying concepts and paradigms could be considered collectively. 
8.4. Reflections on research questions 
8.4.1. Is there something intrinsically valuable about archives? Does such a 
thing as ‘archival value’ exist? 
 The author has explored the various concepts of value found in the archival 
literature, in theories about appraisal and selection in Chapter 2, and in theories 
about arrangement and description in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 she outlined several 
concepts of value that originated in other discourses and which have impacted upon 
and influenced archival thinking about value. Her exploration of the philosophical 
literature and axiological theories of value in Chapters 5 and 6 facilitated a re-
interpretation of archival concepts of value in Chapter 7. The axiological discussion, 
in particular, raised the possibility of multiple concepts of intrinsic value.5 The 
adoption of a Principle of archival value, based on Moore’s Principle of organic 
unities, enabled the author to interpret several archival theories in support of the idea 
that there is something intrinsically valuable about archives by understanding the 
organic whole of archives in terms of a part-whole relationship, which may comprise 
many different sorts of parts that have value(s) that contribute to its intrinsic value 
‘on the whole’.6 The discussion in Chapter 7 suggested that the theories of Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson and Luciana Duranti can be interpreted as identifying a part-whole 
relationship in terms of archives as an aggregation of records (or documents) that 
possess an intrinsic value and whose value remains constant regardless of whether 
they are part of the whole or not.7 The author also suggested that the theories of 
Hans Booms, David Bearman, Terry Cook and Helen Samuels can be interpreted as 
identifying other components within the organic whole of archives that have 
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unchanging intrinsic value (e.g. activities, functions, structures, creators and society) 
and which contribute to an intrinsic value of the archives ‘on the whole’.8  
 Using the framework of the derived theory, the author interpreted the theories 
of Tom Nesmith and Brien Brothman to support a concept of archival value as an 
organic whole consisting of the variable values of its parts (e.g. the values of the 
records as they evolve with each activity of creation, processing and use) and the 
value of the archives ‘on the whole’ (established in the cultural and social values of 
the archival institution).9 The theories of Theodore R. Schellenberg and Terry 
Eastwood were interpreted by the author as supporting a concept of archival value as 
an organic whole consisting of mixed parts (possessing both variable and constant 
values).10 The archival theories of Nesmith, Brothman, Schellenberg and Eastwood 
rely on a different concept of intrinsic value to those of Jenkinson, Duranti, Hans 
Booms, Bearman and Cook.11 By allowing a more flexible conceptualization of 
intrinsic value, this group of theories also support the concept of archival value by 
holding that there is something valuable about the make-up of the organic whole and 
its parts that entails that the value of the whole is more than the mere sum of its 
individual parts.  
 This study leads the author to answer the research questions affirmatively; 
there is something intrinsically valuable about archives (although interpretations of 
‘intrinsic’ vary), and there is such a thing as ‘archival value’. 
8.4.2. Can we define archival value? 
  The study has evidenced the problematic nature of definition within the 
archival literature.12 It has also evidenced the lack of consensus on definitions and 
terminology in the philosophical literature.13 It is therefore unsurprising that the 
definition of archival value has proven to be a complicated matter. Nonetheless, the 
author believes that she has identified a concept of archival value that is capable of 
meaning and explanation. The author has disentangled the abstract ideas which lie 
behind much of the archival theory in order to reach the fundamental basis of the 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 7, sections 7.3.4. and 7.3.5. 
9 See Chapter 7, section 7.4.1. 
10 See Chapter 7, section 7.4.2. 
11 I.e. one that does not depend solely on its internal properties; see Chapter 5. 
12 See Chapter 1, sections 1.2. and 1.4.; Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
13 See Chapter 5; Chapter 6, sections 6.5.2. and 6.5.3. 
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theory. This critical approach is reflected in her own work, as, throughout the thesis, 
the author has been careful to use language consistently, and to explain terminology, 
in an attempt to avoid confusion or misunderstanding. The author has suggested a 
concept of archival value that relies on a part-whole relationship and which holds 
that there is something valuable about the make-up of the organic whole of archives 
and its parts, which entails that the value of the whole ‘on the whole’ is more than 
the sum of its individual parts.14 
 This study leads the author to conclude that whilst a definition of archival 
value is problematic, it is possible to reach an approximate concept of archival value 
that can be understood, if not perfectly defined. 
8.4.3. Can we measure archival value? 
 The author has explored the varied attempts to measure the value in archives; 
for example, in utilitarian terms,15 cultural terms,16 and economic terms.17 She has 
also discussed the philosophical issues surrounding the measurement of value.18 The 
author discovered that, as yet, no definitive answer has been found to the question of 
whether or not value can be measured. The author initially thought that exploring 
this question would be productive, particularly given the volume of literature 
devoted to addressing it in both the axiological and archival disciplines. However, an 
answer remains elusive with comparatively little progress made in either to realize a 
definitive solution. Moreover, the lack of an answer has not prevented progress in 
the research as, by recognizing the difficulty of answering this question, the author 
was able to focus her attention on exploring the other research questions.  
 This study leads the author to conclude that, as yet, there is no definitive 
answer to the question of whether or not value can be measured; and to suggest that 
perhaps it is not the right question to ask for the purposes of progressing research in 
archival value. 
8.5. Reflections on findings 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 7. 
15 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.4. 
16 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.  
17 See Chapter 4, section 4.4. 
18 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.3. 
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 The main findings of this study are as follows: 
8.5.1. The intrinsic value of archives ‘on the whole’ 
 This study has supported a concept of archival value that regards archives as 
an organic whole, comprising many different sorts of parts which have value and that 
may contribute to its intrinsic value ‘on the whole’. This concept asserts that there is 
something valuable about the make-up of the organic whole of archives and its parts 
which is greater than the mere sum of the parts. It is supported by the concept of a 
part-whole relationship which allows a range of possible permutations regarding the 
nature and composition of the whole and its parts, but is necessarily based on the 
premise of added value generated by their relationship(s). 
8.5.2. The complexity of archival value concepts 
 This study has confirmed the centrality of concepts of archival value to a 
wide range of archival activity, including appraisal, arrangement and description. It 
has also shown that these concepts are complex and challenging. The existing 
literature has evidenced that many archivists have falsely assumed that it is 
straightforward to identify and judge value. The resultant simplistic approaches, with 
poorly defined terminology and a lack of critical awareness of underlying 
assumptions, have led to clouded meanings and confused theories. More rigorous 
thinking and greater acknowledgement of the difficulty of the subject would assist 
those who have been brave enough to grapple with it, and would benefit the future 
development of robust archival theory in this area. 
8.5.3. The continuing relevance of ‘traditional’ archival theory 
 Throughout this thesis the author has demonstrated that there has been 
considerable inter-connectedness and cross-fertilization in the development of 
archival theory. In response to the challenges of late twentieth and twenty-first 
century recordkeeping the archival profession has developed multiple theories on 
appraisal, arrangement and description. Yet very few, if any, of these theories are 
entirely new and most owe their development to concepts and principles that were 
laid down at the beginning of the twentieth century or earlier. Despite the many 
changes to the world in which archivists practice – including technological advances 
and the proliferation of digital records, Access to Information legislation, and the 
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growing influence of postmodernism, to name but a few – traditional theories have 
not been abandoned. On the contrary, the twenty-first century continues to witness 
the widening application of archival theories to support archival practice. Sir Hilary 
Jenkinson and Theodore R. Schellenberg may have written about archives nearly one 
hundred years and fifty years ago respectively, but, arguably, aspects of their work 
continue to be of interest and relevance to the continuing development of archival 
theory and practice in the twenty-first century. 
8.5.4. The benefits of an interdisciplinary approach 
 The study of the archival literature has evidenced the impact of ideas and 
theories from other disciplines on archival theory, especially from the late twentieth 
century onwards; including theories about material culture, collective memory, 
public value, risk management, and the nature of information as an asset. Drawing 
on ideas from outside the archival discipline has enriched and broadened its 
theoretical development. The methodology applied in this thesis has supported this 
development by similarly employing ideas from an external discipline (in this case, 
axiology) through a process of analogy to give new insight and explanations for 
phenomena in the archival field. 
8.5.5. The role and relevance of professional archival practice  
 In her exploration of archival value, the author has considered issues 
surrounding how, when, and by whom value is ascribed to archives. A range of 
archival theories of value have been presented; some argue that value resides in the 
records of which archives are comprised, whilst others argue that value is determined 
by those making value judgements, be they creators, archivists or users. The 
Principle of archival value put forward in this thesis can be seen as uniting these 
different perspectives, by understanding the organic whole of archives to comprise 
many different sorts of parts that potentially contribute to its intrinsic value ‘on the 
whole’. It suggests an holistic approach to archives in which content and context are 
regarded as components of a concept of archive value. In her attempt to answer the 
question of whether archival value exists, the author responds in the affirmative and 
contends that archival value can be found ‘somewhere in-between’ the records and 
the valuers, in the network of relationships and activities surrounding both.  
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8.6. Areas for further research 
 In section 8.2, the author acknowledged some of the limitations of the 
approach and methodology applied in this study. In this regard, one potential area for 
further work would be to expand the data used in this study beyond published 
literature to include the thoughts and opinions of a wider range of archival 
practitioners. This could be done through a variety of means including surveys, 
questionnaires and interviews. The expansion of the data would provide a wider 
body of knowledge on which to explore the theories put forward in this thesis. The 
expansion of the research might also include an exploration of the practical 
implications of the theoretical concepts investigated in this thesis. An exploration of 
how the Principle of archival value might work in practical terms would build upon 
the research undertaken by the author and make explicit the interconnection between 
theory and practice.  
 This study identified a particular theory in axiology that the author employed 
through Theory Derivation as a framework to consider archival theories of value. 
The author argues that her study has indicated the centrality of value concepts in 
archival theory (and practice) and that, as a result, a better understanding of value as 
a theoretical concept would greatly benefit the archival profession. The range and 
depth of axiology as a discipline suggests that there are potentially other 
philosophical theories and alternative aspects of axiological theory, which might also 
serve as useful and interesting frameworks in which to explore archival value; for 
example, environmental ethics and aesthetics.  
 Finally, this study has reinforced the benefits of interdisciplinary research. 
Interdisciplinarity has been integral to archival theory development, and its centrality 
to the methodology of Theory Derivation opens up the possibilities for future 
interdisciplinary research. One possible research avenue might be to examine 
analogous theories in mathematics, especially part-whole theory or set theory. By 
bringing together different subjects in innovative ways the researcher has the 
opportunity to explore archival phenomena in a truly creative and reflective manner.  
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